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PREFACE AND ACKN O W LED G EM EN TS
Once again the Department of Political Science, in pursuit of its outreach 
programme, has the pleasure to make available to the general public in 
book form the proceedings of a two-day seminar held at the Christ the 
King Hall in Accra on 2 and 3 July, 1992, on the theme "Political Parties 
and Democracy in the Fourth Republic"; and, as was the case with the 
one held on 21 June, 1991, on Ghana's transition to constitutional rule, the 
seminar was organized in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foun­
dation of Germany. Significantly, that a seminar on such a theme could 
be conceived and organized at all is because the ban on overt party 
political activities had been mercifully, if belatedly, lifted on 18 May 
1992.
The theme was discussed under the following broad heads:
(i) The Constitutional and Legal Basis of Democracy; (ii) Society and 
Political Parties; (iii) Political Parties, Representation and Democracy; 
and (iv) The Institutional Mechanisms of Party Politics. Papers were 
presented by sixteen resource persons including a representative of the 
British government, Mr. Donald Anderson, a Labour Opposition Front 
Bench Spokesman on Africa. For some technical reasons, two of the 
papers could not appear in this volume.
It may be noticed that the present work is, in a significant sense, a 
sequel to our recent publication, Ghana's Transition to Constitutional Rule 
published in 1991. For, although each has a specific focus, both works are 
essentially concerned with the problems and prospects of Ghana's 
transition to constitutional-democratic rule. It is also worth emphasizing 
that the revised papers had already been submitted to the publisher 
before the presidential and parliamentary elections of November and 
December, 1992, respectively; and this is why it was not possible to 
update the material where necessary. Even so we believe that this does 
not detract, to any appreciable degree, from the major thrust and 
significance of the book as a whole. It is our fervent hope that the valuable 
lessons contained in this volume will inspire, warn and guide us in our 
fourth attempt at evolving a free, just and stable pluralist democracy in 
Ghana.
At this juncture, the Department wishes to place on record its debt 
of gratitude to a number of people. These include, first, Prof. D.A. 
Akyeampong, then the Pro - Vice Chancellor, University of Ghana,
vii
Legon, who gave the keynote address in lieu of Prof. G. Benneh, the Vice- 
Chancellor; secondly, the chairmen of the various sessions — Mr. S. Y. 
Bimpong-Buta, Director,GhanaLawSchool,Mr.JusticeGeorgeLamptey, 
Appeal Court Judge, and Prof. G.K. Nukunya, then Head, Department 
of Sociology, now Pro-Vice Chancellor, Legon; thirdly, the seminar 
participants, including representatives of some of the newly formed 
political parties, for their lively and invaluable contributions to the 
discussions; and, fourthly, the Department's secretarial staff — espe­
cially Mr. Godfried Mantey, Ms. Selina Odame and Mr. Daniel Nii Noi, 
for helping with the organization of the seminar and preparing the 
typescripts for this volume.
While very grateful to all these people, the Department in all 
honesty must acknowledge its profoundest gratitude to the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation and its Director in Ghana, Dr. G. Schirra — an 
indefatigable champion of constitutional democracy — ably supported 
by the Programmes Officer, Mr. E. Biriku-Boadu, and other staff mem­
bers. Fully aware of the crucial importance of a healthy and vibrant 
competitive party system for the emergence and thriving of constitu­
tional democracy, Dr. Schirra readily accepted the Department7s pro­
posal for the seminar and then — as he did in 1991 —  successfully 
convinced the Foundation headquarters to provide ample funds for not 
only organizing it but also publishing its proceedings. We have no doubt 
whatsoever that, wherever he will be after his tour of duty in Ghana, he 
will continue to aid the cause of constitutional democracy through such 
contributions as these. In the same vein, the Department is most grateful 
to the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) of the UK for supporting 
the participation of Mr. Donald Anderson.
Finally, we would like to state that the responsibility for the views 
expressed in this volume lies strictly with the individual contributors 
only, and not with the Department of Political Science, the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation nor the publisher.
F.K. DRAH 
K.A. NINSIN 
Department of Political Science 





DEM O CRATIZATIO N  IN BLACK AFRICA  
VIEW ED FROM W ESTM INSTER
Donald Anderson
Introduction
When I was invited to participate in this seminar, I asked myself a 
simple question: "What is it from my background and experience 
that I can contribute?" I am not steeped in the academic literature on 
the subject. I am a journeyman, national politician of some experi­
ence, who counts myself as a friend of Africa and 1 shall speak in that 
light.
I am equipped to give the perspective of a British and European 
Parliamentarian to the dramatic and welcome democratic advance in 
Africa. I hope to have the humility not to parachute into Ghana and give 
prescriptive solutions. Hence this is a personal approach of a busy 
politician unsullied by Foreign Office duties! I stress a "British and 
European Parliamentarian" because British foreign policy will increas­
ingly be influenced by our membership of the evolving European 
Community. The Maastricht Treaty seeks to establish "a common 
foreign and security policy based on co-operation between the member 
states." Such co-operation already exists at all levels. Individual 
member states will be lead countries in respect of states or regions with 
which they have a special interest or expertise, perhaps because of a past 
colonial relationship.
One further word of disclaimer: I see my role as a frank friend. I 
am confident that you will not shoot this messenger from Europe even 
if his message is not always what you wish to hear. It would be wrong 
for Africans immersed in the heady events of their democratic transition, 
to imagine that events here are of constant and deep concern in Europe. 
Later, I shall argue, as I look at events in Africa, from the other end of 
the telescope, that Africa as a whole, for reasons good and bad, slipped 
lower down the agenda of concern and that Africa and its friends must 
struggle and shout much louder than in the past to gain proper attention.
The starting point is undisputably that there is a wave of democra­
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tization in Africa, which is most welcome. There are obviously excep­
tions to the in-coming tideof democracy— Mauritania, La Cote d'Ivoire,1 
Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. Zimbabwe and Zaire are 
marking time. Chad, Liberia, Ethiopia and Somalia give an unclear or 
contrary signal. But the picture is of real progress in the Cape Verde 
Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia and in Benin, Niger, Madagas­
car and Mali. Togo and the Congo exhibit special problems of transition; 
whilst there are real signs of hope in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Kenya, The Gambia, Cameroon, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Burundi, 
Rwanda — and, of course, here in Ghana.
Clearly, these developments predated the "six months that shook 
the world" in 1989, from the free Polish election in June 1989, via the 
opening of the Berlin Wall in November, to the violent overthrow of 
Ceaucescu in December. But events in Africa were influenced and 
accelerated by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of 
the Second Cold War. The evidence for re - dating is charted by Professor 
Samuel Decalo.2 President Bongo of Gabon later spoke of "the wind 
from the east that is shaking the coconut trees,"3 and Decalo exaggerates, 
but has a point, when he writes of the consequent "devaluation" of 
Africa — "African states were transferred from Cold War pawns into 
irrelevant international clutter."41 had personal experience of this on 9 
November, 1989. I was flying overnight from Namibia to the United 
Kingdom, having been an international monitor at the pre- indepen­
dence elections. I had a great story to tell of the peaceful birth of a new 
African democracy. Here was a happy model for all of Southern Africa 
and beyond. Yet, overnight the Western press switched off their interest; 
because that night the Berlin Wall was opened. Western powers are 
quick to respond that no aid has been diverted from Africa to Eastern 
and Central Europe. The truth is that attention across the board has been 
focused there for the past two years or so for understandable reasons of 
interdependence, proximity, more attractive markets and perceived 
danger from refugees and nuclear proliferation.
This process has come on top of a certain irritation with Africa over 
the past decade. Few British newspapers have regular articles on Africa, 
save the traumas of South Africa. The exceptions are the Finaticial Times 
(Michael Holman) and the Independent (Richard Dowden). The latter 
wrote a rather gloomy think-piece inferring that, apart from South 
Africa, the main factor behind the West's attention to Africa was 
humanitarian. This does, however, underline that Africa now has to seek 
attention in a harsher world context and with increased competition.
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There is also the question of aid fatigue and its offshoot: conditionality 
and insistence on "good governance." The World Bank in its Report of 
1989 stated: "... political legitimacy and consensus are a precondition for 
sustainable development.... Underlying the litany of Africa's problems 
is a crisis of governance."5 Douglas Hurd and Lynda Chalker spokeand 
wrote on the same theme in Britain as did President Mitterand to the 
assembled Francophone leaders in France. The Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting (CHOC.M) issued its Harare Declaration last 
October on the theme of democratic principles. (See the House of 
Commons Library Note on Good Government.)
Some of these criticisms were unfair. There were factors such as 
drought and the adverse terms of trade behind the crisis. Europeans 
forget the phenomenon of Hitler and their continental tragedy of 
Yugoslavia. But much could not be blamed on external factors and 
convenient scapegoats such as "neo - colonialism." There was Mengistu. 
There was a decade of mismanagement and decline in the 1980s.
The courtesy of a guest only prevents me from looking at the history of 
Ghana since independence when it had a flying start, and the subsequent 
waste of resources and talent and erosion of civil liberties.
The memory of the misallocation of resources on the continent of 
Africa still poisons the international atmosphere. The recollection of 
false dawns of democratic advance blotted out by subsequent military 
coups, makes W estern opinion slow to recognize and respond to the real 
progress now being made, symbolized by the dignified change of 
government in Zambia. Add to this an increased parochialism among 
Western politicians (fewcurrent British MPs have worked overseas), the 
ending of East-West rivalries, and Africa faces an uphill task.
How, then, can Western countries and politicians work with 
Africans in building democracy on sure and lasting foundations? One 
way, of course, is to seek means of underpinning the economies of the 
African countries. In an interview in New Africa, President Museveni 
stated: "We have postponed elections because of sheer logistical prob­
lems. We don't have paper for school children to write on, let alone 
for voters."6 To discuss this would lead me to consider the terms of 
trade, protectionism and GATT — a fascinating study, but not for this 
chapter. Let us at least agree that without economic recovery on a 
sound and lasting basis, it will be much more difficult for democracy 
to be established, to survive and to prosper. That said, it is true that 
assistance to states in establishing democracies is now high on the 
agenda of international organizations, to the extent that there are
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dangers arising from lack of co-ordination. Let me give examples of 
practical work by organizations of which I have some direct personal 
experience — irrespective of that done directly by governments and 
inter-govemmental organizations.
The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has sent teamsof Parliamentar­
ians to monitor elections. I went to Namibia in 1989. The Conference at 
Yaounde in April was at a most opportune time in that country's 
democratic advance. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy was es­
tablished in March 1992 to provide assistance in building and strength­
ening pluralistic institutions overseas, following consultations between 
the British Government and the British political parties.
The annual budget this year is one million pounds.The Common­
wealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), internationally and the indi­
vidual national branches, help in election monitoring, run seminars and 
courses for Parliamentarians and help by placements in training those 
involved in the machinery of Parliaments. The Parliamentarians for Global 
Action (PGA) established in 1991 a special African task force which, for 
example, visited Togo during the political crises in December 1991 and 
June 1992, when I led the delegation.A WEPAA, founded in 1984 to 
mobilize European Parliamentarians in the struggle against apartheid, 
is now re-focusing its activities to act as a lobby in Europe for African 
(particularly Southern African) development and democratization.
There is a recognition of the danger of over-enthusiastically seek­
ing to transplant Western models into different soils, but there are 
universal principles and aspirations. Sharing experience and providing 
training can only assist the welcome process now under way.
My judgement is that, although opinion in the West has been 
soured by bad images of the past, there is now an increasing recognition 
of the well - based and important progress to wards democracy in Africa. 
The way forward will not always be straight; there will inevitably be 
some reverses, but on the basis of mutual respect, we can share experi­
ences and help those travelling along the road to an ideal goal which is 
always relevant but can never be totally attained.
House of Commons Library Note on Good Government
UK policy on "good government" was first adumbrated in a speech by 
the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, to the Overseas Development 
Institute on 6 June 1990:
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Nobody believes that good govemmentalonecan perform miracles 
where natural resources are inadequate. But too many of Africa's 
resources have been dissipated by war, bad management and in 
some countries, by corruption. Economic success depends to a 
very large extent on effective, honest government and political 
pluralism. (I would add, observance or the rule of law, freer and 
more open economies.)
These are choices for Africans, not for us to make. But aid 
donors can help where the will is there by pro viding assistance and 
training to strengthen legal, financial and other institutions which 
help form the fabric of a healthy society. And they should consider 
potential recipients of aid in the light of certain criteria. Countries 
which tend towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for 
the rule of law, human rights, market principles, should be encour­
aged. Governments which persist witn repressive policies, corrupt 
management, wasteful, discredited economic systems should not 
expect us to support their folly with scarce aid resources which 
could be used better elsewhere.
This is not a doctrine for Africa. There is no justice, no point in 
singularizing, picking out one continent. These are exactly the 
tests which we are applying in Eastern Europe at the present time. 
We want to see these tests more widely accepted not because they 
are Western, but because where they are accepted, they are effec­
tive and beneficial. That is to say, no one has actually found out a 
better set of principles for government and effective policy by 
which to live.
The concept of "good government" was further amplified in an 
article by Lynda Chalker in the Sunday Times of 18 August 1991:
Errant regimes can no longer cloak their authoritarian tendencies 
in Marxist jargon or look to a superpower to bail them out. Not that 
good government necessarily means replicating Westminster- 
style institutions. National traditions and circumstances differ 
radically. I believe "good government" can best be judged by 
reference to three guiaing principles: Sound economic ana social 
policies which allow free rein to market forces. Governments 
should not take on tasks best left to others. Greater prosperity 
should enable poverty, illiteracy and disease to be tackled and 
opportunities to be created for popular participation. Arms spend­
ing should not exceed what is needed for legitimate self-defence. 
The second fundamental is the competence and accountability of 
government institutions. Ineffective policies and corruption can 
J J * r nments are accountable through the
inexperience as well as evil intent. So apart from penalizing 
authoritarian regimes, we should share expertise in areas such as
Bad government can result from
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training civil servants, the organization of political parties and the 
mechanics of running free elections.
The third key aspect of good government must be respect for 
human rights and the rule of law. Entrepreneurs will not start 
businesses, nor outsiders invest, if there is no redress against 
arbitrary confiscation or corruption. These principles are neither 
the sole invention of the West nor the only product of the collapse 
of socialism in Eastern Europe. There has also been a growing 
realization in many developing countries that the key to prosperity 
lies largely in their own hands. No amount of aid or central control 
can produce the investment in productive economic activity on 
which advancement depends.
In Africa, some countries such as Botswana have followed such 
policies since independence. They tend now to be among the most 
prosperous and stable countries on the continent. Not all develop­
ing countries have yet embraced good government with the same 
enthusiasm. Some have set their faces against change. In such 
circumstances our aid cannot be unaffected. We are looking for at 
least a trend towards better government.
It should be noted that at no point does HMG specify that multi­
party ism is an essential component of "good government." Mrs. Chalker 
stated that HMG was to spend 50 million pounds on "good govern­
ment" over the next year. The money will go to areas such as reforming 
the structures of procedures of government, assistance in drafting 
legislation, training for police, customs and civil servants, election 
monitoring, support for the media, human rights groups and other 
NGOs and improving accountancy standards (ODA News Release 63/ 
91, 19 July 1991).
The UK is a party to the Fourth Lome Convention, as signed in 
December 1989 by the states of the European Economic Community and 
the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, which includes all the 
states of Sub-Saharan Africa. In both the preamble and Article Five of 
Chapter One ("Objectives and Principles of Co-operation") the Conven­
tion establishes a clear link between development and human rights. 
The EEC has increasingly explicitly shaped not just its development 
policies but also its aid policies in the context of this link (Africa Confiden­
tial, 20 December 1991).
At the Commonwealth Summit in Harare in October 1991, the UK 
was active in ensuring that issues of democracy and human rights were 
high on the summit agenda. The Harare Declaration of 20 October 1991 
included a pledge that all member-states would "work with renewed
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vigour" to implement the principles embodied in the 1971 Declaration of 
Commonwealth Principles, concentrating especially in the following 
areas:
(i) the protection and promotion of the fundamental political 
values of the Commonwealth:
-  democracy, democratic processes and institutions which 
reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary, just and honest govern­
ment;
-  fundamental human rights, including equal rights and 
opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour, 
creed or political belief;
(ii) equality for women, so that they may exercise their full and 
equal rights;
(iii) provision of universal access to education for the population 
of our countries;
(iv) continuing action to bring about the end of apartheid and the 
establishment of a free, democratic, non-racial and prosper­
ous South Africa;
(v) the promotion of sustainable development and the alleviation 
of poverty in the countries of the Commonwealth through:
-  a stable international economic framework within which 
growth can be achieved;
-  sound economic management recognizing the central 
role of the market economy;
-  effective population policies and programmes;
-  sound management of technological change;
-  the freest possible flow of multilateral trade on terms fair 
and equitable to all, taking account of the special require­
ments of developing countries;
-  an adequate flow of resources from the developed to 
developing countries, and action to alleviate the debt 
burdens of developing countries most in need;
-  the development of human resources, in particular 
through education, training, health, culture, sport, and
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programmes for strengthening family and community sup 
port, paying special attention to the needs of women, youth 
and children;
-  effective and increasing programmes of bilateral and multi­
lateral co-operation aimed at raising living standards;
(vi) extending the benefits of development within a framework 
and respect for human rights;
(vii) the protection of the environment through respect for the 
principles of sustainable development which we enunciated 
atLangkawi;
(viii) action to combat drug trafficking and abuse and communi­
cable diseases;
(ix) help for small Commonwealth states in tackling their particu­
lar economic and security problems;
(x) support of the United Nations and other international institu­
tions in the world's search for peace, disarmament and effec­
tive arms control; and in the promotion of international 
consensus on major global political, economic and social 
issues.
To give weight and effectiveness to our commitments, we intend to 
focus and improve Commonwealth co-operation in these areas. This 
would include strengthening the capacity of the Commonwealth to 
respond to requests from members for assistance in entrenching the 
practices of democracy, accountable administration and the rule of law 
(paras 9 and 10).
The UK has been accused at points of turning a blind eye to the 
misbehaviour of certain Sub-Saharan African signatory-states where 
economic or strategic interests dictate, above all, Kenya and Malawi. For 
most of 1990 and 1991 there appeared to some critics to be a reluctance 
on the part of HMG to use its not inconsiderable leverage to pressure 
President Daniel arap Moi to cease the harassment of his political 
opponents and to restore a multi-party system to Kenya. The US seemed 
much more willing to challenge the Kenyan authorities. But the UK's 
willingness to pressurize such governments appears to have increased
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since the benchmark Harare Declaration. On 25-26 November 1991 the 
UK agreed to a decision at a meeting of the Consultative Group of 
Kenya's aid donors to suspend a decision on future aid to Kenya for six 
months pending moves there towards economic and political reform. 
Within days of this decision, President Moi announced that Kenya 
would return to multi-partyism.
The UK has been accused of a similar reluctance to put pressure on 
Malawi. But the level of UK pressure on President Banda is increasing.
We have already cut our programme aid to Malawi this year from 
ten million pounds to five million pounds because of lack of 
progress on human rights and good government. The Malawi 
fcovemment is aware tnat we will place increasing emphasis on 
adherence to these principles in determining future aid levels. 
(HL Debate Vol. 532 c65W, 20.11.91)7
NOTES
1. La Cote d' I voire now has a semblance of multi-party democracy.
2. S. Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in
Africa." in African Affairs 91,1992, pp. 7-35.
3. President Bongo reported in West Africa, 9 April, 1990.
4. S. Decalo, ibid.., p. 17.
5. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa : From Crisis to Sustaimble Growth . Wash­
ington EXT, 1989, p.34.
6. Neiv Africa, July 1991, p.14.
7. For a discussion of US policy on promoting democracy and human rights
in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Africa Confidential, 6 December,! 991.
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Chapter 2
PO LITICAL PARTIES AND TH E M ACH IN ERY  
OF DEM O CRATIC G OVERN M EN T
Kweku G. Folson
Introduction
Since 1984 the people of Ghana have expressed on three separate 
occasions their preference for a liberal-democratic polity. On the last 
occasion, that is, on 28 April, 1992 they decisively opted for a constitution 
that was crafted to ensure such a polity.1 The Draft Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana. 1992, provides a machinery for running a liberal- 
democratic form of government. The constitution provides for a net­
work of institutions which is a set of checks and balances. The power of 
Parliament to legislate is hedged around with "countervailing powers" 
that are exercised by the National House of Chiefs, the President, the 
Council of State, the Supreme Court and a number of Independent 
Commissions. Similarly, the powers of the President are hedged in with 
countervailing powers belonging to Parliament, the Council of State, a 
host of independent Commissions (including the National Security 
Council) and the Supreme Court. This network has been designed to 
ensure that the main institutions of government will exercise only 
limited powers and in prescribed ways, thus yielding a liberal-demo­
cratic polity. The constitution-makers, however, were not satisfied 
with this arrangement of offices.
In addition, the Preamble to the Constitution also proclaims that 
on adopting the constitution, the constitution-makers affirmed their 
commitment to "freedom, justice ... the principle that all powers of 
Government spring from the sovereign will of the people; The Principle 
of Universal Adult Suffrage; The Rule of Law; and the Protection and 
preservation of fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms." The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore the role political parties in the 
Fourth Republic can play within this machinery to promote the goal 
of democratic government.
There is a dialectical relationship between political institutions 
and human behaviour such that political institutions shape the
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behaviour of those who work them whilst the institutions in their turn 
are shaped by the behaviour of the political actors. This point was 
forcefully made by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. 
Reflecting on representative government in 1861, he wrote:
political institutions (however the proposition may be at times 
ignored) are the work of men; owe their origin ana their whole 
existence to human will. Men did not wake on a summer morning 
and find them sprung up. Neither do they resemble trees, which, 
once planted, 'are aye growing' while men 'are sleeping.' In every 
stage of their existence they are made what they are Dy human 
voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which are made by 
men, they may be either well- or ill- made; judgement and skill may 
have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these. 
And again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure 
have not had it in their power, to give themselves a constitution by the 
tentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose, or as the 
sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation of political 
progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but it aoes not 
prove that what has been found good for others would not have 
been good also for them, and will not be so still when they think fit 
to adopt it.
On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political 
machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be 
worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their 
simple acquiescence, but their active participation; and must be 
adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available. 
This implies three conditions. The people for whom the form of 
government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not 
so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its 
estalishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary 
to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what 
it reauires of them to enable it to fulfil its purposes. The word 'do' 
is to oe understood as including forbearances as well as acts. They 
must be capable of fulfilling the conditions of action, and the 
conditions of self-restraint, wnich are necessary either for keeping 
the established policy in existence, or for enabling it to achieve the 
ends, its condudveness to which forms its recommendation."2
Thus a constitution made to promote democratic government 
will encourage democratic behaviour, but the behaviour of the people 
must also sustain the democratic ethos of the constitution if the 
objective of democratic governance is to be realized. A constitution with 
pronounced undemocratic features cannot promote democratic gover­
nance, and behaviour that runs contrary to the democratic ethos can
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only smother the democratic features of a constitution.
No better way of determining the political behaviour of a people 
exists in the modern world than observing the behaviour of the 
people's political parties; for political parties are the institutions that 
directly link society, social groups and individuals in a natural associa­
tion with government. The manner in which political parties will 
operate the machinery of government provided by the Draft Constitu­
tion 1992 will thus have a lot to do with whether democracy will 
flourish or not in the Fourth Republic.
The Modified Presidential System and Its Possibilities
In broad outline, the machinery provided by the Draft Constitution 1992 
is a modified version of the American system of executive presidency. 
The main modification is the bridge between the executive and the 
legislature provided by the requirements that (i) a majority of Ministers 
must be Members of Parliament3 and (ii) that Parliament can pass a 
vote of censure against Ministers, in which case the President may 
dismiss them.4 These are important variations on the American system 
that offer ample opportunities for both mischief-making and construc­
tive governance. The convention of the American political system 
which keeps the executive and the legislature apart from each other5 
has been found obstructive of good governance, and attempts have been 
made, particularly through the party system, and other dubious meth­
ods, to overcome the separation.
The provision in the Draft Constitution that some of the Ministers 
must come from Parliament provides an opportunity for Ministers to 
interact on a continuous basis with the leaders of the party or parties in 
a majority in Parliament, if the President's party does not have such a 
majority. In a liberal-democratic system of government, political 
parties have many responsibilities to discharge. In both the British-type 
parliamentary system and the American congressional system, parties 
operate at all levels of government. They mobilize voters and opinion in 
a competitive race for or against the government of the day. This they 
do through rallies, campaigns and party conferences, and in Africa 
sometimes by enlisting the support of or taking over, non-political 
organizations such as trade unions, co-operative organizations, youth 
and women's associations and even social clubs.6 The political parties 
are also the principal actors on the parliamentary stage. Finally, they
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control the executive or administrative machinery. In all these spheres 
and at the various levels in the Fourth Republic, the political parties will 
have a heavy responsibility to ensure that the democratic machinery 
works. When party politics started in African countries in the late fifties 
and early sixties, it was not uncommon for political parties engaged in 
competitive bidding for support among the electorate to carry out this 
particular function to the accompaniment of violence. Over the years 
this penchant for violence has decreased, though there are recurring 
situations which are always in danger of regression into violence. At the 
level where violence does occur, it is the supporters and very junior 
officials of the party at the grassroots who are usually involved. In the 
Fourth Republic, it will be the duty of the regional and national officers 
of the parties to keep the temperature of political debate low and to 
restrain their supporters so that the temptation to violence can be held 
in check, and democratic stability encouraged. Experience in the 
Second and Third Republics suggests that, provided there is goodwill 
and there are no inflammable political issues extant, it should be easy to 
maintain at the grassroots level the conditions of democratic stability.
It should also be relatively easy for political parties to maintain the 
conditions of democratic stability on the executive level. Here there is 
no party competition. The executive by its very nature is unitary and 
different parties do not share it at one and the same time; they normally 
alternate in a liberal-democratic system in controlling it. Here, then, all 
that is required of political parties is not to abuse their power. In a liberal- 
democratic political system, it is vital that the administrative machi­
nery of the state remain neutral as between the political parties so that 
any of the parties that wins an election can count on the loyalty of the 
machinery in implementing the party's policies. It is therefore incum­
bent on the party in power not to subvert the loyalties of the officials in 
the administration or to fill the administrative machinery with its 
supporters. This, of course, goes for the party or parties in opposition 
also. The governing party must not have grounds to complain that the 
opposition is subverting the officials in the administration and that it 
cannot be sure its policies are being faithfully executed.
The temptation to subvert the loyalties of public officials is particu­
larly strong for highly ideological parties and parties that tend to see 
society in terms of sharp cleavages. Current political conditions in the 
country and the world generally are not likely to encourage parties to 
develop along such lines and to that extent the forces pushing parties 
into undemocratic practices will be relatively weak in the Fourth
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Republic. It will still be necessary, though, for party leaders to bring 
pressure to bear on the more youthful and radical of their followers to 
ensure that moderation prevails. It takes only one major party to 
embrace an extremist ideology for the whole democratic structure to 
come tumbling down, as happened in Germany in the inter-war period.
Keeping the political temperature cool at the grassroots and keep­
ing hands off public officials will thus be essential if political parties are 
to run the machinery of government in such a way as to promote 
democracy. The parliamentary stage, however, appears to hold the key 
to the maintenance of a democratic machinery of government. It is here 
that government policy is finally hammered into law. It is here also that 
there is a direct and intense clash between parties as they seek to fashion 
society according to their ideal images or to apportion resources to 
interests within society. Moreover the very manner in which legisla­
tures proceed with their business is highly conducive to conflict. Here, 
there are channels which the opposition can use to frustrate the imple­
mentation of government policy and here too are opportunities the 
government can use to muzzle the opposition. Above all, some of the 
most powerful of the party leaders are in the legislature and therefore 
have the opportunity to hammer out consensus on policy before it is 
embodied in legislation.
The political parties in the legislature in the Fourth Republic, if they 
are to promote democracy, will have to co-operate, through "the usual 
channels"7 to ensure that the wheels of legislation and policy-making are 
smooth, that there is cross-fertilization of ideas and that, in this way, 
consensus gains over conflict. By such behaviour, the political parties 
can surely make a powerful contribution to democratic stability. This, 
of course, does not necessarily flow from the mere presence of political 
leaders in Parliament; for in the past, opposition parties in the country 
have had occasion to complain in a way that suggests that the presence 
of Ministers in Parliament did not induce collaboration between the 
government and the opposition. But this only suggests that there are 
other forces which help to shape the behaviour of political parties 
towards one another. What this means is that the presence of opposition 
leaders and Ministers in Parliament presents an opportunity missing 
from the pure executive Presidency for legislature —  executive cross 
fertilization which can be exploited to promote the public good. It is up 
to the parties to take up the opportunity. Few people realize the extent 
to which successful parliamentary democracy depends on the co­
operation between opposing political parties inside the legislature, but
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the maintenance of liberal democracy depends to a great extent on this.
If for one reason or another (say, tribal antipathy or personal 
animosity), the parliamentary leaders of the opposing parties cannot get 
on, Parliament will grind to a halt or obstructive opposition will generate 
incoherent policies. Moreover, the right to pass a vote of censure against 
Ministers could present great temptations. In a pure executive presi­
dency/the farthest Parliament can go in embarrassing the executive is 
to turn down executive proposals made to parliament, or to hold up 
appointments. These measures come to parliament from the President, 
and even if they are defeated the administration can carry on whilst 
modifications are worked out. The one power in this system that can 
be employed by parliament to completely cripple executive action is the 
power to approve the appointment of Ministers. If Parliament refuses 
to approve the appointment of a Minister, to that extent the relevant 
Ministry is crippled. In the modified executive presidency provided for 
in the constitution for the Fourth Republic, a vote of censure against a 
Minister has the same effect politically, if not legally, and where the 
leaders of the parties are not in a mood to co-operate, the whole 
administration could be crippled in this way.
The bridge provided in the Draft Constitution by the presence of 
Ministers in Parliament therefore is either an opportunity the political 
parties can exploit to build confidence between the executive and the 
legislature so as to ensure that executive policy is suffused with the 
thinking of Parliament, thus promoting smooth administration and 
development, or it can be exploited to obstruct the machinery of 
government and thus promote instability.
Conception of Opposition and Behaviour of Political Parties
In early nineteen century British Parliament, before the idea of opposi­
tion had been refined, a leader of the Opposition claimed that it was the 
duty of the Opposition to oppose everything done by the government 
and to turn out the government.8 No Opposition in a Ghana Parliament 
has ever adopted such a crude view of its function. Ghanaian opposi­
tion parties have however often operated on the assumption that it is 
the duty of the government to accept what the Opposition says, and the 
refusal of governments to accept criticisms by the Opposition has led 
to a certain desperation among the Opposition. Such desperation can 
easily lead an opposition party in control of Parliament under the
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Constitution of the Fourth Republic to adopt obstructionist tactics, using 
in part the power to pass votes of censure. It is important, then, for 
opposition parties to understand that in a representative system, it is not 
incumbent upon the government to accept criticisms by the Opposition.
In the cabinet system, a desperate or frustrated Opposition can 
disrupt parliamentary business and thus make it difficult, if not impos­
sible, for the government to govern, as the Irish nationalists demon­
strated in the British Parliament in the 1880s and 1890s. In the final 
analysis, however, the Government in the cabinet system can have its 
way because it has a majority in Parliament. The danger under the 
modified presidential system provided for by the Draft Constitution is 
that the President may not have a majority in parliament, and the 
Opposition, with its majority in parliament, would then have complete 
freedom to totally cripple the government. This suggests that successful 
democratic government under the Fourth Republic will make a special 
demand on the statesmanship of the leaders of political parties in 
parliament; it will place a great premium on the capacity on all sides for 
compromise and on the ability of the government to take criticism 
without construing it into ill-will, lack of patriotism or treason, a 
practice that is all too common on the African continent, and is 
nurtured by a jaundiced perception of aspects of our culture.
A good example of this jaundiced perception of aspects of our 
culture on which modem authoritarianism feeds is the claim that 
there is not a word in any African or Ghanaian language for the English 
word "opposition/' But what is necessary for a modern institution or 
practice to take root in a new society is not the existence of indigenous 
words corresponding in a one-to-one relationship to certain modem 
words, but traditional practices which serve the same purpose as 
particular modem practices. From this perspective, it is false to claim 
that there were no practices in African traditional political systems 
which served the function of a modem opposition. There was in the 
Akan political system an institution which was very similar to an 
"opposition" in a modem liberal-democratic political system. This was 
the institution of Nhvankuxm among the Asante. The expression is 
synonymous with another Akan word mmerante which means 
"youth." Essentially the Nkwankivaa comprised the free citizens who 
were neither members of the chief s council nor "elders." It is because 
of this that Busia called them "commoners."9
The Nkwankioaa constituted an unofficial unit recognized with a 
right to publicly express their opinion on matters concerning the
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society, and this they did through an association of their own. The 
Nkivankivaa even had a recognized leader, the Nkivankivaahene (i.e. 
Nkioankicm chief) whose title was, unlike other ahenfo (chiefs), not a 
hereditary one. He was chosen by the Nkivankwaa themselves for his 
bravery and eloquence and he articulated their views before the elders. 
In essence the position of the Nhvankioaa was that of the opposition in 
a modern liberal-democratic system. It stood outside the chiefs 
government and had the right to criticize it. Indeed it is significant that 
whereas an elder ran the danger of being suspected of disloyalty or 
even treason if he criticized the chief, the Nkivaiihvaahene faced no 
such danger for discharging this function. The elder was part of the 
government, a cabinet Minister, if you like, and had no more right to 
publicly criticize the chief than a modem cabinet minister has to 
criticize his/her Prime Minister. On the other hand, theNkivankivaahene 
stood outside the Government, and had the same right as the modem 
"leader of the Opposition" to marshall public criticism of the Govern­
ment.
In the early part of the century, as the traditional political system 
reeled under the impact of "modern forces," theNhvankwaa be­
came such an effective focus of anti-chief sentiments that the Asante 
Confederacy abolished the institution of Nkivankivaahene. The institu­
tion of Nhmnkivaa was highly developed in Ashanti, but under the 
name of Asafo, it was also to be found among both the Akan and non- 
Akan ethnic groups along the coast. Inability to tolerate criticism or 
opposition cannot therefore be ascribed to the culture nurtured by the 
traditional system of government. The political parties thus face no 
cultural barrier in developing the habits of responsible opposition and 
of acceptance of criticism.
It is crucial, however, to the success of democracy in the Fourth 
Republic to understand that governments come into power in democra­
cies with their own programmes and that they come into power in an 
executive presidency such as is provided for under the Draft Constitu­
tion for a definite period during which they are under a political 
obligation to implement their programme. The government of the day 
may choose to modify its programme only if it is convinced by the 
arguments of the Opposition (a rather rare occurrence), by the turn of 
events, or by a change in public opinion.
But it is no part of democratic theory that the government must 
accept the criticisms of the Opposition; an Opposition that wants the 
government to accept its criticisms and change its policy as a result,
19
must rely for this on a change in public opinion. Opposition criticisms 
must therefore be responsible and well-informed.
An irresponsible and uninformed or ill-informed opposition is 
likely to expose itself as a merely fractious opposition out to discredit the 
government just so that it can gain office and the perquisites that go with 
it. In debates in the legislature an ill-informed opposition is likely to be 
worsted by the Government. On both counts the Opposition is unlikely 
to convince the public to return it to power. It is therefore important that 
the party or parties in opposition keep themselves well-informed if the 
alternation of political parties in power, a practice which keeps the 
hberal-democratic body politic so healthy, is to operate in the Fourth 
Republic. Political parties in opposition can keep themselves well 
informed by having their own research units and policy committees 
into which sympathetic experts are drawn. Even in developed coun­
tries political parties in Government which can indirectly rely on the 
expert services of bureaucrats and technocrats in government find it 
necessary to have such research units and policy committees, for they 
cannot assume ideological affinity with such officials.
Another condition of responsible and effective opposition is a free 
press. Without a press that ferrets out information, especially informa­
tion that is inconvenient to the authorities, the party in opposition is 
bound to miss a lot of information that can give bite and solidity to its 
criticism, and the Government party is also bound to miss a lot of 
information that can make it effective and enlightened. Thus, it will be 
necessary early in the life of the Fourth Republic for the political parties 
to put their heads together to put flesh on the right to information 
guaranteed in theory by the new Constitution. (The Constitution only 
guarantees "the right to... information, subject to such qualifications and 
laws as are necessary in a democratic society.")10 This can be done by 
passing a Freedom of Information Act which will compel officials to 
make available, at least to accredited journalists and bona fide research­
ers, any official information that is not legally and expressly classified as 
being confidential or secret, the Act narrowly defining what is confiden­
tial and what is secret. In this way the constitutional "right to informa­
tion, subject to such qualifications and laws as are necessary in a 
democratic society" can be fleshed out and concretized so that journal­
ists can in practice have access to official information11 without having 
first to genuflect before officials or to subject themselves to threats and 
abuse. It is particularly important that journalists know in concrete 
detail what the 'law s (and) qualifications necessary in a democratic
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society" are.
Another way of ensuring that political parties will be effective, 
particularly in Parliament and in controlling the bureaucracy is via 
specialist committees in Parliament. Largely as a result of our British 
inheritance of cabinet government, we have not (i.e. until the Third 
Republic) made use of specialist committees in Parliament. Because of 
the fear of destroying or diluting cabinet control of policy and the 
collective responsibility of cabinet to Parliament, the British House of 
Commons has relied predominantly on "generalist" committees and 
shied away from specialist or select committees.12 The generalist com­
mittees do not allow the legislature to develop that expert insight into 
administrative processes which it needs to be able to subject executive 
policy to informed and therefore effective criticisms. This is the justifi­
cation of the strictures of the 1968 (Akuffo Addo) Constitutional Com­
mission in respect of the ability of members of modem legislatures to 
cope with legislation:
Legislative work in modem states has tended to increase in volume 
and to cover very complex subjects. Owing to the vast volume of 
legislation that has to be dealt with and the complex nature of the 
subject matter involved, even the most assiduous of legislators 
have found themselves unable to understand most of the legisla­
tion which have to be churned out.13
Up to this point in the history of Ghana, Parliament had satisfied 
itself with generalist committees in carrying out its functions except for 
those committees that related to the internal organization of Parliament 
itself i.e. Public Accounts, Administrative and Rules Committees. The 
1968 Constitutional Commission recommended that in addition to the 
generalist committees, specialist committees should also be appointed 
and given extensive powers to "investigate and inquire into the acti­
vities and administration, (including legislative proposals) of Ministers 
or Departments assigned to them." 14The Commission failed to consider 
the implications of this recommendation for the cabinet system of 
government it recommended. It is not surprising that the 1969 Constitu­
ent Assembly declined to accept this recommendation.15 It was not until 
the 1979 Constitution provided for an executive presidency that Parlia­
ment felt free to set up specialist committees even though such commit­
tees were not mandated by that constitution, and they performed 
admirably the responsibilities of being watch dogs over their ministries. 
The collective responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature for
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executive policy as a whole, which makes specialist committees prob­
lematic, is no part of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. Parliament 
will therefore have every incentive to take up the constitutional power 
to set up specialist committees with extensive powers to undertake "the 
investigation and inquiries into the activities and administration of 
ministries and departments (which) may extend to proposals for legis­
lation." 16 Political parties having representation in the first Parliament 
of the Fourth Republic will do well to set up such committees from the 
very beginning. The committees must have the authority to call for both 
witnesses, examine them on oath or affirmation, and compel production 
of documents. 17 In this way the committees will be able to bring to 
bear on the proceedings of Parliament informed considerations. Parlia­
ment in its turn will be able to scrutinize executive policy more effec­
tively. Policy will gain thereby and so will development. The reputation 
of Parliament is bound to be favourably affected, and stability will 
thereby be promoted.
Political Parties and the Public
Thus far we have argued that political parties need information for 
effective performance of their functions and they need a press with bite 
as well as specialist committees in the legislature for this condition to be 
fulfilled. We have suggested further that political parties themselves 
could help the press to do its work by getting a Freedom of Information 
Act passed early in the life of the Fourth Republic. The press will thereby 
be enabled to ferret out vital information which should enable Parlia­
ment and the political parties generally also to be effective. In the final 
analysis, however, the controlling authority in a liberal-democratic 
polity is the electorate. If the electorate is ill-informed, the political 
parties themselves cannot be encouraged to be well-informed, and 
policy, as laid down either by the legislature or the executive, is bound 
to be inadequate. No doubt this has been at least partly responsible for 
the inappropriate policies which have done Ghana and most African 
countries so much harm. Here the political parties have a peculiar 
responsibility.
In their dealings with the press, they can help it to generate reliable 
information to help raise the standard of knowledge and of the intelli­
gence of the electorate. This they can do by appointing spokesmen on 
various topics whom the press can tap for informed positions of the
22
parlies and specialist contributions to public debate. Such spokesmen 
doubtless have to be members of the party committees in their field. If 
they are members of Parliament they would also have to be members 
of the relevant specialist Parliamentary Committees. In this way politi­
cal parties will lead a creditable campaign of public education, raise the 
tone of public discussion and improve the quality of public policy. The 
demagogue would increasingly be exposed for what he is, and an 
important prop of military ad venturism would thereby be removed. No 
doubt it would be essential to ensure that a political party does not have 
a spokesman on a particular subject for which there is also a parliamen­
tary spokesman and that members of party committees are not substan­
tially different from their party members of the corresponding specia­
list parliamentary committee. Without ensuring this, the larger ques­
tion of the relationship between the party in parliament and the party 
outside would arise. This is a question that has plagued many a 
representative legislature in their early life. Early in the century, the 
question arose in several European countries among "democratic" 
(mostly socialist or labour) parties whether the parties in parliament 
should be answerable to the party outside which worked for their 
election.
In Britain as late as the 1960s, this problem was highlighted by the 
repudiation of the nuclear policy of the Labour Parliamentary Party by 
the Labour conference in 1961. In Ghana it arose in another form in the 
Third Republic when the leader of the Parliamentary Opposition clashed 
with the leader of the whole party, the Popular Front Party (PFP) who 
was not in parliament and the former had to be changed. The basic 
question raised here is whether the party can be said to owe more 
allegiance to the party machinery in the whole country or broadly to the 
electorate itself. When and if this question arises during the Fourth 
Republic, a common sense solution would seem to be best. Both the 
national party machinery and the party inside parliament should be 
responsible to the electorate. The two are not independent of each 
other and cannot act as such. Some machinery must therefore be found 
for the two wings of the party to decide policy issues together. Thus the 
party specialists in parliament and those outside will have to co-operate 
in order partly not to confuse the public and partly to enrich general 
policy. Such co-operation will ensure that when a political party takes 
over the reins of government after an election, there will be people ready 
to take over the Ministries instantly and give informed direction to them.
In their new position, the Ministers may not be in a position to
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relate to the public to the same extent as when they were in opposition. 
Here it would be useful to develop a cadre of public relations officers 
who would liaise with the public and keep it fully informed. The 
President would be well-advised to follow the American practice of 
having spokesmen to liaise with the press. All this would be conducive 
to good policy-making.
A free press is thus essential to responsible opposition. The Draft 
Constitution makes provision for this, and it is incumbent on the poli­
tical parties to ensure that the free press is upheld in the Fourth Republic. 
The press ensures that information about public affairs is in the public 
domain. But it is now becoming increasingly clear that information that 
is kept in official files may be equally or even be more important for 
responsible and well-informed criticisms than information gathered 
from the public at large, and this has given rise to freedom of infor­
mation laws in some countries.
The responsibility of political parties does not end here. If political 
parties exist to serve the electorate, and in pursuit of this they have to 
ensure that journalists have unfettered access to information on public 
matters, then it is surely their duty also to ensure that their internal 
activities as far as possible are not hidden from the public. In parti­
cular, the process of formulation of vital public policy and the election 
of party officers should be open to the public. Here too the public is 
bound to be represented by the media and other political parties; these 
should be in a position to detect and expose shady activities. It should 
not be possible in a democratic polity for a handful of individuals to 
pick a presidential candidate and impose him on a whole party without 
protest from the press and/or other political parties. Such an eventua­
lity would corrupt the Fourth Republic ab initio. . The belief that this is 
how the leadership of the People's National Party (PNP) was chosen 
under the Third Republic did much to undermine the leadership of the 
state and to eventually lead to its overthrow. It would seem to follow 
that political parties should be open to the public. Apart from activites 
which clearly needs confidentiality, all other activites of political parties 
should be open to the public at any rate through the press. All internal 
party elections should be monitored by the press and forums where 
public policies are hammered out should also be monitored by the press.
The Political Parties Law has made it mandatory for the Electoral 
Commission to supervise intra-party elections. The intention behind 
this provision may be praiseworthy; it may be an attempt to ensure that 
openness of political parties that is necessary to an "open" society. But
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it can be an unwelcome intrusion into theaffairs of political parties by the 
state. Though the Electoral Commission is designed by the Constitution 
to be independent of the Government, it is always difficult for institu­
tions sourced by the state to be completely independent of the Govern­
ment since the latter acts most of the time for the former and in any case 
it is the President who appoints members of the Commission, even if 
"in consultation with the Council of State."18 For this and other reasons 
there is a question mark against the independence of the Electoral 
Commission. Only the Chairman of the Commission and his Deputies 
enjoy the conditions of service of the Court of Appeal and the High 
Court respectively, leaving the position of the four other members 
highly exposed. The latter can indeed claim other public offices. I 
would therefore put the onus for ensuring the openness of political 
parties on the parties themselves.
The provision of the Political Parties Law that the Electoral Com­
mission should supervise elections within political parties is, then, at 
best a dubious provision. No doubt it was provided in pursuit of the 
provision of the Draft Constitution 1992 that "the internal organization 
of a political party shall conform to democratic principles." 19 But this 
constitutional provision itself is dubious partly because of the 
ambiguity of the expression "democratic principles" and partly because 
I believe that the operation of "inner party democracy" in this century 
has proved perfectly compatible with the existence of anti-democratic 
oligarchical tendencies within political parties; the "iron law of oligar­
c h / ' enunciated by Robert Michels some eighty years ago has been 
largely borne out by the history of the erstwhile communist party of the 
Soviet Union,20 "the radical revolutionary" parties of the Third World21 
and the works of such scholars as Seymour Martin Lipset22 and Robert 
T. Mckenzie.23 Oligarchies are a mortal enemy of democracy, and 
nothing defeats them more than publicity.
It is worth noting that the informal links previously referred to are 
not confined to political parties in a democratic system of government. 
In a democratic polity there are also informal links, in addition to 
whatever formal ones there may be, between the political parties and 
non-political associations and social groups. There are the interest and 
pressure groups "which provide for the aggregation, articulation and 
transmission of group demands when these demands are made through 
or upon governments."24 Executive policy and parliamentary and 
subordinate legislation affect a range of groups and associations with 
whom policy and legislation need to be discussed in a pluralist demo­
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cracy. Some of these groups and associations are so powerful that 
they may be by-passed only at the risk of instability. There may be, 
there indeed usually are, official committees through which such pow­
erful groups as trade unions, employers' and professional associations, 
students' unions and chiefs may formally be consulted at the stage 
where formal decisions are being made in the governmental 
machinery.
The political parties need to sustain these in the Fourth Republic. 
But long before this stage is reached, ideas are formulated which 
ultimately serve as the basis of policy and legislation. At this stage the 
formal machinery is not of much use, and informal links have to be 
exploited to the full. It is essential therefore that political parties in the 
Fourth Republic develop their informal links with social groups and 
associations as much as possible, for these are the avenues through 
which most of the inputs society as such makes into the political 
system are channelled. In the final analysis a political system exists to 
process the demands of society into policy outputs. This is only a 
technical way of expressing what Edmund Burke said in the eighteenth 
century, that a constitution is a contrivance of the human mind to satisfy 
human wants. Indeed, as Robert McKenzie said more than thirty years 
ago, "pressure groups, taken together, are a far more important channel 
of communication than parties for the transmission of political ideas 
from the mass of the citizenry to their rulers."25 If political stability in the 
Fourth Republic is to have a reasonable chance of survival, the political 
parties must ensure that they are in constant dialogue with these 
interest and pressure groups, using the avenues of informal as well as 
formal links, to ensure that legislation and policies are not simply 
imposed but are the result of genuine consensus.
Political Parties and "Non-Political" Offices
So far the discussion has centred on the more "political" sphere of the 
machinery of government. It has steered clear of the "administrative" 
machinery and the judiciary. In a liberal-democratic system, political 
parties in control of the executive branch of the state do lose elections 
and give way to other parties ever so often. The administration is 
expected to serve whichever party is put in charge of the executive by 
the electorate. For this reason the administration or the public service 
is normally expected to be neutral as between political parties, and the
26
political parties in return are expected not to have links with the public 
service other than what necessarily flows from their control of the 
executive upon winning elections. This is all that the neutrality of the 
civil service boils down to and is completely different from the larger 
question whether the Civil Service is neutral as between classes. But 
this limited position has not always been accepted in this country. 
During the First Republic it was maintained that the civil service should 
not be independent of the party in power and that it had to be 
brought into line with the "socialist aspirations" of the Convention 
People's Party (CPP).26
It must be recognized that Nkrumah was not a believer in liberal- 
democracy, and after 1962 the CPP was wholly antagonistic to the 
ideology.27 Moreover the 1960 constitution was hardly liberal-demo­
cratic. Now the Constitution of the Fourth Republic is thoroughly 
liberal-democratic and seems to beacceptable to all the emerging parties, 
including those in theCPP-PNP tradition. In such a political atmosphere 
it would be going against the grain for any political party to seek to tie 
the Civil Service in particular or the Public Service generally to its 
apron strings either structurally or ideologically.
All political parties need to bear in mind that any attack on the 
political neutrality of the public services, as explained above, would 
constitute an attack on the democratic system of the Fourth Republic. 
And this will be so whether the attack consists of seizure of power to 
appoint and dismiss public servants or indoctrination of public servants, 
for any such attempt would ultimately violate the Constitution.28 There 
is hardly any act permitted by the Constitution which cannot be done 
without first indoctrinating public servants or gaining absolute control 
over the public services. This is a crucial point that needs careful 
exploration, for it is sometimes argued that parliamentary institutions 
cannot be used to implement socialist principles. But to implement 
socialist principles which, for example, constitute an attack on the right 
to private property, it would only be necessary, under the Fourth 
Republic, to amend the constitution as it would be necessary if trade 
unions were to be abolished to facilitate the operations of market 
mechanisms. Thus the Constitution provides a way out of a seeming 
quandary.29 So even a radical socialist party bent on a "revolutionary" 
reconstruction of Ghanaian society need not threaten democratic 
stability in the Fourth Republic, provided it is prepared to submit to the 
considered and expressed opinion of the electorate on matters of funda­
mental social importance.
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It must be admitted that if such a party is not prepared to abide by 
the results of a referendum on a question that touches on the fundamen­
tal democratic rights guaranteed by the Fourth Republic, then the party 
is an anti-democratic one and hence anti-Fourth Republic. The other 
democratic parties will then have an obligation to isolate it, as both the 
communists and the Gaullists were isolated in the Fourth French 
Republic. This argument does not apply to only "revolutionary" attacks 
on the Constitution. Political parties need to be on their guard against 
any general doctrines that are incompatible with theconstitutional order 
of which the Draft Constitution forms the core. The Constitution 
outlaws any attempt "to impose on the people of Ghana a common 
programme or a set of objectives of a religious or political nature,"30 or 
the establishment of a one-party state or any attempt to "suppress the 
lawful political activity" of Ghanaians.31 But it will not be politic to wait 
until a political party reaches fora constitutional instrument of political 
subversion before the other political parties act. As soon as a political 
party bares its unconstitutional or totalitarian teeth in the normal 
political fight, the democratic parties must team up to treat it like a 
pariah, thus denying it the opportunity of translating its ideas into 
executive policy. This will be no attack on the constitutional rights of the 
party under attack. Under the Constitution a political party onlyTias a 
right "to participate in shaping the political will of the people, to 
disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic 
programmes ... and sponsor candidates for elections to any public 
office."32 The Constitution does not guarantee the right to hold office or 
to be in power; that is the prerogative of the electorate, as represented 
by parties in parliament.
In the broadest sense, the judiciary is part of the machinery of 
government since the maintenance of law, order and justice is the first 
responsibility of the State on whose behalf the Government acts. Nev­
ertheless it is inconceivable that any political party that forms the 
government in a liberal-democratic state and hence in the Fourth 
Republic could attempt to either establish its control over the judiciary 
or work out an organic relationship with it.
Control of a political party over the judiciary is one of the marks of 
totalitarian rule which the Constitution of the Fourth Republic is de­
signed to exorcise in the first place, and any attempt to institute it would 
be a signal that the party attempting it has designs on the Constitution 
itself and is eligible for the status of a pariah, thus attracting the stem 
attentions of the other parties as suggested above. The independence
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of the judiciary and its neutrality in political conflicts are vital to the 
maintenance of a liberal-democratic polity. A party that controls the 
judiciary is well on the way to using it as an instrument of political 
conflict; by such control a party acquires a formidable instrument 
to suppress other parties.
The  argument that no party should attempt to control either the 
administrative machinery or the judiciary is only one concrete aspect 
of a general philosophy. Liberal democracy can only survive on the vital 
hypothesis that the machinery of the state is neutral both as between 
parties and as between classes. The latter aspect of the hypothesis is a 
vast topic that would take us far afield. In this chapter we must confine 
ourselves to the neutrality of the state machinery as between political 
parties. Liberal democracy substitutes peaceful resolution of political 
conflicts, however acute they may be, for violent resolution which 
plagued European states before they took to liberal democracy whilst 
at the same time involving the mass of the people in the affairs of state.
Peaceful resolution of social conflicts is not possible unless those 
who are thrown up in the political process can rely on the state machin­
ery to implement the resolution that for the moment is acceptable to 
those in control. To attack the neutrality of the state machinery is thus 
to suggest that some political forces cannot implement their preferred 
resolution of social conflicts, no matter what the verdict of the political 
process is. It is this very claim by Marxists which makes Marxism 
incompatible with liberal democracy. As we have pointed out above, the 
Marxist denial of the neutrality of the state is premised on the irreconcil­
ability of class conflicts. But it is not only the Marxist argument which 
represents a threat to liberal democracy. Every attempt to strip the state 
machinery of its neutrality, whether founded on inordinate ambition, 
short-sightedness or prejudice represents such a threat; and it is incum­
bent on political parties in the Fourth Republic to be on the look-out for 
the signs of attack, whether direct or indirect, on the neutrality of the 
state. The old saying that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance is thus 
particularly germane to the preservation of representative democracy 
in the Fourth Republic.
It must thus be recognized that the demand that is occasionally 
made that the "revolutionary organs" should be retained under the 
Fourth Republican Constitution could pose a problem. No one has so 
far authoritatively identified the revolutionary organs. They may, 
however, be said to be those political organs that either have suppor­
ted the regime that was launched on 31st December 1981 or were called
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into being as part of that regime. Of these the June Fourth Movement 
is the best known, but there are also the New Democratic Movement, 
the People's Revolutionary League of Ghana, the African Youth Com­
mand and the Pan-African Youth Movement. Of the second category of 
revolutionary organs (those called into being as part of the regime), the 
only surviving ones are the Committees for the Defence of the Revolu­
tion (CDRs). One of the distinguishing characteristics of the CDRs, at 
any rate during the period of militancy, i.e., the period, January - 
November 1982, was their hostility to the judiciary. Of late the CDRs 
have been quiescent but that appears to be tactical. There is the 
possibility that they may merge with a political party in the Fourth 
Republic, as the June Four Movement has already done, and press on 
with their hostility to the traditional judiciary. In so far as the rule of 
law is one of the indispensable pillars of the liberal-democratic system, 
such an eventuality would pose a threat to the democratic stability of 
the Fourth Republic. All political parties committed to the liberal- 
democratic system thus have an obligation to avoid harbouring the 
CDRs.
Cries for "continuity7' in the Fourth Republic that are constantly 
being made by certain political forces in the country sometimes seem 
to suggest that the "revolutionary" organs themselves should be re­
tained. This is a call that may or may not destabilize the Fourth Repu­
blic, depending on how the political parties react to them. The Public 
Tribunals are the only part of the state machinery that was called into 
being as a result of the "revolution" of 31st December 1981. The Public 
Tribunals have, however, been incorporated in the regular judiciary. 
Thus, these particular "revolutionary" organs have been retained; and 
since their retention has been done in such a way as not to threaten the 
rule of law, the Regional Tribunals under the Constitution are fully 
subject to the supervision of the Court of Appeal33 and they will not be 
in a position to undermine the liberal-democratic system. The only other 
revolutionary organs left that are or purport to be part of the state 
machinery are the CDRs. Will their retention pose a threat to the poli­
tical system of the Fourth Republic? The CDRs are not in reality part of 
the state machinery; they came into being in January 1982 in response to 
a call by the Chairman of the PNDC for "popular" support for the 31st 
December "Revolution." They have, therefore, provided a basis of 
support for the PNDC and are expected to perform essentially political 
functions such as checking corruption and detecting acts that can 
retard production. They have also been expected to ensure support for
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the regime by "conscientizing" the people in defence of "the Revolu­
tion."
In the Fourth Republic one would expect the Government to rely 
on the regular security services to check corruption and the ordinary 
citizen to detect acts that retard production, thereby leaving only the 
function of conscientizing the people to the CDRs. For all that, however, 
theCDRs are in fact political bodies which should be able to co-exist with 
the Fourth Republic, provided they do not advocate the forcible over­
throw of the Republic or subvert it. If they do not subvert the Fourth 
Republic or advocate its forcible overthrow, it should be legitimate for 
any political party to work with them or even absorb them. The fact that 
they came into existence to defend the 31 st December Revolution should 
not make their continued existence incompatible with democratic stabil­
ity. It is, of course, highly probable that theCDRs will advocate doctrines 
which, if accepted by the public, will undermine the liberal-democratic 
system. But this is a classic dilemma of liberal democracy which can be 
resolved in conformity with the liberal-democratic principle of freedom 
of speech by persuading the public by word and by deed to repudiate 
those doctrines. In the final analysis liberal-democracy can only survive 
by demonstrating its superiority over authoritarianism and dictatorship 
in satisfying the material and spiritual needs of society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, if the CDRs were to advocate such doctrines, it would be 
incumbent upon the political parties committed to liberal democracy to 
shun them, as already advocated. To shun them would encourage the 
public also to repudiate their anti-democratic doctrines.
It is not only the CDRs that constitute a threat to the liberal- 
democratic system of the Fourth Republic. In so far as the "31st 
December Revolution" has had a consistent ideology, (it is hostile to 
liberal-democratic politics, and all the revolutionary organs have shared 
this ideology) it is, to say the least, risky for any political party 
committed to the political system of the Fourth Republic to embrace 
such organs.
The whole question of what to do with these revolutionary organs 
in the Fourth Republic touches fundamentally on the freedom of 
political parties in the Republic. The Draft Constitution forbids compul­
sory membership of a political party or movement. Subject to this 
limitation, political parties are free to develop links with interest and 
pressure groups; and indeed all citizens are guaranteed the right and 
the freedom to form or join political parties of their choice. If political 
parties arise which (whether as a result of merging with revolutionary
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organs or by virtue of their own ideology) turn out to be antagonistic to 
the liberal-democratic political system and in particular to articles 55(16) 
and 56 of the Draft Constitution, such political parties can only be said 
to be dysfunctional to the machinery of government of the Fourth 
Republic, and the country would be thrown back to 1963-66 during 
which the country became a one-party state.
Conclusion
The existence of several political parties per se is not a requirement of 
democracy. What in this respect is a requirement of democracy is 
freedom of speech and association, and the existence of political parties 
is the inevitable consequence of this. It is perfectly possible to have a 
dominant one-party system asa result of the repeated choice of one party 
in free and fair elections by the electorate, as in India and as contemplated 
for the United Kingdom by Samuel H. Beer in the early Sixties.35 Hence 
the Draft Constitution is right in guaranteeing "the right (of Ghanaians) 
to form political parties" and the freedom of parties "to participate in 
shaping the political will of the people....," and forbidding compulsory 
party membership. This properly implies that there may be other 
groups and associations which may also participate in shaping the 
political will. These groups and associations are the interest and 
pressure groups mentioned above. I have suggested above that to create 
a really stable democratic social fabric, it is necessary for both formal and 
informal links to be maintained between political parties and these 
groups. It is through these links that "the political will" of the society is 
shaped in a democratic system. The formal links, I have also suggested, 
come into play at the stage when executive policy is being formulated or 
laws are being enacted. These links are thus vital to democratic stability. 
But perhaps even more vital are the informal links, for these enable the 
groups to make inputs into the formulation of basic ideas and attitudes 
of political parties which underlie much official policy.
In Ghana some of the more important groups with which links have 
to be established are the trade unions, the employers associations, the 
National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS); professional associations, 
youth associations, and religious associations. Of late there have come 
into existence associations of queen mothers which seem intent on 
making inputs into the political system. This innovation should remind 
us that if political parties are to strike roots deep into the Ghanaian 
society, they will have also to think of their links with the more tradi­
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tional sectors of the society. In the past political parties have tended to 
operate mainly in the modem political system, leaving the traditional 
political systems to operate side by side with them and only exploiting 
traditional grievances and levying "taxes" on the political power of 
chiefs. Now that the Draft Constitution has forbidden chiefs to partici­
pate in' partisan politics and the queen mothers are rather asserting 
themselves, it is perhaps time for political parties to strike direct roots 
into the traditional social structures. At the very least, the opportunities 
for cross fertilization that will be opened up are likely to bind the 
traditional and more modem political systems in such a way as to impart 
some of the stability of the traditional system to the more modem 
system. The stability of the modem political system in Africa has been 
at such a discount that no opportunity should be missed for increasing 
its salience.
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While the question of their nature, role and funding remains controver­
sial, political parties have been recognized as part and parcel of the 
foundations and the machinery of constitutional democracy. It was, 
therefore, not surprising that at a time when official attitude to political 
parties was decidedly hostile, a report on the government-sponsored 
forums on the future governance of Ghana was compelled to admit that 
the vast majority of Ghanaians were not opposed to them. That report 
by the National Commission on Democracy (NCD) ensured that, what­
ever the official misgivings about them may be, political parties would 
feature in the machinery established for the governance of the country 
in the Fourth Republic. This chapter discusses the current legislation on 
the formation and operation of political parties.1
Historically, legislation on political parties in Ghana has sought to 
achieve four basic objectives. Firstly and, most importantly, the legisla­
ture has tried to prevent the formation of sectional parties. Thus shortly 
after independence, the Avoidance of Discrimination Act was passed to 
prohibit organizations based on tribal, racial, religious or local affilia­
tions from being formed to contest elections. Given the heterogeneous 
nature of the country, the pursuit of this objective is not surprising, 
though one must admit this particular legislation was later abused. 
Secondly, legislation has been aimed at establishing the machinery and 
the modalities for examining the sources of income of political parties. 
Thirdly, the legislature has sought to control and regulate the powers of 
the parties and to ensure that, as crucial participants in a democratic 
process, they are run along democratic lines. Lastly, legislation has been 
used to keep out of the political process persons deemed to be ineligible 
to hold public office by the governm ent in power. As w e shall see 




Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the rules, it will be helpful, 
at the outset, to draw attention to the relevant sources. The major sources 
of the current rules are (i) the Constitution prepared by the Consultative 
Assembly and approved at referendum by the people in April 1992;
(ii) Public and Political Party Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and 
Eligibility) Law, 1992 (PNDCL 280) requiring the national executive 
members of a political party to declare their assets as a condition for 
being eligible to hold office in the party; (iii) Political Parties Law, 1992, 
(PNDCL 281) as amended by Law 281 being the principal legislation on 
the subject of this paper; (iv) Public Order Decree, 1972 (NRCD 68) in so 
far as it relates to the holding of meetings, rallies, protest marches and 
other demonstrations; (v) Income Tax Decree, 1975 (SMCD 5) as vari­
ously amended, in view of the provisions relating to the declaration of 
assets by principal office holders of political parties and the general rules 
for the financing of the parties to be found in the existing law; and
(vi) Interim National Electoral Commission Law, 1991 (PNDCL 271) 
establishing the Commission (hereinafter referred to as INEC) as the 
principal state organ for the administration of elections and general 
oversight of the electoral process. While this chapter concentrates on the 
Political Parties Law and the Constitutional provisions, references will 
be made to the other sources whenever appropriate.
Constitutional Provisions
The inclusion of rules on the organization and control of political parties 
in constitutional documents is of fairly recent origin. Political parties 
being in substance just social organizations reflecting the exercise by the 
people of their freedom of association, constitution-makers did not feel 
it necessary to single them apart from other politically-oriented volun­
tary associations. By the mid-fifties, however, the fact that the nature of 
their mandate and raison d'etre went beyond that of purely private 
organizations and therefore requiring some regulation within the basic 
law of the land had become accepted. By including provisions relating 
to them in the constitution, political parties were recognized as constitu­
tional organs of state for securing popular input into government. 
Therefore it should not be considered surprising that the 1992 Constitu­
tion contains provisions on political parties. Indeed the 1979 Constitu-
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tion had set the precedent.
The relevant provisions in the 1992 Constitution are Articles 21 (3), 
55, 56 and 248, and we will now consider them seriatim. Clause 3 of 
Article 21 preserves the associational rights of the citizen, including the 
right to form political parties.
The principal provision in the Constitution on the subject, how­
ever, is Article 55. This Article guarantees the right to form political 
parties for the purpose, inter alia, of shaping the political will of the 
people, disseminating information on political ideas and sponsoring 
candidates for election to any public office. The provision requires that 
political parties shall have a national character. Accordingly, parties 
based solely on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional consider­
ations are proscribed. Thus the national executive committee and the 
founding members of a political party must come from all regions. In 
the case of founding members the rule is that there must be at least one 
from each district of the country. At the moment, there are 110 districts. 
Besides, a political party is not allowed to have a name, emblem, colour, 
motto or other symbol that has sectional connotations. Interesting 
questions arise relating to the pursuit of parochial ideologies. But 
perhaps once these are practised through programmes which are 
national in character, they would not fall foul of the Article.
While thus providing for political parties, Article 55, in its clause 10, 
preserves the right of the citizen to participate as an individual both in 
the general political process and in the contest for elections. An interest­
ing provision in this regard is clause 16. This clause provides that a 
member of an organization or interest group shall not, by virtue of such 
membership, be compelled to join a particular political party. An 
example may clarify the purport of this clause. The Trades Union 
Congress executive may choose to align the Congress with a particular 
political party. But it cannot compel the individual union members as 
union members to join that party. One may question whether attempts 
to compel members of certain social groups to join the government- 
sponsored National Democratic Congress are not inconsistent with this 
provision.
Article 55 also requires equal access to the public media for all 
political parties. Finally, non-nationals are not allowed to make financial 
contribution or donation to a political party. Article 56 merits full
quotation. It reads:
Parliament shall have no power to enact a law to establish or
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authorize the establishment of a body or movement with the right 
or power to impose on the people of Ghana a common programme 
or set of objectives of a religious or political nature.
This is an expanded version of provisions in the 1969 and 1979 
Constitutions prohibiting Parliament from establishing a single-party 
state as had been done by Parliament under the Nkrumah regime. It has 
to be remembered, though, that the Nkrumah regime achieved that 
result after receiving the mandate from the people at a referendum as 
prescribed by the 1960 Constitution. By placing the limitation on 
parliament, the framers are hoping obviously to deny the procedural 
means by which a one-party state can be declared even if the people 
approved of it. However, nothing is provided to stop an amendment 
which removes the prohibition on parliament.
What is not clear from the text above is whether a body established 
to educate the citizenry on desirable goals or ideas such as democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law will also fall foul of this provision. 
Indeed, at the moment, we have in existence the NCD established by law 
one of whose objectives is to educate us on democracy and other civic 
issues. Would it have to be disbanded after the Constitution comes into 
force? And if its existence, strictly speaking, is incompatible with the 
Constitution, should we dismantle it no was we make the transition from 
military rule to constitutional government? The key to a proper under­
standing of Article 56 would seem to be in the phrase “with the right or 
power to impose/' It may be argued that a body established to educate 
people does not have the right or pozver to impose the ideas embodied 
in the educational programmes on the people. Ultimately the people 
decide what to do with those ideas to which they have been exposed. 
However, one may note in passing that the history of mankind and 
politics in the Third World shows that it is a short step from believing 
in a set of ideas as desirable to the inclination to take the necessary steps 
to put in place the machinery for realizing those ideas. On that reading, 
the issue raised in this paragraph becomes not so easy to resolve.
Finally, Article 240 excludes political parties from local govern­
ment elections, and candidates in such elections are not allowed to use 
the symbols or machinery of political parties. This is a continuation of 
the no-party philosophy which is central to the local government 
reforms introduced by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
government. While it may have made sense under a military govern­
ment in which party political activity was a crime, the advisability of this
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provision in a constitution that recognizes political parties explicitly and 
guarantees the freedom of association as well is difficult to fathom. 
Besides, a close reading of the constitutional document as a whole and 
a composite view of the complementarity of the different levels of 
government would suggest that this Article would be creating a lot of 
problems for governance in the Fourth Republic. Perhaps other ways 
should have been found to achieve the objective of establishing local 
government units as true autonomous zones by wrenching them from 
the apron-strings of central government which was the basic philosophy 
underpinning the PNDC reforms in this area. As it is, we now have a 
situation where political parties would try to influence local government 
by indirect means, creating a sort of charade. It is the contention of this 
chapter that this unhealthy situation merely creates a fertile area for 
invidious litigation in the Fourth Republic.
The extensive treatment the chapter gives to the provisions of the 
1992 Constitution necessarily compels an examination of the question 
whether that Constitution is at present in force, in view of the fact that, 
later, it will be argued that certain statutory provisions do not accord 
with its letter or spirit. The view of the PNDC government and lawyers 
of the strict constructionist school is that the Constitution will come into 
force in January 1993according to the government7 s declared programme. 
Until then its provisions are of no consequence. This view has the 
support of at least one High Court Judge who used it as a basis for 
declining jurisdiction in a case in which some litigants sought to overturn 
aspects of the electoral laws on the ground of incompatibility with the 
Constitution. Others have argued to the contrary based on the accep­
tance of the document by the people in a referendum, common sense and 
judicial precedent.
Indeed the controversy has produced startling public disagree­
ment among senior judges. This in turn prompted an obviously 
bewildered reader to ask in a letter to one of the daily newspapers the 
age-old question whether constitutional construction depends on some 
neutral principles or the predilections of individual judges.
This chapter supports those who argue that whether the constitu­
tion is in force now is a non-issue. It is a dry legal issue. We should not 
conduct elections using rules which are not compatible with the provi­
sions of the constitution under which the people to be elected would be 
working. The chapter is emboldened in its view by the fact that a booklet 
published by INEC for the public7s guidance treats relevant provisions 
of the Constitution as applicable to its work.
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This section will highlight the main elements in the Political Parties Law, 
1992 (PNDCL 281) in relation to some basic assumptions about political 
parties in contemporary constitutional theory. The treatment will be in 
four sub-divisions namely (a) definition of political parties, (b) general 
provisions, (c) registration rules, (d) financial provisions. The next two 
sections will then be devoted to an examination of the machinery 
established for the administration, control and regulation, and oversight 
of the political parties and the electoral process as well as general issues 
arising from the statutory provisions.
At the outset, we may note here that discussions of the Political 
Parties Law have been haunted by two basic factors. Firstly, the apparent 
lack of neutrality on the part of the PNDC government arising from the 
declared interest and suspicions about the political ambitions of key 
members of the PNDC, including its Chairman. Secondly, the lack of 
consultation with identifiable interests and political groups which re­
flects the irritating philosopher-king attitude and paternalism with 
which the PNDC has run the affairs of state since coming into power on 
31st December, 1992. Thus the fear that the PNDC is trying to be player 
and referee in the political process is one which animates the reactions 
of others to the rules provided for playing the political game. Besides, 
Law 281 has been formulated in a cavalier fashion. It is wide in its sweep 
and range. And its impact on historically recognized rights of the people 
is demonstrably and unduly restrictive. It is as if the government loathes 
the fact that it has been compelled to allow political parties to operate and 
it has decided to make the process so burdensome and expensive as to 
make it unattractive and uninviting.
Definition of a Political Party
The 1992 Constitution does not define a political party though it recog­
nizes the party, unlike the 1979 Constitution which provided a definition 
in its Article 42(7). But section 33 of Law 281 defines a political party in 
more or less the same terms as the 1979 Constitution. Section 33, in 
language which is clearly not exhaustive, defines a political party as:
[including] any free association or organization of persons (whether 
corporate or un-incorporated) one of whose objects is to bring 
about the election of its candidates to public office or to strive for 
power by the electoral process and by this means to control or
Statutory Provisions
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influence the actions of Government.
Thus political parties, by this definition, are differentiated from other 
voluntary social organizations by the fact that they seek to achieve their 
aims through the electoral process. Conversely, a body which does not 
seek to attain its ends through the electoral process is not a political party 
according to this definition. Presumably, this will still be the case even if 
a social organization seeks to influence those who employ the electoral 
process consciously to control or influence government. On this reading, 
it will be interesting to determine whether a religious organization 
which continuously advises its members to vote for a particular candi­
date (whether a member of the organization or not) thereby becomes a 
political party. The point is given added urgency by the fact that section 
7, echoing Article 55(10) of the Constitution, gives every citizen of voting 
age (i.e. 18 years) the right to participate in political activity intended to 
influence the composition and policies of government. Section 7 also 
makes an offence any attempt to suppress this lawful political activity 
of an individual citizen.
Another issue which arises is the suggestion in the definition that 
an un-incorporated body can be a political party. This is because section 
3(3) stipulates that a political party, registered, under Law 281, shall be 
a corporate body with perpetual succession and may sue or be sued in 
its corporate name. This means at the least that an un-incorporated body 
will not qualify to be registered under Law 281 as a political party. There 
is a difficulty here which may have to be resolved by the courts at the 
earliest opportunity, especially since it is an offence to operate as a 
political party without being registered under Law 281.
General Provisions
The Law allows every citizen of voting age to form or join a political party 
for the attainment of lawful ends. The right to form a political party is 
more explicitly stated here than in Article 55(1) & 2 of the Constitution. 
It thus restores the position originally approved by the Consultative 
Assembly but which was curiously changed into a general guarantee in 
the printed version of the Constitution.
As was provided in the Constitution, the Law prohibits sectional 
political parties as well as the use of symbols, slogans and words which 
smack of sectionalism. The rule against sectionalism is violated if the 
membership or leadership of a political party is restricted to members of
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a particular community, region, ethnic group, profession or religious 
faith; the same applies if its structure and mode of operation are not 
national in character.
Under Law 281, a person is not qualified to be a leader, a founding 
member or a member of the executive of a political party if (a) he is not 
qualified to hold a public office, or (b) he is otherwise disqualified from 
being a parliamentarian by reason, for example, of being a chief or 
belonging to the category of public officers debarred from elective office 
by Article 94(3)(b); in addition, such a person must satisfy the assets 
declaration law. A difficulty which arises here is the level of executive 
officials covered. Does this include national, regional, district and other 
levels of executive officials of a political party or is this confined to the 
national executive only? Neither s.33 of Law 281 in its definition of 
"executive officers of a political party" nor section 10 of Law 280 in its 
definition of "principal office holders of a political party" would seem to 
put the matter beyond doubt. Pragmatism would suggest that the 
disability should attach only to the national executive while principle 
will argue for an all-embracing conception. Only practice and time can 
perhaps resolve this issue.
While the 1992 Constitution merely prohibits non-nationals from 
making a contribution or donation to a political party, Law 281 prohibits 
them from membership and holding of any office altogether. These 
limitations on the political rights of aliens within the jurisdiction of the 
country would seem to run counter to the grain of understanding under 
the international human rights instruments in general and in particular 
the jurisprudence under the International Bill of Rights and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, whatever their justifications 
may be.
In line with the 1992 Constitution, under Law 281 the internal 
organization of a political party must be democratic. It is arguably in 
pursuance of this principle that INEC is to supervise the election of the 
regional and national executive officers of the political parties. This 
requirement, which reflects a similar one under the 1969 and 1979 
Constitutions, is to be welcomed. As has been argued elsewhere in this 
chapter, political parties are good for the establishment of a vigorous 
and vital democracy. Their existence exploits the idea that in unity lies 
strength. They ensure that the people are not afraid to defend a 
constitutional democracy by mobilizing them to action. It is thus 
essential for the survival and flourishing of political pluralism in a state 
that political parties are organized, in relation to their own internal set­
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up and practice, in conformity with democratic principles. This will 
bring the additional benefit of helping to mould a democratic culture 
within the society. Three misgivings that may be expressed here relate 
to the role of I NEC in the election of regional and national executive 
officers, the absence of a definition of democracy in either the La w or the 
Constitution and the debarring of chiefs. INEC's role gives the state an 
unnecessarily intrusive responsibility. It is a role that has the seeds to 
embarrass the agency, given its other general oversight responsibilities 
to be considered later. Th ° rule debarring the chiefs places an unjustifi­
able limitation on their freedom of association.
Registration Rules
There is a general requirement of registration for all political parties. The 
registration must be with INEC. In this connection, it is to be noted that 
it is an offence (a) to operate a political party, 0?) to put forward a 
candidate or campaign for votes for a political party, which has not been 
registered. In view of the conditions for registration stipulated in the 
Law, one would have thought that the pre-registration steps necessary 
for satisfying those conditions would be allowed by the Law. This is not 
so. The result is that these aspects of the Law have been honoured more 
in the breach than in the observance and with impunity. The legislature 
here could have taken a leaf from corporate law and practice which 
permits pre-incorporation measures and makes them binding on the 
corporate entity once it comes into existence. Clearly a legal requirement 
which is incapable of compliance with by the most law-abiding citizen 
does a disservice to society, is subversive of respect for law and thus 
undermines the rule of law. It is to be hoped that this aspect of the Law 
will be given an early review.
An application for registration must satisfy the general conditions 
noted earlier in this Section. In addition, it must comply with the specific 
modalities and conditions stipulated in sections 8 to 11 of Law 281. 
Briefly, a political party must have a constitution which is in conformity 
with the 1992 Constitution. The application must be accompanied with 
two copies of the constitution. The party must show evidence that (a) at 
least one of its founding members is ordinarily resident or registered as 
a voter in each of the districts of Ghana; (b) it has branches in all the 
political regions of Ghana; and (c) it is organized in at least two thirds of 
the districts in each region. No doubt, mathematicians will be kept busy.
In its application, a political party must show that its name,
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emblem, colour, motto or other symbol does not offend against the rule 
prohibiting sectionalism nor closely resembles that of the Republic of 
Ghana nor that of a political party in existence or which was in existence 
in the First, Second or Third Republics. On the question of names, it may 
not use a name whose abbreviations are the same as those of a proscribed 
political party. The requirement relating to names, symbols and slogans 
has released the creative talents of Ghanaians as they endeavour to coin 
the acceptable and seems, from the burst of creativity it has engendered, 
not to pose a difficulty for the sponsors of political parties.
Further, a political party must have had its national chairman, 
leader, general secretary, national treasurer and the other members of its 
national executive committee elected under the supervision of INEC in 
accordance with section 17 of Law 281. And it must show that it is not 
otherwise in breach of the Law.
In addition, the application must be accompanied with (a) a list of 
the full names and addresses of at least one founding member from each 
district of Ghana; (b) a full description of its symbols, slogans and 
colours; and (c) the fee prescribed by INEC as well as any other 
reasonable particulars INEC may require. It is obvious that the require­
ments relating to the founding members and the symbols, slogans, etc. 
are intended to underpin the rule prohibiting sectionalism and the 
revival of proscribed political parties.
Registration is a two-stage process. Within seven days of the 
receipt of the application, INEC must issue the party with a provisional 
certificate. INEC will then cause a notice of the application to be 
published in the Gazette.2 This is to enable any person with an objection 
to the application to do so. The objection may concern the p a rt/s  
constitution, name, aims, objects, symbols, slogans or colours. INEC 
itself may commission enquiries to be made relating to any of the 
particulars submitted. The Law provides a thirty-day period for objec­
tions.
At the expiry of thirty days after the publication in the Gazette, 
if there are no objections or such objections as have been raised are dealt 
with by the party and INEC is satisfied that all the registration require­
ments have been complied with, then the party must be registered. A 
party whose application for registration is turned down by INEC may 
apply to the agency to reconsider its decision. If, within fourteen days 
after such an application, the party is still not registered, it can appeal to 
the Court of Appeal whose decision shall be final. There is no time limit 
within which such an appeal may be lodged.
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Once a political party has been registered, INEC must issue it with 
a final certificate. This acts as evidence that all the registration require­
ments have been satisfied by the party.
But there is one important flaw in the Law which can delay the 
process of registration. This is to be found in section 8(2). This subsection 
expects INEC to publish the fact of an application for registration in the 
Gazette only as soon as practicable but seems to leave the determination 
of the practicability to INEC.
Finally section 6(3) is such a curiosity that it merits full quotation. 
It reads:
A political party shall not be registered under this Law unless it has 
on its national executive Committee or secretariat a member ordinarily 
resident or registered as a voter in each region.
It is difficult to determine the rationale for this particular provision. 
Given the fact that there are ten regions, this requirement means that the 
national executive committee will consist at least of ten persons, assum­
ing that the officers are chosen from within that group. In practice this 
is unlikely to be the case. Leaving the national executive committee aside 
for a moment, why is a political party required to have a national 
secretariat with a minimum of ten persons? To put it mildly, this is a 
surprising requirement in a cost-conscious age. Other provisions would 
seem to cater for the legitimate state interest in preventing sectional 
parties.
A key element in the conception of an effective multi-party system 
as the foundation for modem constitutionalism embraces the idea that 
political parties should have proper and adequate economic resources 
for financing their operations, including elections. Legislation should 
thus be designed to assist and encourage political parties to be cost 
effective. They should not be burdened with avoidable administrative 
expenses. This last comment sets the stage for the discussion in the next 
sub-section.
Financial Provisions
By far the most controversial and burdensome of the provisions of Law 
281 are those relating to the finances of the political parties and the 
disclosures required of them. They are also the most intrusive. They 
exceed by far what can justifiably be claimed to arise from the ground
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rules contained in the Constitution. A summary of these requirements 
is necessary if the above opening comments are to be fully appreciated.
Firstly, within sixty days of the issue to it of a final certificate, a 
political party must furnish INEC with the following: (a) a detailed 
declaration of all its assets and expenditures including contributions, 
donations or pledges (in cash or kind) to its initial assets by its founding 
members; (b) the declaration must state the sources of all funds and 
assets; (c) satisfactory evidence of the location of its district, regional and 
national offices, indicating the street, road or avenue as well as the area 
of the location of the premises housing these offices; (d) information on 
the nature of the interest or estate it has acquired in these premises as well 
as the names, addresses and nationalities of their owners; (e) the names, 
titles and addresses of its district, regional, national and constituency 
officers; and (f) the name and address of the auditor approved for it by 
INEC. INEC is to publish this information within 30 days of its receipt 
in the Gazette.
Secondly, every political party must submit a statement of its assets 
and liabilities to INEC within twenty-one days before every public 
election. And forty days after every election in which it has participated, 
it must provide INEC with a detailed statement of expenditure on each 
of its candidates and indicate therein how the money was spent.
All the financial statements and declarations required to be submit­
ted to INEC must be supported by a statutory declaration signed by the 
party's national secretary and national treasurer.
Thirdly, a political party is required to keep the following record at 
its head or national office: (a) a list of members; (b) contributions by 
founding members; (c) a statement of accounts showing sources of its 
funds, names of contributors, membership dues, donations (cash or 
kind) and financial transactions executed through that office; 
(d) properties of the party, indicating time and mode of acquisition 
thereof; and (e) any other particulars required by INEC.
Fourthly, citizens cannot contribute in excess of a sum to be 
determined by INEC in any one year to the coffers of a political party.3 
However, contributions by founding members to the initial assets of the 
party are excluded from this limitation.
Fifthly, no company, partnership, firm or business enterprise can 
contribute in cash or in kind to the funds of a political party. A question 
which arises here is whether it is lawful for such an entity to spend its 
money on its own steam and without reference to a political party but for 
the purpose of canvassing for the election of that party's candidates or
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furthering its objectives. And why not? one may ask. Why should a 
business entity not expend money to support a party whose policies and 
programmes it deems will create a congenial atmosphere for the economy 
in general and business in particular?
Sixthly, no alien can make a contribution or a donation directly or 
indirectly or give a loan to a political party; neither may a political party 
accept such a contribution. But may a business entity give a loan to a 
political party? And may either a business entity or an alien support an 
independent candidate financially?
And lastly, but by no means the least, there is a requirement that the 
accounts of the political party be audited yearly by the auditor approved 
by INEC. A copy of the audited accounts must be filed with INEC, which 
may also order an audit at any time. Further, any person, whether a 
member or not, may inspect the accounts at the offices of INEC and, upon 
the payment of the prescribed fee, take a copy.
Finally, it must be noted that non-compliance with any of these 
obligations outlined above entitles INEC to cancel a political p a rt/s  
registration. However a political party whose registration is so cancelled 
can appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Several issues arise from the above financial provisions. They form 
the subject of the discussion in the next section.
Implications of Financial Provisions4
It is fair to begin our comments here by noting one important truism. 
That is the electoral process is the process which gives birth to the 
government itself in a constitutional democracy. It is therefore crucial 
that political parties as the key players in the electoral process are as free 
and unobstructed as possible. They should in principle not be subjected 
to greater intrusion by the state than other organizations. Legislation 
designed to regulate their operations should both facilitate those opera­
tions and encourage the citizenry, both the timid and the audacious, to 
seek to play an active part in those operations. In a constitutional 
democracy, it must be stated, time and again, that such legislation must 
be aimed at fostering the formation of a vibrant and genuine multi- 
partyism so that political representation in the organs of government 
would be founded on the true will of the people.
The limitations on contributions and the financial and property 
disclosure requirements can be said to be aimed at achieving a number
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of legitimate state objectives. First, the limitations prevent the emer­
gence only of political parties supported by the affluent sections of the 
community. Given the average levels of income of Ghanaian families, 
both rural and urban, the 1 million limitation in any one year may even 
be said to be overly generous and defeatist of the objective.
Secondly, the elimination of the disproportionate influence of 
moneyed and propertied interests on the political process gives a sort of 
boost to the principle of equality and equal opportunity for all citizens 
enshrined in the Constitution.
Thirdly, by deterring the '"buying" of elections and minimizing the 
influence of the large contributor, the legislature hopes to save elective 
public office holders from becoming hostage to those interests. This will 
ensure that the office holders are relatively free to pursue the national 
interest without the fear of the sort of blackmail which could threaten 
their survival.
The objective of the disclosure requirements is presumably the 
belief that by promoting full disclosure of finances and financial trans­
actions of political parties, the purity and open-ness of the electoral 
process will be maintained. The justification here is clearly the govern­
ment interest in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. 
Disclosure, no doubt, is an effective way of revealing the type of political 
support that is sometimes coupled with expectations of special favours 
or rewards. Disclosure also serves an informational purpose. It is 
intended to help the voters to define their candidates more. Here the 
interest being served is the public right to know as much as it can about 
those vying for power in the society.
But comparative law and politics teaches us that limitations on 
political contributions and disclosure requirements need to be carefully 
crafted. Otherwise they have the adverse reverse effect of being invidi­
ous and rather chilling effective citizen participation in the political 
process; and this for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the limitations may well discourage participation by some 
citizens in the political process. Secondly, the limitations affect the 
citizens' important twin political rights of freedom of speech and 
association in ways that are not clearly supportable by a close reading of 
the Constitution's provisions on fundamental human rights. Thirdly, 
they unfairly discriminate against political parties in relation to other 
groups which have the same or even more capacity to impact on the 
government and the political process than political parties. Why, we 
may ask, is the citizen free to contribute limitless amounts to his Church
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groups which in this country have the potential to influence the political 
process at least in the short term more than political parties but be 
limited in what he can give to the party of his choice?
The disclosure requirements may serve the interests noted above 
but there are serious negative sides to this coin which ultimately 
outweigh the benefits. First, quite often contribution to a political party 
is a form of speech ie. symbolic speech. It helps to leave one in no doubt 
as to where a person stands in the political spectrum and what his 
political convictions are. But fear of reprisal may deter contributions, 
especially in a repressive regime like the PNDC.
Freedom may be a hazardous ideal to pursue but the disclosure 
requirements are worse. It is as if political parties are being treated as 
pariahs. They are not.
Thirdly the public's right to know is not absolute. It should never 
be treated so, especially where its exercise will reveal other people's 
private political convictions. It must be carefully balanced against 
privacy rights. As Chief Justice Burger of the US Supreme Court said in 
the case of BUCKLEY v. VALEO, secrecy,like privacy, is not per se 
criminal. Hence one of the greatest pillars of democracy invented in our 
contemporary times has been the secret ballot. In this connection, it must 
be said that the stringent disclosure requirements in Law 281 will have 
the same chilling effect that the abandonment of the secret ballot system 
in Kenya and Nigeria is reported to have had.
Fourthly, for a country making a transition from eleven years of 
military dictatorship to civilian constitutional rule, the administrative 
costs which the requirements saddle political parties with are stagger­
ing. These alone are enough to prevent the formation of small parties to 
prosecute minority interests and unpopular causes. The ultimate aim is 
the creation of a rich and competitive political process. Paradoxically its 
effect will be to give a disproportionate influence to those with money 
who are therefore able to make large contributions to the initial assets of 
a political party. They will put their money only where the chances of 
rewards are real. The Law clearly overplays the feet that political parties 
have public functions within the political process.
Administration of the Political Process
The main agency established for the administration, regulation, control 
and oversight of the political and electoral process in general and
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political parties in particular is the Interim National Electoral Commis­
sion (INEC). It was created by Law 271. But to determine the full 
extent of its powers, we have to read Laws 271 and 281 together. It 
has a potential membership of eleven persons, all of them to be ap­
pointed by the PNDC. Again the issue of neutrality and independence 
arises here. How can an agency whose members are appointed by the 
PNDC in its sole discretion and without reference to any other author­
ity be impartial and independent of the PNDC which is sponsoring 
a political party and whose Chairman's political ambition, a common 
secret? It must be noted here that in the 1992 Constitution, although 
the members of the Electoral Commission are to be appointed by the 
President, he is required to act on the advice of the Council of State, 
a formulation which binds him to the advice proffered by the Council 
of State. In the transitional period, an acceptable compromise would 
have been for the PNDC to consult with other political groupings or 
even the Consultative Assembly which formulated the Constitution. 
But this was not done.
Be that as it may, INEC is the authority responsible for registering 
political parties under Law 281. For this purpose, it has extensive rule- 
making, enforcement, investigative and adjudicating powers. But it 
is not the final arbiter in the matters over which it presides. For its 
decisions are appealable to the Court of Appeal in all cases. In relation 
to its decision to cancel the registration of a political party, it may even 
be argued, from the language of section 16 of Law 281 as compared 
with section 12, that there is a further appeal possible to the Supreme 
Court.
INEC also serves as the national clearing-house for information 
on elections and political parties. For it is the principal repository of 
the numerous reports, statements and declarations which political 
parties are required to file in respect of their sponsors, officials, mem­
bers and finances. It thus has record-keeping and disclosure functions 
as well. It is given the power to make these records available to the 
public.
When INEC prohibits a political party, Law 281 gives the Attor­
ney-General power to apply to the High Court for the winding up, 
dissolution and disposal of that party's assets, rights and liabilities as 
appear to the Court just and equitable.
The initial indications are that INEC is going to have a rocky ride. 
But some of its members, especially the Chairman, have exhibited 
commendable capacity to be independent of government. Commend­
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able too is INEC's willingness to consult with the emerging political 
groupings and forces to deal with the Issues arising from the draconian 
legislation that it is operating under. One only hopes that INEC 
members will soon get over the temptation to make too many public 
speeches, some of which even betray a lack of proper appreciation of 
the legislation the agency is operating under.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the current legislation on political parties 
provides a comprehensive but oppressive code of rules defining politi­
cal parties, their constitutional role and legal principles relating to their 
internal organization and governance. It also establishes the legal rights 
and duties of individual party members as well as the general public. 
The chapter argues further that the legislation is too intrusive, errs too 
much in favour of a misguided view of the public interest. In the end it 
creates a stranglehold over political parties which can ultimately be 
dysfunctional to the political process. Some of the observations made 
in here have been made by others in the public media. A government 
responsive to the views of the people would have by now set in motion 
a major review of the rules. Given the philosopher-king attitude of the 
PNDC, however, this type of sensitivity is perhaps too much to expect. 
We hope and pray that the baby which the current unsatisfactory 
legislation delivers is able to sustain democracy in the Fourth Republic.
NOTES
1. Legislation is used liberally in this chapter to refer compendiously to
statutory provisions as well as relevant parts of the Constitu­
tion adopted in a referendum in April, 1992.
2. INEC may also publish information required to be published in the
Gazette, in the national daily newspapers, on the radio and 
National Television.
3. At the time of writing this chapter, INEC had fixed the ceiling at tfl
million - see PNDCL 283.
4. See generally the discussion in the following cases:
-  Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 US 290 
(1981);
-  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US1;
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-  National Citizens Coalition and Colin Brown v. Attorney- 
General, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, reported in 
McWhinney. Supreme Courts and Judicial Law-Making: Constitu­
tional Tribunals and Constitutional Review. (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1986) pp.19-208;
-  See also German electoral law controversies discussed therein 
at pp.l 94-208.
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We live in exciting times. The fall of the Berlin Wall is now part of history. 
The two Germanies have united. And the bankruptcy of communism 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is now clearly beyond 
redemption. It is not, perhaps, that communism as an intellectual ideal 
has no more appeal. Rather communism as a framework for satisfying 
the complex needs of human beings has lost its legitimacy. So has been 
its economic twin of central control of the national economy. Though the 
transition in the political field from communism to constitutional de­
mocracy and, in the economic field, from central control to market forces 
is by no means out of the woods yet, truly may we say with Francis 
Fukuyama that one epoch of human history has come to an end.1
The democratization wave has not passed us by here in Ghana. 
External and internal factors have ensured that, whatever the personal 
ambivalence of the Chairman of the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) may be, personal autocratic rule will give way to 
pluralist democracy. The military factor remains an unknown quantity 
in all these calculations but that reflects more nervousness about the 
ambitions of the PNDC Chairman than fears about the ambitions of the 
armed forces as an institution.
This chapter examines the framework which has been devised for 
the democratic game in the Fourth Republic. But before looking at the 
structures and ideas on which our democracy in the Fourth Republic is 
founded, a few preliminary observations are necessary.
Constitutional Democracy
W ithout attempting a comprehensive definition of the term "demoracy," 
it may be stated at the outset that, from a close study of the process of 
transition to the Fourth Republic, what we want is not just democracy
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but constitutional democracy. Democracy, as a concept, basically connotes 
government by the will and consent of a sovereign people. There are 
structures and mechanisms for the distillation of the will of the people. 
And because the people are a dynamic force, the system provides for 
periodic renewal of their consent. The opportunity for periodic renewal 
of the mandate of the people makes democracy su perior to other systems 
of governance for the simple reason that it provides an internal self­
correction mechanism. But democracy means more than the undiffer­
entiated will of the majority of the people.
In our contemporary society, it means constitutional democracy. 
That is, the system of government in which the power-wielders are 
subject to clearly defined and pre-determined rules which place appro­
priate brakes on the aggrandizing nature of power. Constitutional 
democracy ensures that minority interests are safeguarded. And it 
keeps open the processes which permit the formation, in the polity, of 
majorities according to different issues.
Our decision to go for constitutional democracy is good for one 
important reason, namely, the heterogeneous nature of our society. An 
examination of the demographic profile of the Ghanaian society shows 
that the pure application of the democratic principle, for instance, of one 
person one vote will always produce a government which is unrepre­
sentative of the major ethnic interests and whose legitimacy will, there­
fore, be constantly subjected to attack. By constitutionalizing our 
government, we are enabled to compel the formation of political alli­
ances across ethnic lines and other sectional interests.
But constitutional democracy is a difficult system because of its 
reliance on deliberation and its positive utilization of dissent and 
opposition. It flourishes only if there exists within the ethos of the society 
belief in the idea that power and its exercise should be subject to 
limitations. Fortunately for us, our traditional political systems are 
founded on this belief. It is part of our cultures. The acute student of our 
chieftaincy systems will realize that, even though access to the highest 
political office (that of the chief) is based on the hereditary principle, our 
traditional political leaders who pretend to tyrannical power do not last. 
This point bears reminding ourselves of as we move from a period which 
glorified the aggressive use of power based on an extreme positivistic 
view of law.
Given its complexity, it is not surprising that some in even the most 
advanced democracies are not always able to keep the faith. I will like 
to refer to two recent matters to drive this point home. The first relates
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to the Danish vote on the Maastricht treaty. By a slim majority, Danish 
voters rejected that treaty which is designed to foster greater union of the 
European Community nations. An important principle on which the 
treaty was negotiated was that of unanimity. Strictly speaking, there­
fore, the Danish rejection scuppered the process. And yet there have 
been suggestions from other parts of the community, including Britain's 
John Major, that the results of the Danish vote would not lead to a re­
negotiation of the treaty. Secondly, in the June 15 issue of the American 
weekly magazine, Newsweek there is a feature article on Ghana. The 
writer all but states that the prospect of democracy for Ghana is bad news 
for the World Bank-sponsored economic strategy pursued by thePNDC. 
The writer fails to note that the absence of genuine open debate about the 
structural adjustment programme has resulted in a lukewarm attitude 
on the part of the populace, visible signs of progress notwithstanding. 
This in turn has denied the programme the local productivity and 
initiative needed to solidify its gains. Well indeed might it be said that 
for some Western capitalist interests dictatorship in the third world is a 
friend while democracy is an enemy. This attitude is unfortunate. For 
society's tried and tested way of instituting enduring development has 
been through the democratization and taming of its politics and politi­
cians.
The machinery of constitutional government is expensive. Just 
think of the monies spent on elections, referendums, peoples' initiatives, 
parliaments, etc. It requires a literate and well informed citizenry, 
actively participating in the process. For it is not a game for just 
professional politicians and intellectuals. This need gives additional 
importance to education at all levels of the society. But it need not be 
foolishly expensive.
Constitutional democracy requires agreement on the major ground 
rules (at least some of them), hence a formal constitutional document has 
been found to be a good and indispensable midwife. But the proper 
functioning of the document depends in turn on the existence of a bold, 
competent and far-sighted judiciary able to operate as the conscience of 
the people — a sort of continuing consultative assembly: the kind of 
judicial statesmanship exhibited by Chief Justice Marshall of the US 
Supreme Court in the famous case of MARBURY v. MADISON.2 It bears 
reminding ourselves of this fact as we make the transition from a decade 
of military dictatorship in which the judiciary have lost practice and 
individual judges in any case may have been chosen more for their 
inability to hurt the dictatorship than for being able to take a long term
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view of the society's values.
In a constitutional democracy, the opposition is a respectable part 
of government. The campaign to unseat the government does not end 
with the elections. Rather the campaign to win the minds and hearts of 
the electorate at the next election begins immediately with the post 
mortem. In this respect, we may run into a cultural block. Under our 
traditional constitutional systems, open campaign and opposition would 
seem to end with the selection and enstoolment of one of the contestants.
Ultimately, then, it can be said that the key elements of a constitu­
tional democracy are the rule of law, government by consent, separation 
of powers or the absence of an accumulation of power in one person or 
body of persons, judicial review and human rights —  a marvel of 
compromise and balance. Let us now examine the 1992 Constitution in 
the light of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs.
The 1992 Constitution
On April 28,1992, the people approved the 1992 Constitution at a nation­
wide referendum. The document which provides the framework for 
democracy in the Fourth Republic was the work of a Consultative 
Assembly instituted by the PNDC. The Consultative Assembly7s work 
was based on the earlier constitutional documents of 1957,1960,1969 
and 1979 as well as the report of the Committee of Experts appointed by 
the PNDC to formulate a draft. While the document contains some new 
and interesting ideas, a casual reading of it reveals that it substantially 
reflects the 1979 Constitution. The Constitution comes into force on 7 
January, 1993.
The Constitution provides for the traditional triad of the executive, 
legislative and judicial organs of state. But new centres of power 
expressly provided for in Ghanaian constitutions since 1969 have been 
retained. This refers to political parties and buffer institutions such as the 
Council of State, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman now re­
named the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice.
The structural arrangements of the Constitution contain elements 
of both the parliamentary and presidential systems of government. 
Thus though the President is not answerable to Parliament, yet he is 
required to select the majority of his ministers from Parliament. The 
parliamentarians appointed as ministers by the President retain their 
seats in Parliament. Further, questions of what other kinds of paid work
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a minister is able to engage in are to be resolved curiously not by the 
President but by the Speaker of Parliament, even for those ministers 
chosen from outside Parliament.
The relationship envisaged between the legislature and the execu­
tive under the constitutional arrangements betray the deep-rooted grip 
which the parliamentary system has had on the political psyche of 
Ghanaians. The requirement that the majority of ministers should be 
parliamentarians carries with it some dangers. Prof. Folson, in his 
chapter, has discussed some of the benefits and dangers of this arrange­
ment. In addition, two more potential dangers may be noted. First, there 
is the question of the additional cost to the nation of the governmental 
machinery if it is decided to appoint parliamentary secretaries to assist 
those ministers with their constituency work. Secondly, unless good 
sense prevails, unhealthy rivalry may develop between those ministers 
who are parliamentarians and those who are not. This is not an idle 
observation if we take into consideration the rivalry which has devel­
oped in the District Assemblies between appointed and elected mem­
bers. The adverse consequences of such rivalry and the retardation of 
government business which it will give rise to can only give constitu­
tional government a bad name. I take the view that whatever the benefits 
may be, the arrangement under the 1979 Constitution by which there 
was strict separation of personnel between the legislature and the 
executive but with mutual access given to the members of both institu­
tions was superior to the present arrangements.
In two areas, the PNDC has clearly got its way. First is the 
integration of certain levels of the public tribunal system into the pre-31 st 
December 1981 judicial system provided for in Chapter Eleven of the 
Constitution; second is the provision debarring political parties from 
local government elections. Whether this will be good for democracy in 
the Fourth Republic only time can tell.3
There is some confusion in functions under the Constitution. The 
responsibilities given to the Commission for Human Rights and Admin­
istrative Justice and the National Commission for Civic Education may 
be cited in this connection. Further the respective roles of the Commis­
sion for Human Rights and Justice and the High Court with respect to the 
protection of human rights have not been defined with sufficient clarity. 
Besides, one is not sure about the advisability of establishing the 
National Commission for Civic Education. There are not enough 
safeguards in the Constitution to prevent it from being manipulated and 
used as an ideological tool by the government in power. This institution
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clearly contains the seeds for undermining the rationale behind Article 
56 which prohibits Parliament from establishing a movement with the 
right or power to impose a common programme, or a set of objectives of 
a religious or political nature on the people of Ghana.
By far the biggest problem Is whether the Courts, especially the 
Superior Courts, will be able to play their role as constitutional arbiters 
in the Fourth Republic. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, constitu­
tional democracy will flourish in the Fourth Republic only if our judges 
using the power of judicial review under the 1992 Constitution do their 
work conscientiously. The early signs do not give one much to hope for.
First, it took a High Court judge ten days to decide whether he had 
jurisdiction in an important public law litigation. Then the judge 
decided that he had no jurisdiction in a matter in which it was alleged by 
one side that the rules relating to an important element in the political 
process, namely, the formation of political parties, were unfair. The 
decision of the High Court judge in this case must have come as a shock 
to all who have been brought up to know that, in the common law 
tradition, the High Court of Justice always has in addition to its statutory 
powers, inherent jurisdiction to do justice. Secondly, in the trial of the 
journalist, George Naykene, the Circuit Court judge failed to appreciate 
and therefore to consider the public law implications of thecriminal libel 
charge brought against the accused. The implications and effect of his 
decision on the societal interest in freedom of speech and of the press 
seemed completely lost on the learned judge. As a result, in a matter in 
which the inadequacy of a civil action for damages by those who felt 
defamed by the offending publication was not demonstrated at all, a 
journalist was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. In a consti­
tutional democracy, it behoves the judiciary to constantly keep in mind 
the fact that every aspect of the law has constitutional implications in the 
short or long term for the society.
There are three other matters which are worth discussing as we 
contemplate the fortunes of constitutional democracy under the 1992 
Constitution in the Fourth Republic. The first relates to the legitimacy of 
the Constitution itself. As noted earlier, the principal architect of the 
Constitution lias been the Consultative Assembly established by the 
PNDC. Candour will make us admit that there are many Ghanaians 
who were suspicious of the motives of the PNDC at the beginning and 
who therefore did not participate in the work of the Assembly. Though 
the final document was better than had been feared, the haste with which 
the referendum was held revived old fears and suspicions entertained
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by a not-insignificant section of the population. It is not an exaggeration 
to state that there are many Ghanaians who believe that a major surgery 
would have to be made on the Constitution in the early years of the 
Fourth Republic if it is to achieve nation-wide legitimacy.
The second issue relates to the disqualification of chiefs. It is an 
observable fact that a majority of chiefs are unhappy about this provi­
sion; not so much because they entertain ambitions to plunge into the 
political arena but because of its discriminatory nature in spite of the 
avowedly good intentions with which it was made. It has to be noted that 
throughout our chequered national constitutional history, chiefs have 
remained a major stabilizing force. It will be unfortunate therefore if this 
disqualification were to alienate them completely from the national 
political process.
Thirdly, and undoubtedly, the most explosive and controversial 
issues relate to the Transitional Provisions contained in Sections 34,35 
and 37 of the First Schedule to the Constitution. These sections pose the 
gravest threats to constitutional democracy in the Fourth Republic. They 
stick out as an unnatural growth in the constitutional document. No one 
can deny their potential for rocking the very foundations of the society. 
How will the courts handle the issues involved here particularly in the 
light of the Supreme Court decision in the KWAKYE CASE4 where the 
majority of the august CQurt faced with similar provisions in the 1979 
Constitution declared itself impotent in certain circumstances? Again 
only time can tell.
But this chapter can and must end on a cheerful note. It is clearly 
an observable fact, throughout the length and breadth of this country, 
that Ghanaians are looking forward to a democratic future. Perhaps, a 
little too eagerly, one may say. But the goodwill to make our democratic 
experiment succeed this time round is great. The Preamble to the 1992 
Constitution accurately captures and reflects the basic ideals embodied 
in constitutional democracy. Where there is a will, there is always a way, 
so the old adage goes. While the signs in the transition period may not 
give too much hope for the future, there is no doubt that the overwhelm­
ing desire of the people to live in freedom will ensure that democracy 
will flourish, with its usual ups and downs, in the Fourth Republic.
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1. Francis Fukuyama,"The End of History" in The National Interest, Vol.16
(1989), pp.3-18.
2. I Cranch 137 (1803).
3. See the chapter on "Legislation on Political Parties" for discussion of
this provision.
4. (1981) G.L.R. 644.
Part II
Society and Political Parties
TH E SO CIO -CULTURA L M ATRIX AND M U LTI-PA R TY  





Students and observers of politics have long noted the salience of 
cultural factors and the socio-cultural matrix for political behaviour. 
Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture 2 ,S.E. Liner's The Man on 
Horseback2, and Ali A. Mazrui's Cultural Forces in World Politics3 are 
three outstanding scholarly efforts which attempt, with varying 
degrees of success, to explain political phenomena on the basis of 
cultural variables.4
For Ghana, Maxwell Owusu's Uses and Abuses o f  Political Power: 
A Case Study of Continuity And Change in The Politics of Ghana f  Victor 
T. Le Vine's Political Corruption: The Case of Ghana; 6 and the Final Report 
of the Commission on Bribery and Corruption 7 appropriately take 
cognisance of the socio-cultural matrix in their respective concerns.
Historically, each of Ghana's three attempts at multi- party consti­
tutional rule highlighted and focused on institutional/structural and. 
procedural issues to the utmost exclusion of the socio-cul tural matrix. 
With independent Ghana's first attempt at multi-party constitutional 
rule which was inaugurated under the 1957 Independence Constitution, 
for example, the Westminster model of government, with a few notable 
innovations like the Regional Assemblies, was transplanted on to the 
Ghanaian sodal context without much effort at effecting any attitudinal 
or cultural change. In the case of the 1969 Second Republican Constitu­
tion, the effort was generally geared towards the institution of a consti­
tutional matrix which would well-nigh make a repeat of dicta torial rule 
impossible in Ghana. The 1979 Third Republican Constitution on the
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other hand was more of a cross between the American and Westminster 
models of constitutionalism than an innovative formulation particu­
larly tailored to suit the Ghanaian cultural matrix.
In each of these instances, the constitution was to a large extent 
perceived, so to speak, as an end in itself. Considerable efforts went into 
the formulation of a supposedly appropriate and perfect constitutional 
arrangement on the assumption that such an accomplishment would 
ensure a democratic and stable multi-party regime in the country.
As is well-known, those expectations were never met; because 
military intervention, deriving from a complexity of factors, ultimately 
abrogated each of those constitutional experiments. The lapses that 
characterized previous attempts at constitution-making applies today 
as, Ghana, through the on-going efforts and processes geared towards 
the envisaged Fourth Republic, works towards the establishment of 
multi-party constitutional rule scheduled for early 1993.
The present chapter is based on the axiomatic assumption that the 
disregard of cultural factors constitutes the prime causatory and ex­
planatory factor for the ultimate collapse of Ghana's First, Second and 
Third Republics. It focuses on Ghana's cultural variables in relation to 
the restoration of multi-party constitutionalism in the Fourth Republic. 
Impressionistic and documentary sources are scientifically utilized to 
identify pertinent aspects of (political) culture in Ghana which could 
have an adverse effect one way or the other, on the goal of establishing 
durable, multi-party constitutional rule in Ghana. In this regard it is 
important to recall that the Ghanaian state, as at present constituted, is 
certainly a "young" one. It has existed in such a centralized form for 
barely a hundred years. Even more significantly, it has existed as an 
independent entity for less than four decades.
The state itself is largely the creation of European colonialism; and 
it comprises various ethnic groups with their own peculiar — if not 
widely varyi ng subcultures. The present chapter however focuses on 
the emergent (and still unfolding) national (political) culture which 
exists over a nd above (and notwithstanding) those various subcultures. 
Narrower s ill, the chapter does not concern itself with the entirety of 
theemergoj itnational political culture in thecountry. The focus is strictly 
confined t.< an identification and discussion of those aspects of the 
nation's p c Jitical culture which do not augur well for the practice and 
survival o' multi-party constitutionalism in Ghana. The point of such 
narrowed rocus is to enable in-depth and thorough discussion of those 
negative « spects with a view to coming up with concrete proposals
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which, if put in place, would serve as a remedies and help make Ghana's 
on-going attemptatdurableconstitutional rule turn out successfully this 
time round.
A discussion of the methodology adopted here should be apposite. 
There has been no stratified sampling oftheGhanaian population for our 
present purposes. Close observation (both participant and non-partici­
pant) spanning over slightly four years has been a major methodological 
option. That apart, reliance has of course been placed on my professional 
acquaintance with certain societal and political manifestations over 
about a decade. I have also used the relevant material on the subject.
It should be noted, however, that the trends noted in the work 
constitute a pioneering account that draws on personal basis of observa­
tions, unstructured and random interviews, and a close scrutiny of 
various relevant press and other documentary evidence on national 
issues. The reader's columns of the Ghanaian print media have been 
particularly scrutinized, as they have manifested public opinion on 
various national issues.
The present work aims at presenting, in fairly broad but accurate 
strokes, the emergent national political culture in Ghana in so far as they 
negatively impinge on Ghana's long-held democratic aspirations. 
Sequels to the work should properly aim at formulating hypotheses out 
of the stated trends and observations with a view to subjecting such 
hypotheses to rigorous empirical tests and analysis.
Identification
Stemming from the above concerns, the following may be identified as 
salient features of the emergent national political culture in Ghana which 
have potentially negative implications for the nation's aspiration to­
wards durable multi-party constitutionalism in Ghana. The first of 
these is the prevalence of a definitely non-confrontational, submissive, 
and compliant attitude towards authority. This behavioural disposi­
tion is generally manifested towards all forms of authority — parental, 
social, political, religious, and so on. There is extreme reluctance to 
publicly question, ridicule, or diverge from official standpoint. The 
exercise of authority — whether by elder siblings, parental figures, 
traditional office-holders, and other public officials —  rarely draws 
challenging or divergent responses. The tendency is for people to 
comply; or at least refrain from public and open challenge, disputation, 
contestation or confrontation.
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Closely related to this tendency is a widespread perception of 
divergence from and challenge of the authorities' standpoints —  and 
indeed non-conformity with the common stance — as marks of 
disloyalty and of subversive intent. Such challenges and divergences 
are commonly regarded in most cases as unnecessarily confrontational 
and somehow improper. Consensus is much prized; and such diver­
gence from the consensual stance is seen as a stubborn and arrogant 
insistence on individuality and a concomitant failure to submerge 
individuality in the consensual pool.
Indeed there is an intense dislike of, and serious misgivings and 
apprehension about, open/public disputation and argumentation. 
There is a marked preference for unanimity on public issues; and 
indeed both open and subtle pressures are often brought to bear in 
efforts towards achieving such consensus. Open divergences and 
long-standing controversies (whether academic or general) are 
particularly frowned upon.
Another feature of the emergent political culture in Ghana which 
has possible negative import for durable multi-party constitutional rule 
in the country is that national politics hinges basically on personalities 
rather than on principles, ideas, or issues. A close examination of media 
coverage of electoral contests in Ghana and of the campaign strategies 
and ploys of individual and group contestants at elections in Ghana, 
clearly illustrate the rather low significance of abstract ideas and obtuse 
principles in such contests. Symbolic, sentimental and metaphysical 
influences, as opposed to ideas and principles per s e , would seem to 
be far more salient. Mike Oquaye illustrates this point in his Politics in 
Ghana 1972-1979:
Some PNP campaigners employed the element of the mysterious 
and the supernatural which had proved very successful in 
Nkrumah's days. Even though it was not officially claimed by the 
party, its supporters repeatedly propagated tire news that Presi­
dent Nkruman's spirit had been consulted and that he had chosen 
the name, emblems and colours of the party assuring them that the 
palm-tree would lead the party to a victory, and if the party failed, 
that would lead to the total ruination of the country. It was further 
said that Nkrumah had put a curse on Ghana ana that this would 
be removed, upon Ghanaians voting for the PNP. These utterances 
were quite meaningful if one considers the fact that Ghanaians 
believe in the supernatural and secondly, that Ghana had actually 
sunk and continued to sink since Nkrumah left the political scene.8
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Hence, very few Ghanaians, even among the educated, can carry on 
sustained meaningful discourse on the manifesto of their preferred 
political parties.
A further feature is the prevalence of a highly cynical and an 
extremely economical-instrumentalist perception of politics. The state 
and national politics, are widely seen as a gold mine to be exploited for 
personal and /  or group gain and for social mobility. Concomitant to this, 
there is a cynical attitude towards representation of politics as an 
avenue for selfless public service. Apparently very few believe in the 
reality of (or even approve of) altruistic public service through the 
political arena. Appointees to top political positions who are unable to 
"feather their nests" whilst in office and leave such office poor, or 
poorer than they were prior to their taking up such high-level political 
appointments, are commonly regarded as being stupid.
Yet another feature is a widespread tendency to veer away, as far 
as possible, from such activist political manifestations as demonstra­
tions, civil disorder, and critical public debates.
There is also a generally fatalistic, resignatory attitude towards 
political issues in particular and public issues in general. This tendency 
would seem to derive its support from a widespread belief that issues 
would somehow sort themselves out with time. Common street 
expressions which manifest this attitude include such sayings and 
responsesas "alavanyo"9; "ebaahi'10; "ebeyeyie"11; "Nyamebekyere"12; 
"Nyame ndae"13; and "ehuru a ebedwo"14. What all these features 
have in common is that they constitute aspects of the emergent 
national political culture in Ghana which neither augurs well for, nor 
will enhance the practice and prospects of, a stable multi-party constitu­
tionalism in Ghana.
This does not mean, however, that the emergent political culture 
is entirely negative as regards the national aspiration for multi-party 
constitutionalism. There certainly are positive aspects of it. (For ex­
ample, there is a marked dislike of political violence under virtually all 
conditions.) The positive aspects, however, do not constitute the 
concern of the present chapter. As indicated above, our focus is on the 
identification and discussion of the negative aspects of national 
political culture and its bearing on the national quest for stable multi­
party constitutionalism.
The mere identification and presentation of these negative aspects 
ana's emergent political culture is however inadequate. Some 
lly pertinent issues still remain. For example: how is that reality to
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be accounted for? What factors shaped or determined the emergent 
political culture outlined above?
Sources
Major sources of such a national political culture are the various tradi­
tional cultural norms of Ghana's ethnic groupings which, incidentally, 
have considerably much in common despite their various differences 
and diversity. Traditional customary practice, for example, virtually 
frowned upon confronting legitimate authority unless absolutely neces­
sary and critical. The preference was clearly in the direction of submis­
sion, obedience, consensus and unanimity. Prolonged and sustained 
debate over public policy, and criticism particularly after a decision of 
some sort had been made, were certainly frowned upon. Such custom­
ary attitudes and norms have been transmitted over the years through 
the processes of socialization, and ha ve become a feature of the emergent 
national political culture.
Another source is the historical experience of colonialism in 
Ghana. Colonialism did not spawn a democratic culture. If any thing, it 
heightened and stultified the undemocratic aspects of the traditional 
heritage. The institution of chieftaincy, for example, was under 
colonialism freed of some of its in-built checks and balances which kept 
it off dictatorship. Also the Provincial and District Commissioners, 
through their position in the Crown Colony's administrative set-up, did 
nothing to encourage a democratic ethos among the colonized popula­
tion and their traditional rulers. On the contrary, their modus operandi 
did a lot to enhance and sustain a political legacy of conspiratorial and 
elitist policy formulation which operated without much reference to, 
and without much input by, the colonized masses.
Colonialism thus encouraged an alienated and a paternalistic 
framework of government which did not facilitate the democratic 
practice of open discussion, fairly unfettered criticism of public policy, 
and mass involvement in public policy formulation.The well-known 
dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies of successive governments 
since the attainment of independence have also reinforced these nega­
tive aspects of political culture in Ghana.15
Furthermore, the prevailing situations like the massive scale of 
adult illiteracy, the high school drop-out rate, the adoption of English 
(a foreign language) as the official language, and severe deprivation and
68
poverty have also contributed significantly towards the emergence of 
the negative aspects of Ghana's political culture that I have just 
discussed.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Democracy cannot thrive for long if the socio-cultural matrix is not 
conducive to the perpetuation of democratic rule! In this regard it is 
inadequate, as the tendency has so far been in Ghana, to focus almost 
exclusively on institutional and legal frameworks in the bid to establish 
democratic governance. Certainly the rule of law and those constitu­
tional and legal pillars are indispensable for democratic governance. 
Appropriate and well-functioning institutions and structures are a 
sine qua non for stable democratic rule as well. However, the socio­
cultural matrix is no less important and therefore should not be ignored.
There is certainly a pressing need for public education to get the 
general public to imbibe, appreciate, and defend the democratic ethos 
way of social organization and national existence. Admittedly some 
efforts in that direction have been made in the past. The Centre for 
Civic Education established by the National Liberation Council, which 
continued into the Second Republic, is an example of such efforts. 
Earlier, the Extra-Mural Studies programme of the then University 
College of the Gold Coast had served a similar purpose. For now, 
however, no specific national institution exists to carry out this 
function. It must be said in passing that over the years, the initiative 
of various regimes in establishing bodies devoted to public political 
education has often incurred suspicion, misgivings and animosity. In 
the light of this record, it would seem most appropriate to leave the 
important task of national political education to a time-tested body like 
the Institute of Adult Education of the University of Ghana. The body 
has certainly exhibited, over the years, evidence of impartiality, inde­
pendence from governmental control and effectiveness.
To ensure adequate financial provision for the performance of the 
task, one per cent of each year's defence budget should be offered to 
that Institute to carry out the task of civic education.
Furthermore, sustained and well-conceived programmes must be 
put in place to reduce the massive scale of public alienation from policy 
formulation. In this regard there should be strenuous efforts to:
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(i) reduce the unfortunately high level of adult illiteracy;
(ii) overcome the English language barrier which excludes a signifi­
cant majority of citizens from active participation in national 
affairs;
(iii) ensure the involvement of all social segments in policy affairs;
(iv) incorporate civic education much more significantly in school 
curricula; and
(v) reduce the undemocratic and anachronistic features of traditional 
culture.
It is only when these have been achieved that a durable multi­
party constitutional rule could thrive in Ghana.
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In the light of the acceptance of the Draft Constitution in the referendum 
held on 28 April, 1992, and the subsequent hectic preparations towards 
the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on 7 January, 1993, it may be 
assumed reasonably that Ghanaians as a whole have resolved to make 
yet another attempt at evolving a pluralist democracy. It may be recalled 
that the three previous attempts made in 1957-1960,1969-1972 and 1979- 
1981 were aborted for a number of reasons. As the platitude goes, "a 
country deserves the type of government it has" — that is, in normal 
times. Little wonder that a number of social scientists have observed that 
the character of a country's social structure has a great deal to do with 
the emergence and thriving of pluralist democracy.
This chapter, then, is a modest attempt at exploring the issue of 
whether or not Ghana does have the type of dvil society that will 
facilitate the transition to, and help to ensure the thriving of, pluralist 
democracy in the Fourth Republic. For the sake of convenience the rest 
of the chapter falls into four parts. In part one the terms pluralist 
democracy and civil society are broadly delineated; in part two is offered 
an overview of the chequered history of civil society in the post - 
independence periodupto 31 December, 1981; part three deals broadly 
with civil society during the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) era; while part four contains the conclusion and recommenda­
tions.
Pluralist Democracy and Civil Society Explained
Briefly, pluralist democracy is characterized by the following key ele­
ments: the existence and protection of civil and political rights, including 
the right to form relatively independent associations/organizations like
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political parties and pressure groups resulting in a competitive party 
system; free and fair elections; limitations on the powers of government; 
the rule of law and an independent judiciary; a free press; accountability; 
local self-government; tolerance of diverse opinions; political compro­
mise; acceptance of decisions by majority procedure and respect for 
minority views; peaceful resolution of differences; and supremacy of 
civil authority over military and other security institutions. Thus 
broadly delineated, pluralist democracy is not different from constitu­
tional or liberal or multiparty democracy -1
Historically speaking, civil society was narrowly conceived and 
equated with the economy.2 Nowadays, it is broadly conceived and 
located in the general society which includes the economy. Hence, 
broadly speaking, civil society denotes the presence of a cluster of 
intermediary organizations/associations that operate between the pri­
mary units of society (like individuals,nuclear and extended families, 
clans, ethnic groups and village units) and the state. These intermediary 
groupings include the following: labour unions and associations of 
professionals, farmers, fishermen, women, youth and students; reli­
gious and business organizations; cultural and recreational clubs; as 
well as political parties.
However, in the literature on the subject competing models of civil 
society have been identified. The major ones are the "corporatist" and 
"pluralist" models. In the former the intermediary organizations are 
sponsored and often sustained by, and dependent on, the state. Mem­
bership of such organizations is usually involuntary or semi-voluntary. 
A typical example is the medieval European guild. A person was bom 
into it as a son of a guild member; otherwise he had to join it if he was 
to have any opportunity to practise his occupation in the first place. It is 
important to note, though, that the "corporatist" model, which emerged 
within the liberal-democratic context, must not be confused with the 
Fascist notion of the "corporate state." The major thrust of the advocates 
of the "corporatist" model is that increasing state intervention in some 
established liberal democracies, particularly in the sphere of the man­
agement of the national economy, has made it necessary for the state to 
seek the advice and co-operation of certain strategically placed groups 
like business and labour. And this has led to the incorporation of such 
g psin the decision-making process. In the event, the state has gained
r social control in return for giving functional representation to 
roups. For us here, however, the danger is that the "corporatist" 
not carefully applied, can lead to totalitarian dictatorship.3
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In the "pluralist" model a variety of organizations emerge volun­
tarily to compete with one another in pursuit of their own interests 
without, however, ignoring cross-cutting interests. In their operations 
they may be likened to market forces. Civil societies which approximate 
the "corporatist" and "pluralist" models are to be found, for example, in 
Switzerland, Germany, Austria as well as the Scandinavian countries, 
and the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America, 
respectively4.
It would appear from historical experience that the "pluralist" 
model of civil society is better and more easily able to facilitate the 
transition to, and help to sustain, pluralist democracy5 — despite some 
weaknesses associated with this model like unequal distribution of 
economic power and the threat of extreme particularism embedded in 
it. But if a civil society of this kind is to play its role in the process of 
democratization, then a number of conditions must be met.
First, as many of the social forces and interests that find organized 
expression in groups should see themselves as constituting relatively 
autonomous and counter-vailing centres of economic and political 
power in relation not only to the state and its agencies but also to the 
primary units of society.6 Secondly, these intermediary organizations 
(or subunits of civil society) must be characterized by organizational 
continuity in a large measure; while their rights and entitlements on 
which their very corporate existence rests must be accepted, respected 
and protected by the state. For, in the modem era especially, there is no 
civil society without the state; that is why there is also the need for co­
operation between the state and civil society without prejudice to the 
tetter's autonomy. Thirdly, it is imperative that these sub-units are 
tolerant of one another in pursuing their interests. But this will be 
impeded to a large extent if there exist gross inequalities based, for 
instance, on either the distribution of material rewards or traditional 
distinctions of tribe, caste or race within the society.7 Fourthly, they must 
develop a capacity for democratic self-governance. Leaders should be 
periodically and democratically elected to ensure accountability for 
their stewardship; while deliberation about group action must be free, 
open, tolerant and fair. Finally, these subunits must cultivate what has 
been termed the "civic spirit"8 which broadly means conscientious 
respect for the rights of all (including actual or potential competitors) and 
keen concern for the welfare of the larger community.
The emergence of a variety of intermediary organizations in a 
society must be highly appreciated and encouraged rather than de­
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plored—  particularly in the light of the tragic consequences of the 
severe constriction of civil society under communist rule in the former 
Soviet Union and elsewhere. For even their mere existence diversifies 
and enriches the institutional environment. Thereby, citizens are given 
ample opportunity to choose which organizations to affiliate with; and 
choice, it may be noted, is very crucial to the successful operation of 
pluralist democracy.
Besides, as already indicated, these subunits of civil society fill a 
great many roles which are not considered as falling within the 
province of the state. And they provide the social space in which citizens 
can explore both the possibilities of freedom and the responsibilities of 
self-governance, free from the potentially oppressive arm of the state.9
At this stage, it is appropriate that the relationship between political 
parties and other segments of civil society is tackled, but only briefly 
since it is amply discussed by Prof. Folson in another chapter. Of all the 
subunits of civil society, it is political parties which are most manifestly 
political in their objectives and operations. They seek, above all, to attain 
or retain political power, normally through elections, in order to form 
the government of the country either alone or in concert with other 
parties.10 Failing that, they may go into opposition and try to influence 
the government in many ways.
Admittedly, most of the other subunits such as single-issue pres­
sure groups may present or support candidates for election to the 
legislature to promote their cause. Occasionally, a subunit or a section 
of it may itself form a political party as the leadership of the Ghana Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) did in 1979; or it may forge very close ties with 
a political party as the American Federation of Labour-Congress of 
Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) has done with the Democratic Party 
of the USA, and the Roman Catholic Church with the Christian Demo­
cratic Parties in Germany and Italy. Many of these subunits may prefer 
to lobby the government and its agencies in order to influence them on 
certain issues and policy decisions; and thereby, seek to make the 
authorities responsive to the wishes of the citizens, and accountable for 
their policies and actions.
On the whole, however, these other subunits of civil society 
te the building blocks of political parties. They provide many of 
(ht mbers and sympathisers of these parties. Moreover, political 
ire the vehicle whereby the various interests and concerns 
d 1 j  individuals and the other subunits are "aggregated" into 
<ages", usually expressed in "party platforms" or party
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manifestoes. Thus, even though their conflict-minimizing (and hence 
unifying) role is usually overlooked by "no-party" advocates, political 
parties in fact play a significant role in reducing conflict and bridging the 
wide gaps between different alternative sets of preferences.11 That is 
why a democracy could degenerate into "anomic violence" in the 
absence of genuine parties. It is in these and other respects that political 
parties, as a subset of civil society, are very crucial to the successful 
operation of pluralist democracy.
Historical Overview 
1957-196612
Although colonial rule in Ghana was on the whole autocratic, it did not, 
paradoxically, obstruct the emergence of voluntary organizations of 
many kinds -  especially from the end of World War I onwards. The 
colonial authorities even encouraged and guided the growth of the 
labour and co-operative movements. What they did not and were 
unwilling to do was to encourage the growth of an indigenous, self- 
sufficient and autonomous entrepreneurial capitalist class;13 just as until 
1951 they allowed only token popular participation in government.
Even so it is no exaggeration to observe that independent Ghana 
inherited a nascent civil society which was potentially vibrant. For there 
clearly existed a variety of social forces which had voluntarily estab­
lished organizations to pursue, inter alia, occupational, social, self-help, 
religious, recreational and political goals; some of them were pressure 
groups as well.
Among these intermediary organizations were the following: the 
National Farmers' Union, Asante Farmers' Union, United Ghana Farm­
ers' Council and Alliance of Co - operatives; the Chambers of Commerce 
and Mines, Ghana Employers' Association, Ghana Manufacturers' 
Association, and Women Traders' Associations in some of the main 
towns; the trade unions of which the largest and most important were 
the United Africa Company Employees' and Mine Workers' Unions, 
and over which a Trades Union Congress uneasily presided; the Ghana 
Bar Association, Ghana Medical Association and Ghana Mid wives' and 
Nurses' Associations; the Christian Council of Churches, National 
Catholic Secretariat and Ghana Muslim Council.
There were also sports clubs, self-help associations (like credit
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unions), literary dubs, as well as old boys' and old girls' assodations, 
espedally of the major second cyde educational institutions, all of which 
established networks for social interaction, debate and support. And last 
but not least were the politically oriented assodations— the Convention 
People's Party (CPP), National Liberation Movement (NLM), Togoland 
Congress (TC), Northern People's Party (NPP), and Muslim Assodation 
Party (MAP) —  which aggregated and canalized the diverse interests 
and demands of their constituents in sodety. A great number of these 
voluntary intermediary organizations were ethnically cross-cutting in 
membership.14
At independence, then, there was no question that what may be 
termed the voluntary, pluralist basis of sodal and political action had 
emerged -  however fragile it was.15 And at the party political level, the 
numerical weakness of the parliamentary opposition (33 against the 
C PFs 71) belied the sizeable eledoral support it mustered in the 1956 
general elections (the last before independence)16 It was the expectation 
that dvil society would develop further to serve as the engine to propel 
the first constitutional-democratic enterprise to success.
To some people, one of the grounds for such expectation was the 
magnificent speech17 Nkrumah delivered on 12 November, 1956 in the 
Legislative Assembly in which he extolled, and promised to uphold, the 
cardinal tenets of liberal democracy. Only the main points will be 
highlighted here.
First, he acknowledged the immense value of constitutional oppo­
sition, the competitive party system, free and fair elections based on an 
'accurate register of voters" and supervised by an independent and 
impartial eledoral commission, as well as the independence of the 
judiciary. Secondly, he expressed his belief in and resped for the rights 
of regional minorities. According to him, it was the government's duty 
to ensure that "in the various regions of Ghana any minority party' 
was accorded "fair consideration in the regional machinery of govern­
ment."18 Thirdly, Nkrumah underscored "the equal importance of the 
rights of individuals." These included: (i) "freedom from arbitrary 
arrest"; (ii) the inviolability of the individual's home, and freedom from 
arbitrary search; (iii) freedom from arbitrary confiscation of property; 
and (iv) freedoms of speech, thought, consdence —  and of association: 
"the Government believes that any individual should be entitled to join 
any trade union, political party or other associations of his choice" (thus 
ac io wledging the relevance and importance of a pluralist civil society 
for liberal democracy).
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But that all this was mere rhetoric — part of "tactical action" — 
calculated to conciliate the NLM-dominated opposition and convince 
the British government to fulfil its promise of granting independence to 
the country after the 1956 elections,19 is confirmed by Nkrumah's 
revealing remark in the preface to his Autobiography. According to him, 
in the post-independence period it might be necessary to support even 
a political system founded on social justice and a liberal-democratic 
constitution with emergency measures of a totalitarian kind.20
The motivation for this remark is not explained entirely by the 
lessons Nkrumah may have drawn from the bitter CPP-NLM conflict 
during 1954-1956. The plain fact is that, ideologically, Nkrumah was a 
fierce advocate of "developmental dictatorship" of a socialist kind.21 In 
his view the economic and social development of Ghana must be "jet- 
propelled" to enable it catch up with the developed countries. Hence he 
did not see why the government's efforts at development should be 
hampered by constitutional limitations of the kind enshrined in the 
Independence Constitution. Besides, he was aware that developmental 
dictatorship is, generally speaking, incompatible with a strong civil 
society which will restrict its autonomy. Hence he sought to arrest its 
development in Ghana. Before discussing the steps he took in this 
direction, it is necessary to outline some of the major changes that were 
made to the constitutional-political structure in the period.
Soon after independence there occurred certain events which the 
CPP and the government adroitly exploited to great political advantage. 
These included: the Alavanyo riots in the Volta Region involving the 
Togoland Congress (TC); the Ga Shifimo Kpee protest movement in 
Accra; and the alleged assassination attempt by some opposition 
elements on Nkrumah's life in December, 1957.72 The government then 
embarked on a system atic dism antling of the Independence 
Constititution, the ultimate purpose of which was revealed by Kofi 
Baako, a Ministerial Secretary and an ardent disciple of Nkrumah, when 
hesaidinjuly 1958 in the National Assembly: "We shall never allow the 
Opposition to unseat us. The CPP shall always sit here as the Govern­
ment."23
The Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act, 1958 removed all the 
special provisions on constitutional amendments and cleared the way 
for the amendment of the Independence Constitution in many other 
respects. The regional assemblies, which had been elected in 1958, were 
dissolved under the Regional Assemblies (Amendment) Act, 1959. 
Amendments affecting the judiciary, the constitutional provisions on
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which had been entrenched, were effected by ordinary legislation. The 
most significant of such amendments dissolved the judicial service 
commission which was devised to ensure fairness in the appointment of 
superior court judges in particular.
The Independence Constitution was eventually replaced by the 
1960 Constitution under which Ghana became a republic on 1 July, 1960. 
Nkrumah, who became the first President (as Head of State and Govern­
ment), was vested with enormous powers— as exemplified by article 55 
and his power to appoint, without reference to any other authority, all 
superior court judges. He could also dismiss the chief justice at will and 
at any time. The other superior court judges enjoyed security of tenure 
since they could be removed only through a special procedure. How­
ever, by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964, the President could 
dismiss such judges also "at any time for reasons which to him appear 
sufficient." Nkrumah's control over the judiciary was total.
In the immediate post-independence period, the government also 
devised what Harvey24 has aptly called the legal instruments of political 
monopoly. These included: the Deportation Act, 1957 under which 
some people, alleged to have been foreigners but were opposition 
supporters, were deported; State Council Ordinances which were 
aimed at undermining the authority of some paramount chiefs and 
weakening their position as opposition supporters; and the Avoidance 
of Discrimination Act, 1957 which made illegal political parties based on 
tribe, region or religion. In anticipation of this enactment the opposition 
parties which would have been affected by it came together and formed 
the United Party (UP). But realizing that by these measures the opposi­
tion had not been completely eliminated, and impatient with the com­
plexities and the slow pace of due process of law, the government 
enacted the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in July 1958. Under this 
enactment hundreds of people, including not a few of CPP members 
who hailed it because they thought it was aimed at the opposition only, 
were detained without trial.25
In the republican era the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961 
made it an offence to publish anything considered defamatory or 
insulting to the President. Since Nkrumah, the President, had by this 
time become an autocrat and occupied the centre stage in almost every 
aspect of Ghana's political life, this law severely limited political debate 
and discussion. The Newspaper Licencing Act, 1963, which enjaired the 
government's complete control of newspaper publication, added the 
coup de grace, it crippled press freedom.
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Besides all these legal measures, a number of political measures 
were taken to strengthen the C PPs hold on the country. Such measures 
included: (i) the re-structuring of the party which involved the appoint­
ment of party faithfuls —  rather than civil servants —  as district and 
regional commissioners to control the local institutions and population 
espedally; and (ii) the absorption of trade unions, farmers' co-opera­
tives, and womens' and youth organizations —  which could thwart the 
C PPs efforts at domination— as "integral wings" or "composite parts" 
of the party. Such bodies were the Trades Union Congress (TUC), United 
Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council (UGFCC), National Coundl of 
Ghana Women (NCGW), Builders' (later Workers') Brigade, Ghana 
Young Pioneers (GYP), and all other bodies involved in the training of 
the youth.
It must be noted, however, that the CPP leadership did not have an 
easy time of absorbing the trade unions and farmers' co-operatives, for 
instance. It is, therefore, appropriate to narrate, if only rapidly, the 
history of their struggle against government and party control.
It is no foreshortening of history to observe that the country7s 
labour movement came into political limelight in January 1950 when the 
Gold Coast Trades Union Congress (GCTUC) called a general strike in 
support of Nkrumah's declaration of "positive action."26 The direct 
consequence of this strike and its suppression by the colonial govern­
ment was the collapse of the GCTUG In January 1951 it was revived 
under the guidance and encouragement of the Labour Department. Its 
leadership included such non-political moderates as D.K. Foevie and S. 
Larbi-Odam, the leaders of the Mine Workers' and UAC Employees' 
Unions respectively. After the C PPs electoral victory in February 1951, 
Nkrumah and some union leaders, who had been imprisoned as a result 
of "positive action" and the general strike, were released. Some of these 
union leaders formed a rival central labour organization called the 
Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC). In 1953 there was a merger 
between the GCTUC and GTUC under the former's name; but the 
leadership was drawn from both bodies.
The period 1953-1958 witnessed an interesting struggle within the 
labour movement involving three groups. The first group comprised 
the relatively well-established unions; for example, the Railway, UAC, 
and Mine Workers' Unions. These sought to maintain the independence 
of the labour movement. The second group consisted of union leaders 
who supported the CPP; and prominent among them was J.K. Tettegah 
who considered that their control of the labour movement would pave
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the way for eventually attaining strategic positions in the CPP. The third 
group was the CPP itself which hankered after control of the labour 
movement for its own purposes.
In this period the CPP cou Id not impose itself on the unions not only 
because it lacked the resources to do so but also because such a step 
would have served partly as a convenient pretext for the British govern­
ment to delay independence. And this, coupled with the very pre - 
disposition of the first group, dictated caution on the C PPs part.
On the other hand, the first group itself had to tread warily because 
it could hardly afford, nor did it seek, an all-out confrontation which 
might estrange a party that was most likely to assume state-power at 
independence. The CPP supporters in the unions also had to be cautious 
in their approach for two main reasons. First, since they did not have 
their own unions, they lacked a strong support-base in the labour 
movement.27 Secondly, they had both friends and enemies in the 
government; and Tettegah particularly was considered a potentially 
serious potential threat to the CPP leadership.
But there was one factor which apparently favoured the Tettegah 
faction. This was the disenchantment of many unionists with the 
fragmentation of the labour movement into a great number of small 
unions with meagre financial resources. According to the annual report 
of the Ministry of Labour, in 1957 there were approximately 130 regis­
tered unions with a total membership of nearly 80,000. Of these unions 
21 had less than 50 members each, 31 had between 50 and 250 each, and 
16 had between 250 and 1000 each.28 The Tettegah faction could well 
have exploited this disenchantment by convincing the smaller unions to 
regroup themselves into bigger unions, while authority would be 
centralized in the TUC.
It is true to say that under its constitution of 195619, for instance, the 
GCTUC had extensive powers over the affairs of the affiliated unions. 
These included the powers of intervention in all industrial disputes, of 
investigation into union misconduct, and of expulsion. In reality, 
however, the TU C s control of the unions was anything but effective, as 
evidenced by the financial arrangements it had with them. The consti­
tution enjoined every union to contribute 3d per member annually; this 
was nearly two per cent of membership dues. And yet the unions only 
tonally made even this meagre contribution to the TUC.
Oespite such problems confronting the labour movement, the 
ah group made continued, but futile, efforts to dominate it. 
s came to a head in September 1955 when the non-political group
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broke with the GCTUC and established the Congress of Free Trade 
Unions (CFTU), only to return to the GCTUC a year later. But the group 
still resisted all attempts to centralize authority in the GCTUC until after 
independence; and even then some unions were still unyielding.
At its 14th annual conference in January 1958 the TUC, under the 
leadership of Tettegah as Secretary-General, was widely expected to 
adopt a proposal for a new structure of the labour movement. Its main 
thrust was the creation of a centralized trade union organization —  as 
had all along been advocated by the Tettegah group. Although it was 
adopted in principle, the proposal was fiercely opposed by some unions, 
notably the powerful UAC and Ghana Railway Employees' unions. 
They insisted on retaining their independent and separate existence.
But since the CPP was then the governing party in an independent 
Ghana, and since it was determined to control the labour movement at 
all costs, the government took the bull by the horns and enacted in 1958 
the Industrial Relations Act which spelt out the new structure. Because 
of continued opposition by some unions, much sterner measures —  in 
the form of amendments to the 1958 Act in 1959 and 1960 —  were 
adopted. Briefly, through these laws authority was centralized in the 
TUC; all unions were merged, first into 24 and later reduced to 10; union 
dues were deducted at source; and all non-unionized workers including 
civil servants automatically became unionized, meaning that their right 
to choose to join or not to join a trade union was eliminated.30
By 1960, then, there was not the slightest hint of any possible 
autonomy for the unions. The democratic election of union leaders, 
especially of the TUC, rarely occurred. Indeed, they were accountable 
not to the rank and file, but to the government and party (in effect to 
Nkrumah) since, as already noted, the TUC was incorporated in the CPP. 
And the Secretary-General of the TUC, J.K. Tettegah, became a Minister 
Plenipotentiary and an Ambassador Extraordinary.31 Thus was 
achieved government and party control of the labour movement, but 
not without opposition from some unions.
The co-operative movement, of which the farmers' co-operatives 
were a part, was also brought under government and party control. But 
the movement resisted such control until 1961.
The co-operative movement began in the 1920s. By 1945 it had 
grown into a vital social force. After a drawn-out struggle with the 
colonial government, under whose encouragement and guidance it 
flourished, the co-operative movement won a large measure of au­
tonomy from government control which it jealously guarded32 It also
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cherished the general co-operative principle of political neutrality. 
Accordingly, it is in order to outline broadly the structure of the 
movement existing before the CPP's intrusion in 1952.33
The co-operative movement comprised registered primary, village 
produce marketing societies, secondary or district unions, and national 
or apex unions. These bodies as a whole were fairly democratic in 
structure and operation.
The affairs of a primary society, for example, were managed by an 
elected management committee. The latter entrusted the society's daily 
affairs to its chief executive who was subject to such directives as the 
committee might give in accordance with the society's bye-laws. The 
general meeting of the society's members was the final authority.
The district unions consisted of not less than two registerd primary 
societies which dealt in the same produce/crop or engaged in a similar 
business venture and operated in the same district. These unions 
enabled the primary societies to market their produce collectively, and 
provided them with finance and storage facilities. The unions com­
prised representatives of the primary societies who at periodic meetings 
exchanged views and took decisions on common problems. The powers 
of a union were derived from the primary societies. Its affairs were 
managed by a committee elected from members on "an equal vote 
basis." Final authority lay with the general nembership, and was 
exercised through votings at periodic meetings. Each union had a staff 
headed by a secretary experienced in co-operative affairs.
By 1952 there were three national bodies within the co-operative 
movement, namely, the Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association, the 
Ghana Co-operative Bank, and the Alliance of Ghana Co-operatives. 
The Marketing Association, originally called the Gold Coast Co-opera­
tive Federation, was formed in December 1944. Its major task was to 
arrange the most economic co-operative marketing of cocoa for the 
societies and unions that dealt in cocoa and were known as Cocoa 
Farmers' Marketing Co-operatives. The Association was under a man­
agement committee composed of one elected representative of each 
union. Shares in the Association were held by the unions.
The Co-operative Bank emerged in October 1946 to serve as a 
i m for financing co -operative activities. Its membership was open 
io all registered co-operatives at all levels; and all of them were also 
i alders. The Bank's management committee consisted of elected 
-entatives of all the members.
T\e Department of Co-operatives (established in April 1944) under
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the Registrar of Co-operatives was solely responsible for co-operative 
education, promotion, and publicity. However, the co-operative move­
ment came to feel that an independent body should perform these tasks. 
Hence the formation of the Alliance of Ghana Co-operatives in 
December 1951. All the registered societies and unions as well as the 
Marketing Association and the Co-operative Bank were members, and 
shareholders as well. A committee of representatives of the members 
managed the Alliance's affairs; while ultimate authority rested with the 
general membership. Unlike the two other national bodies, the Alliance 
was non-commercial. Therefore, it relied on the financial support of its 
members (who were its owners) for its continued existence.
It must be emphasized that the co-operative movement, prior to its 
forcible absorption by the CPP, was financially autonomous. Its units 
were primarily self-financing through entrance fees, share subscrip­
tions, donations, and annual levies on members. As the Omaboe 
Committee on the re-organization of the co-operative movement put it 
in 1964: "Member investment formed one of the solid foundations of the 
(old) co-operative movement.'34 Interestingly, all management commit­
tees, including office-holders, served the societies without remuneration 
other than refund of transport and subsistence expenses incurred while 
travelling on business for the societies. The only exception was the 
treasurer who normally was paid a fixed allowance. It was only later 
that, as a result of the increased volume of activities, full-time, paid 
Directors were appointed to head the committees on the national bodies.
Besides the Co-operative Bank, the most enterprising and success­
ful of the co-operatives were the cocoa farmers' marketing societies and 
unions. It has correctly been observed that 1948-1961 was their "golden 
age." Although they faced keen competition from UAC and Cadbury, 
they were able, through the Marketing Association, to capture a sizeable 
portion of the cocoa market: their share of the total cocoa purchases 
increased from 10 per cent in 1948 to 30 per cent in 196135
The cocoa marketing co-operatives, which were strongest in Ashanti 
and Brongland, were mostly dominated by the more entrepreneurial 
wealthy farmers. They were politically neutral and almost indifferent to 
the nationalist agitation for independence. Though Nkrumah, after the 
C PPs formation in 1949, was not enthusiastic about them partly for this 
reason, he shrewdly saw the cocoa marketing business as the key to the 
cocoa sector. Its significance for building support for his party was not 
lost on him: he could exploit to advantage the potential hostility of many 
smaller cocoa farmers to the bigger, wealthier ones.36
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Little wonder that the government established in 1952 the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company (CPC) as a cocoa buying agent and a subsidiary 
of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). It soon became a centre of 
patronage for the selective distribution of loans to CPP supporters in the 
cocoa growing areas in particular. As such it was resented by many 
Ashanti cocoa farmers and the Opposition.37
In 1953 the CPP established the United Ghana Farmers' Council 
(UGFC) to replace the National Farmers' Union (an opposition group). 
Initially a subsidiary of theCPC, the UGFC continued to operateafter the 
collapse of the parent body. Democracy was virtually non-existent in 
the structure and operations of the UGFC. Secretary-receivers were 
appointed to run the village societies each of which had a three- 
member village advisory committee comprising the chief farmer and 
two other appointed representatives — all of whom were CPP mem­
bers. The Secretar-General was also a party appointee. The UGFC was 
thus a bulwark of support for the CPP in the 1956 general elections.
In 1957 the government declared the UGFC the sole representative 
and mouthpiece of all farmers in the country, and made it one of the 
CMB's licensed cocoa buying agents. The government also directed the 
CMB to pay the UGFC an annual subvention of £100,000; and decided 
to build a £100,000 national headquarters for the Council into which it 
moved in 1959. In 1958 the UGFC's marketing section was registered as 
the Ghana Farmers Marketing Co-operative Ltd.
In cocoa marketing the UGFC encountered strong competition 
from the independent African cocoa brokers, UAC and Cadbury, as well 
as the Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association. To capture and 
monopolize cocoa marketing, the CPP through the UGFC had to 
remove these competitors. Eventually, the first two groups bowed out 
without resistance. But the third group resisted strongly until 1961. 
After all, the older established cocoa marketing co-operatives also had 
allies among Opposition and CPP backbenchers in the National 
Assembly.
In 1959 the government announced its plan to unify the co­
operative movement. The older co-operatives correctly saw it as an 
attempt to bring them under government and party control through the 
UGFC. The latter, they argued, had violated all co-operative principles 
by being a CPP organ. Unfortunately, their united front was broken in 
July 1960 when the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and Sefwi cocoa marketing 
o operatives formed a separate body, the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and 
Sefw Co-operative Organization (ABASCO). The break was appar­
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ently due to fears of southern domination of the Marketing Association. 
The UGFC and the CPP saw the break as an opportune moment to strike. 
In late 1960 they negotiated the absorption of ABASCO into the UGFC. 
The remnants of the Marketing Association were decreed out of exist­
ence, and their considerable assets seized, when in May 1961 the 
government made the UGFC the sole lincensed buying agent of the 
CMB; that is, the only body that should handle "the local marketing of 
the whole cocoa crop of Ghana."38
Earlier in August 1959 the independent Alliance of Ghana Co­
operatives had been dissolved and the National Co-operative Council 
(NCC) had been formed to perform its functions. The NCC, clearly a 
government and party organ, was itself replaced in July 1962 by the 
Central Co-operative Council (CCC). The CCC was a smaller, adminis­
trative unit within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare "respon­
sible for publicity and international representation of the co-operative 
movement."39
The flourishing and autonomous Co-operative Bank was also 
dissolved in November 1960. The Omaboe Committee was so im­
pressed by the Bank's achievements that it wrote: "At the time of its 
liquidation the Bank had assumed a very effective role in the develop­
ment of the Co-operatives. ... The Ghana Government guaranteed the 
Co-operatives to borrow up to £G2.05 million from the Commercial 
Banks for cocoa marketing and this sum was channelled through the 
Bank and so efficiently managed by it that it was never necessary for the 
Government to be called upon to honour its guarantee." Besides, "the 
effects of its (liquidation) contributed in no small measure to the financial 
plight (of) most of our present (co-operative) societies."40 The tone of this 
assessment suggests that the Committee regretted the Bank's dissolu­
tion. For the government and the CPP, however, it was as well that 
another autonomous centre of economic power had been eliminated.
The UGFC was renamed the United Ghana Farmers' Council Co­
operatives indicating its new character as an umbrella organization for 
all the country's co-operative and non-co-operative farmers and fisher­
men. Interestingly, the Omaboe Committee considered the new name 
untidy, and recommended instead the United Ghana Farmers' Co­
operatives Council (UGFCC), which was accepted.41
The UGFCC was, clearly, not a genuine co-operative organization, 
but a government and party instrument for subduing the farmers and 
fishermen who constituted a vital social force. For his contribution to this 
end, Martin Appiah-Danquah, the UGFCC's Secretary-General, was
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rewarded with the post of Minister Plenipotentiary and Ambassador 
Extraordinary— like Tettegah. However, the resentment of the majority 
of the Co-operative cocoa farmers arising from their elimination from 
cocoa marketing and the high taxation of the cocoa sector, contributed 
in no small measure to the general disaffection with the government 
and the CPP during 1960-1966.
At this juncture we must look briefly at Nkrumah's approach to 
Ghanaian private enterprise. Historically, it has been asserted, industri­
alization leading to transitions to pluralist democracies occurred on the 
initiative of individuals and groups that were able to develop entrepre­
neurial activity separate from and largely independent of the state.42 
However, it must be added, for individuals and groups of any modem 
society to fill such a role, it is imperative that they cultivate the habits of 
independence and self-reliance to enable them resist the state's monopo­
lization of all power. Thus qualified, the assertion generally holds. That 
is, the availability of a strong, autonomous and self dependent 
entreprenuerial class of people in civil society is one of the crucial 
prerequisites for the transition to pluralist democracy — a point to be 
taken on later.
As already noted, although the colonialists did not encourage the 
growth of a Ghanaian capitalist class, at independence the material for 
its emergence and development was available in the sizeable minority 
of Ghanaian business people, besides the wealthy cocoa farmers. These 
were very eager and ready to strike out on their own in industry, 
commerce and finance. What was lacking was an enabling institutional 
framework for harnessing indigenous ideas as well as human and 
material resources.43
Truly enough, in the immediate post-independence period 
Nkrumah himself, under W. Arthur Lewis's influence, recognized the 
necessity of a mixed economy in which indigenous private enterprise 
would play a significant role. But since his ultimate objective was the 
Marxist-socialist transformation of the inherited colonial economy, 
Nkrumah did not provide the needed framework for local business 
people to expand and diversify their activities. Instead, he took certain 
anti-capitalist measures which aimed at severely curtailing their activi­
ties in even the sphere allotted to them, namely, "small-scale Ghanaian 
pr vate enterprises." The "Work and Happiness" programme of 1962, 
eflected Nkrumah's "Left-tum" in 1961-62, emphasized the need 
lop at an accelerated ratethe state and co-operative sectors. These 
progressively replace all other economic structures and eventu­
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ally play the dominant role in the economy.
The dissolution of the old, autonomous co-operatives has already 
been noted. Their replacements under the UGFCC were highly regi­
mented. They eventually proved an unmitigated disaster, especially in 
agricultural production and marketing.
A great number of state enterprises were established to supplant 
indigenous private interests in industry, finance, and commerce. For­
eign private interests were directed to work with the state rather than 
with their indigenous counterparts. The aim was to cripple the private 
sector by breaking its links with foreign private interests. And, as the 
Ollenu Commission on import licences revealed in 1967,44 Nkrumah 
tried to cajole some successful Ghanaian industrialists-including the 
young Robert Ocran, part-owner and managing director of Mankoadze 
Fisheries - to abandon their private enterprises to assume management 
positions in state enterprises. Besides the ideological factor, there was 
another reason for Nkrumah's efforts at smothering the already fragile 
bases of the indigenous private enterprise sector. Since wealth is power, 
he knew that the emergence and development of a class of rich Ghanaian 
capitalists, who would constitutecountervailing centres of power in civil 
society, would gravely threaten his grip on state-power. Hence another 
crucial social force was stunted.45
Having penetrated and captured the labour and co-operative 
movements; and having suppressed the growth of domestic private 
enterprise, Nkrumah and the CPP relentlessly tried to spread their 
tentacles into other social institutions. Attempts were made to form CPP 
branches in religious organizations and introduce the Young Pioneer 
Movement in first and second cycle educational institutions but not 
without opposition from some school and religious authorities. Leaders 
were imposed on organizations like the Muslim Council and profes­
sional associations like the Association for the Advancement of Manage 
ment. NorweretheuniversitiesatLegon,Kumasi (whichbore Nkrumah's 
name), and Cape Coast spared. Chapters of the National Association of 
Socialist Students' Organization (NASSO) were opened in all of them. 
They were known as "study groups" devoted to the assimilation and 
propagation of "Nkrumaism".46
Although Nkrumah was statutorily the nominal Chancellor of the 
three universities, he was determined to direct and control academic 
affairs, particularly staff appointments and programmes of instruction. 
For example, he instituted what were called "Presidential" or "Osagyefo 
State Professors of Law" to teach "socialist jurisprudence and legality/
among others, at the Legon Law Faculty. Such appointments were not 
made through the normal academic procedures.
Then in November 1964 a committee was appointed to "work out 
a system to ensure the removal of all publications which do not reflect the 
ideology of the Party or are antagonistic to its ideas" — in plain words 
to prescribe "socialist" textbooks for teachers and students, and pro­
scribe those considered "capitalist."47 Earlier in January 1964 a CPP mob 
led by N.A. Welbeck, a Minister of State, descended on the Legon 
campus, attacked a number of the staff and students, and caused 
considerable damage to property — all in a bid to coerce the university 
into submission to Nkrumah. Immediately after, six expatriate mem­
bers of the academic staff were deported. In spite of all these efforts, 
Nkrumah could not completely penetrate and take over the universities, 
secondary schools, Christian churches, and the Ghana Bar Association.
By 1964, however, Ghana had become a de facto one-party 
dictatorhship. For, the numerical strength of the parliamentary opposi­
tion had been reduced to a trickle through the detention of some of its 
members or through enforced carpet crossing or exile by others. It only 
remained for the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964 (enacted after the 
managed referendum of that year) to regularize the situation. The Act 
legalized the CPP as the only political party. In early 1965 the National 
Assembly, elected in 1956, was dissolved. Then the C P Fs central 
committee (in effect Nkrumah, since as Life Chairman he appointed its 
members) nominated and declared 165 people "elected" unopposed as 
members of parliament.
Ghanaians as a whole were thus effectively disenfranchised and 
disempowered. The real meaning of what Nkrumah called a "People's 
Democracy" became clear power came from above and not from the 
bottom up; and the expression "The CPP is Ghana and Ghana is the C P F' 
in fact became "Nkrumah is Ghana and Ghana is Nkrumah."
The advent of a "People's Democracy" drastically affected the 
relations of individuals and social groups (both primary and secondary) 
to the state in many respects. First, political pluralism was effectively 
eliminated and the great majority of Ghanaians were equally effectively 
excluded from the political marketplace. For example, a vital mecha­
nism - the parliamentary opposition linking UP members and sympa- 
t s to the state —  was smashed. Recruitment into public office and 
to state resources depended on personal or party connections 
than on popular support or achievement. Citizen participation 
edefined to mean solidarity with, and unflinching loyalty to,
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Nkrumah and other party influentials. Hence the proliferation of 
patron-client networks with the inevitable corrupt practices. Many 
individuals and groups devised mechanisms for sheer survival outside 
the state apparatus (a phenomenon that was to become most pro­
nounced years later during the Acheampong and Rawlings regimes, 
especially).48 Some took refuge in religious worship, particularly in the 
pentecostal churches; while others in the urban slums carved niches for 
themselves in the growing informal economy; and still others simply 
"voted with their feet."
In the first half of the 1960s, the "culture of fear" (induced by the 
indiscriminate use of the PDA) notwithstanding, various individuals 
and social groups including the trade unions, students, universities, 
professionals, and the Christian churches voiced their disaffection with 
the government and party. Religious leaders protested the deification of 
Nkrumah. The trade unions, led by the Sekondi-Takoradi railway 
workers, in 1961 embarked on the most serious of the industrial 
actions that occurred in this period; it was ruthlessly suppressed.
A number of people, including Opposition leaders like Joe 
Appiah, Victor Owusu, William Ofori-Atta, and J.B. Danquah, were 
detained for allegedly instigating the strike. Danquah, who persis­
tently challenged the repressive laws in courts, was detained again 
after his release from the first detention. He could not survive the 
second. Meanwhile the underground political opposition was active; 
Accra shook periodically with bomb explosions; and there were some 
assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life.
The liberal-democratic experiment was aborted for two major 
related reasons. Civil society was itself fragile and limited in scope 
at independence. But since Nkrumah knowingly precluded pluralist 
democracy from his political agenda, it only followed logically that 
he would try to arrest the steady growth of the kind of civil society that 
was capable of nurturing it. Consequently, civil society became even 
more fragile and contracted than it was at independence. Yet not a 
few of its subunits managed to hold their ground somehow. In the 
event, civil society, together with a number of primary social groups 
in the rural communities and urban slums, contributed in no small 
way to the kind of situation that partly but significantly impelled some 




The National Liberation Council (NLC) was subsequently established 
with Major-General Gater Lt.-Gen. J. A. Ankrah as Chairman and Head 
of State and Mr. J.W.K. Harlley, the police chief, as his vice. In nature 
and design, the NLC was temporary and corrective. Its intention was 
to clear the Nkrumah mess and hand over power to liberal-minded 
and responsible people.
It valiantly tried to tackle the country's economic prob’ems like the 
fast deteriorating balance of payments position, raging inflation and the 
huge foreign indebtedness. It also sought to reduce the high level of state 
intervention in the economy by, inter alia dismantling several state 
enterprises and instituting measures for the sound management of the 
remainder. Its economic policies were not wholly negative; for in 1968 
it launched a two-year Development Plan which emphasized rural 
development.
However, as was correctly observed in 1968: 'The NLC brought to 
Ghana a freedom unknown for years ... for the vast majority of 
Ghanaians ... this, and not its economic policies, was its chief justifica­
tion" 49 —  despite the enormous economic difficulties that faced 
Ghanaians. It restored the judiciary's independence, freedom of 
expression including press freedom (though some form of press censor­
ship continued), and freedom of association (though party political 
activity was banned).
Indeed, the NLC encouraged associational life resulting in the 
resurgence of the subunits of civil society, reactivation of old ones 
dissolved by the Nkrumah regime (like the Ghana National Farmers' 
Union and Ghana Co-operative Farming and Marketing Association) 
and the emergence of new ones (like the Eastern Region Transport 
Co-operative Union and Ghana National Contractors' Association). 
A1 though it was not always as much of a necessity as it should have 
been for a civilian regime, the NLC made it a cardinal policy to create 
channels of communication and consultation with the public on numer­
ous issues through these voluntary organizations, a number of which 
were also pressure groups.50 For example, the NLC established a 
k of ad visory committees and appointed many commissions and 
ees of inquiry on a number of which representatives of some of 
pational groups especially served.
( ourse, all was not rosy. The trade unions became dissatisfied 
ow level of wages and other conditions of service which they
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attributed to the close rapport between the government and private 
sector employers who were mainly foreigners. They launched a series of 
strikes in 1966-69. One of the most serious of these involved the mine 
workers at the Ashanti Goldfields in Obuasi (which had been taken over 
by Lonhro) three of whom the police shot dead. Nor did the NLC 
actively encourage the re-organization of the revived co-operative 
movement along pre-1961 lines as it did with the TUC under B.A. 
Bentum — an attitude which the Busia administration also adopted. On 
the whole, however, civil society came back to life during 1966-1969. 
The NLC, finally, bequeathed to Ghanaians a liberal-democratic 
constitution crafted by a Constitutional Commission and approved by 
a Constituent Assembly on both of which significant segments of civil 
society were represented.
Following keenly contested general elections in August 1969 in 
which voter participation reached the high level of 63.2 per cent of 
registered voters, the NLC on 1 October 1969 gave way to a civilian 
government. The latter was formed by the Progress Party (PP) led by 
K. A. Busia, with the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by K.A. 
Gbedemah as the dominant opposition party. (The two were "revised 
versions" of the UP and CPP respectively.)
The PP government assumed office on the tidal wave of strong and 
widespread expectations that the foundations of pluralist democracy 
would be laid gradually but firmly. After all, the party's leadership 
made no secret of its great admiration for liberal democracy. It was also 
hoped that civil society during NLC rule had fairly well recovered from 
the shock it received from Nkrumah to lend its support to the second 
democratic experiment. Indeed, the prevailing conditions favoured its 
own growth and the fulfilment of the task thrust upon it.
First, under the Constitution, freedom of expression and associa­
tion was guaranteed; while preventive detention without trial and the 
single-party state were outlawed. Secondly, there existed a freely elected 
parliament comprising government and opposition members to serve 
as a channel of communication between state and society. Thirdly, in 
line with its preference for limited government and free enterprise, the 
PP government confined its role to establishing an institutional frame­
work for individuals and social groups to promote and fulfil their goals. 
The tasks of state agencies would be regulatory rather than intervention­
ist. The private enterprise sector would be reactivated with the emphasis 
on agriculture and rural development. The government in fact estab­
lished a separate Ministry for Rural Development, and enacted the
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Ghanaian Business Promotion Act to indigenize small - scale retail trade 
and business. These and other policies and measures gave associational 
life a new lease of life, and in a measure helped to widen the scope of civil 
society. And yet the second democratic experiment lasted barely twenty- 
seven months. This was due to many factors, a couple or so of which are 
discussed briefly here.
First, the government antagonized, and in some cases alienated, 
certain powerful social forces by some of its economic and political 
measures. Its inefficient implementation of the Aliens Compliance 
Order of 1969 resulted in the mass exodus of farmhands in the rural 
areas where it had its bulk of support. Many big cocoa farmers were 
affected and became dissatisfied. Moreover, in late 1971 its inability to 
pay the cocoa farmers for their crops —  as a result of the deepening 
economic crisis — compounded their disaffection with government.
On account of the increasing disparity of income and wealth, the 
workers became highly dissatisfied with the daily minimum wage of 75 
pesewas. In its July 1971 budget, aimed at tackling the worsening 
economic situation, the government refused to raise the minimum wage 
but simultaneously imposed on all working people a National Develop­
ment Levy to raise funds for rural development projects. In August 
many trade unions expressed their anger through wildcat strikes. To 
forestall a possible nation-wide strike, the government made the work­
ers all the angrier by passing the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 
1971 to enable "every union to be free and independent" but which in 
effect dissolved the TUC and fragmented the labour movement.
The growing economic difficulties resulting in general restiveness 
offered the remnants of Nkrumah's supporters the opportunity to 
revive and brazenly propagate his ideas and policies. The government 
rightly considered this development a serious threat to liberal democ­
racy. It, however, over-reacted in the most incompetent manner by 
banning the display of Nkrumah's portraits and the use of CPP slogans 
like "freedom" under the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1971.
Ealier in 1970 the government had dismissed 568 civil servants (an 
action popularly called "Apollo 568") under the transitional provisions 
of the 1969 Constitution; this action was unpopular because it was 
considered unfair. Even worse, the "SallahCase" that followed led Busia 
conflict with the judiciary. Mr. Sallah, a public servant, challenged 
gality of his dismissal in court. After the Supreme Court's decision 
favour, Busia remarked in a radio and television speech that no 
could compel the government to re - instate any dismissed public
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servant Although legally justified, that remark was unnecessary. For 
it gave the wrong impression that Busia of all people despised the rule 
of law and the independence of the judiciary; an impression which has 
persisted to this day.
The government also came into confrontation with the students, 
led by the National Union of Ghana Students' (NUGS), with its intro­
duction of the Students Loan Scheme by which grants to students 
would cover only tuition and examination fees. Furthermore, the stu­
dents angered the government by requesting all ministers of state to 
declare their assets as the Constitution required, and by supporting the 
call of ex-CPP supporters for an amnesty for all political exiles, includ­
ing Nkrumah.51 The student leaders were summoned before the bar 
of parliament and severely reprimanded. There followed a rash of 
student demonstrations and disturbances.
There was also the parliamentary Opposition to contend with. Its 
numerical weakness (35 to the PPs 105) was compounded by the early 
removal of its leader, K.A. Gbedemah, from parliament under the 
disqualification law. This action made his supporters all the more bitter. 
Perhaps, his removal, however legally justified, contributed in no 
insignificant measure to the undermining of the second democratic 
experiment. For, as one of the few opposition members with consider­
able parliamentary experience, he could have exerted a moderating 
influence on his younger and inexperienced colleagues. As it happened, 
the parliamentary Opposition most often adopted an uncompromising 
stand in debates on many burning issues, including "Apollo 568," the 
expulsion of aliens, dialogue with South Africa and the deteriorating 
economic situation. By late 1971 the Opposition had become highly 
distrustful of the government and virtually alienated from it.
Secondly, patron-dient networks with the attendant corruption 
and nepotism persisted. The general belief was that such networks 
benefitted only certain groups and individuals, implying that others had 
been deliberately excluded from access to state resources. Not surpris­
ingly, the government's frequent calls on the general public to tighten 
their belts —  while government and party officials, for example, were 
reportedly loosening theirs — were derided.
Thirdly, the government's not infrequent high-handed approach 
to issues and the corresponding uncompromising reactions of some 
groups, especially the parliamentary Opposition, showed to a large 
degree that the liberal-democratic ethos was yet to strike deep roots in 
the society as a whole. In January 1972 the very anti-democratic forces
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in the society, which the Busia government tried in vain to contain, 
conspired with a few of their counterparts in the armed forces to 
overthrow it. They were not resisted mainly because they cleverly used 
the generalized grievances (accentuated by the 44 per cent devaluation 
of the cedi in December 1971) of various social groups as a pretext for 
their action. But, as they discovered subsequently to their bitter cost, 
certain vital elements of civil society had become fairly self-consciously 
autonomous to tolerate for long any interference in their affairs 
and dictatorship itself.
1972-1981
The National Redemption Council (NRC) comprised six middle-level 
military officers and one civilian with Colonel (later General) I.K. 
Acheampong as Chairman and Head of State. In October 1975 the 
NRC became a purely advisory organ to the Supreme Military Council 
(SMCI) which replaced it as the ruling body. The SMCI comprised 
the commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Border Guards 
as well as the Inspector-General of Police with Acheampong as head.
The Acheampong regime proclaimed the establishment of a social­
ist, self-reliant society through "capturing the commanding heights of 
the economy" for Ghanaians as its ultimate goal. And in the first phase 
of its rule (1972-75), the government's grand designs on dvil society 
gradually unfolded. The government consciously avoided participa­
tory organs and sought to work out a grand alliance of the military, 
bureaucracy, and traditional rulers. Obviously neo-corporate in charac­
ter, the alliance was designed to depolitidze public life.52
In the early phase the government made bold attempts to tackle 
economic problems, notably in agriculture. The "Operation Feed Your­
self " programme, for example, was modestly successful; and popular 
discontent was defused to some extent. But from 1975 on, there set in a 
severe scarcity of "essential commodities," deterioration of the basic 
physical and social infrastructure, smuggling, trade malpractices, in­
cluding "kalabule" (black-marketeering and excessive trade profiteer­
ing through dubious means), rampant corruption with the government 
> e most notorious culprit, and sheer economic mismanagment. The 
omy was in a shambles.
It was against such a background that various organizations like 
ir Assocation and the Christian Churches demanded a return to
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civilian, constitutional rule. This demand was backed up by a series of 
protests and strikes by doctors, nurses, lawyers, students, university 
teachers, and so on. The government responded with massive repres­
sion, including the use of armed force and detention without trial under 
the Protective Custody decree.
Then, in a bid to defuse the very high political tension in the 
country, Acheampong conceived the idea of a "new system of govern­
ment" which he termed "Union Government" (Unigov). Such a system 
would take the form of a national government without political parties; 
and it would include representatives of the armed forces, police, and the 
civilian population (ATC). According to Acheampong, party politics in 
Ghana had "brought division, nepotism, and other evils." On the 
other hand, the inclusion of soldiers would end all coups!
An Ad-hoc Committee was appointed to collect and collate the 
views of Ghanaians on Unigov. In its report the Committee recom­
mended the following, among others: a national government without 
political parties, and without military or police participation either; an 
Executive Presidency, a unicameral legislature, as well as a purely 
advisory Council of State; and a national referendum on Unigov to be 
held on 30 March, 1978.
Predictably, theSMCI launched an extensive propaganda machin­
ery to enlist support for Unigov. A number of government sponsored 
pro-Unigov groups were formed. These included the Ghana Peace and 
Solidarity Council, the Friends of Society, and National Charter Com­
mittees. The TUC leadership as a whole was pro-Unigov (and in fact 
very pro-SMC), although the majority of wage earners were anti- 
Unigov. The chiefs as a whole sided with the government as usual, and 
so were strongly for Unigov.
In sum, Unigov, as Acheampong originally conceived it, was 
meant to marginalize, and atomize for easy manipulation, civil society 
in order to legitimize his military dictatorship. Unigov was 
neo-fascist in conception, design, and structure. But Acheampong's 
efforts had the unintended consequence of inducing greater cohesion 
and solidarity among a number of the subunits of civil society, and 
fortifying their resolve to resist dictatorship. Notable among them were 
professional associations like the Bar, Medical, and University Teach­
ers' Associations —  which operated under the newly formed Associa­
tion of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB) —  and the stu­
dents led by NUGS. There also emerged politically-oriented groups like 
the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) with
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K. A. Gbedemah and General Afrifa among its leaders and the Front for 
the Prevention of Dictatorship (FPD) led by Dr. Safo-Adu. These 
organizations and a few others fiercely resisted the establishment of 
Unigov which they correctly perceived as another form of military 
dictatorship in a different garb. Acheampong in vain used massive 
armed force to halt them in their tracks.
In the wake of the public anger that greeted the manipulated 
referendum results, Acheampong's colleagues on the SMCI acted to 
remove what they disingenuously called his "one-man show" by forc­
ing him into retirement. They reconstituted the ruling body which 
came to be called SMCII with Lt.-Gen. F.W.K. Akuffo as the new 
Chairman and Head of State. SMCII lasted barely a year when it was 
overthrown on 4 June, 1979 by junior officers and other ranks.
Although civil society contributed significantly to the demise of 
Acheampong's dictatorship, it suffered a degree of contraction under it. 
To cope with the harsh economic situation in this period, numerous 
groups and individuals adopted a variety of strategies for survival, and 
became rather indifferent to the state and its agencies. These included 
extensive smuggling, a complex and illegal parallel market, reversion to 
subsistence agriculture, the mass exodus of trained and untrained 
manpower, and extensive participation in the informal economy.53 It is 
also indisputable that the Acheampong regime created the conditions 
for the emergence of a culture of extreme left-wing radicalism and 
violence in Ghanaian society and politics from 4 June, 1979 onwards.
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that was subse­
quently formed was headed by Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings. Earlier on 15 May, 
1979 he had staged an abortive coup, which, according to him, would 
have launched a Mengistu-style revolution in Ghana. The AFRC thus 
embarked on what it called a "house-cleaning" exercise involving the 
purging of the top brass of the armed forces; and a number of high- 
ranking officers including three former heads of state were executed. 
The exercise was extended to the larger society resulting in the most 
callous brutalization of civilians including women traders, especially. 
The scale of violence that occurred in this brief AFRC period was 
i ^paralleled in Ghana's post-independence political and social experi- 
e> before 4 June, 1979. It was to be surpassed during the greater part 
era of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). 
he AFRC's project was to subvert what was perceived as the 
lissible elitist bases of civil society, restructure social and political 
ions along populist lines, and introduce probity, accountability and
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social justice into public life. The project, which could not be completed 
within this brief period, was to be continued by the PNDC.
The constitutionally elected government of the People's National 
Party (PNP) under Dr. Hilla Limann was inaugurated on 24 September, 
1979, thus apparently ending eight years of military, dictatorial misrule 
of which Ghanaians as a whole had become tired. The tasks that faced 
the new government were formidable, to put it mildly.
As a result of Acheampong's massive economic mismanagment 
coupled with the AFRC's reckless and erratic economic measures, the 
economy had ground almost to a halt. The level of stocks of goods in the 
system was abysmally low; and the state coffers were virtually empty. 
Politically, the new government had to contend with Rawlings' ominous 
threat issued in his handing-over address that it was on probation; and 
he was still visibly around to stir up anti-establishment sentiments 
among the populace with his populist rhetorics. The PNP itself had 
hardly settled down to the business of ruling when it began to be tom 
apart by dissension among its leaders centred on power brokerage, the 
distribution of patronage, and accusations and counter-accusations of 
corrupt deals.
Fully aware that there was no magic formula for arresting the 
deplorable economic situation, the government adopted a pragmatic 
approach. It introduced a trade liberalization programme (for which 
it was condemned by some Marxist-oriented radicals), initiated an 
investment code to attract foreign capital, and eventually succeeded 
in having the international economic blockade slapped on Ghana during 
the AFRC period lifted. However, the liberalization programme re­
sulted in soaring prices; and by the end of 1981 the inflationary rate 
had reached 116.5%. The production of cocoa, the country's major 
foreign exchange earner, was on the decline; and even the reduced 
quantity available was locked up on the farms. Th^ factories were 
operating far below capacity, what with the inadequate supply of spare 
parts and raw materials. It was evident that the PNP government 
needed a much longer time to turn the economy around.
On the political front, there was freedom of expression; and the 
mass media could publicize opposing views without fear —  although 
inept attempts to remove some editors of the state-owned newspapers, 
like Elizabeth Ohene of the Daily Graphic, were unpardonable. But it is 
to the credit of the government that it believed in political pluralism. No 
wonder the political opposition was very vigorous, visible and outspo­
ken both within and outside parliament. And it was even able, with the
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support of some PNP parliamentarians, to defeat a vital government 
budget! Civil society, despite its vicissitudes under Acheampong and 
the AFRC, had fairly well recovered and was vibrant. These were 
healthy signs. It was, therefore, hoped that with time the third attempt 
at pluralist democracy would succeed.
But some social forces were sceptical, if not downright cynical, and 
impatient. The majority of workers in state employment, particularly in 
the civil service and public corporations like the Ghana Industrial 
Holding Corporation (GEHOC) and the Tema docks, resented the low 
level of wages and the high price levels with the attendant drastic fall in 
living standards. Consequently there were rampant wildcat strikes 
culminating in the TUC-backed nation-wide strike in 1981. Salary 
increases for parliamentarians further fuelled workers' discontent; and 
some GIHOC workers, led by Amartey Kwei (a future PNDC member), 
invaded parliament and damaged some property. Their alienation from 
the system was almost total.
The students were another source of dissent and discontent. In 
1980 there was a series of student demonstrations on the university 
campuses due to the deteriorating conditions there; a number of stu­
dents were injured and one was killed, resulting in the closure of the 
universities. In May 1981 the NUGS issued a statement deploring the 
worsening economic situation and asking the government to take 
stringent measures to arrest it. There again followed disturbances on 
the campuses. Other educational institutions also had their fair share 
of violent demonstrations and disturbances as happened, for instance, 
at the Nkawkaw Secondary School and the Foso Training College in 
April 1980.54 The impact of the violent AFRC interlude was being felt.
There emerged also certain radical left-wing and anti-establish­
ment groups which became self-appointed watchdogs over the 
government's activities in order to protect the "gains" of June 4 and 
promote its objectives. These included the June Fourth Movement 
(JMF) supported by Rawlings, and the New Democratic Movement 
(NDM). And within the PNP itself the Kwame Nkrumah Revolution­
ary Guards (KNRG), led by Johnny Hansen (a prospective PNDC 
etary), called for a return to Nkrumah's version of Marxist-Leninist 
scientific socialism.
was groups such as these — radical workers, students, intellec- 
pined by radical soldiers and backed up to the hilt by Rawlings 
id not give pluralist democracy the dog of a chance to thrive in 
drd Repbulic. Like Nkrumah, their mentor, their political agenda
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excluded it. And, thanks to the Limann government's undoubted 
failings and ineptitude, the liberal-democratic forces of civil society, 
represented notably by the professionals as a whole, were not suffi­
ciently strong to resist the onslaught.
The PNDC Era
Interestingly, it is arguable that the bulk of the population were not 
expecting a violent, unconstitutional change of government —  despite 
their harsh living conditions during the Limann era. Hence, most 
probably, the general public's initial lukewarm reaction to the coup of 31 
December, 1981. Some PNP stalwarts reportedly even demonstrated 
against the coup in the Upper Region. So, public demonstrations in 
support of the coup had to be stage-managed by organizations like the 
JMF and KNRG in the regional capitals besides Accra.55 In the early 
phase the PNDC's support-base was mainly urban and derived from 
workers, students, leftist intellectuals, the youth, as well as the urban 
unemployed.
The PNDC led by J.J. Rawlings declared that its major aim was the 
"revolutionary transformation of Ghana" which would involve the 
complete "transfer of power from the group of power brokers to the 
ordinary people of this country" to enable them participate effectively in 
the decision - making process. The distinguishing features of the "new 
participatory democracy" were said to be probity, accountability, and 
the pursuit of social justice.
To make "the ordinary people's power" a reality certain popular 
organs were established. These included People's and Workers' De­
fence Commitees (PDCs and WDCs) in the community and at work­
places respectively, public tribunals, the Citizens' Vetting Committee 
(CVC), the National Investigations Committee (NIC) and Mobilization 
Squads (Mobisquads). A repressive security apparatus emerged to back 
up the PNDC: the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), Civil Defence 
Organisation (CDO), People's Militia, and Commandos etc. An equally 
repressive set of "laws" like the Protective Custody and Habeas Corpus 
(Amendment) laws appeared in the statute books.
The Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) and later 
the National Defence Committee (NDC) which replaced the INCC were 
formed to oversee the activities of the Defence Committees. Member­
ship of the latter was initially restricted to "the ordinary people" who
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were sharply contrasted with "the citizens." The former encompassed 
the underprivileged, disadvantaged, marginalized, downtrodden, and 
the exploited; while the latter covered the social elites — professionals 
like lawyers, judges, managers, doctors, bureaucrats, university teach­
ers; wealthy business people; top military and police officers, and so on.
'The citizens" were described as parasites who should be rooted 
out of their privileged positions. Accordingly, they were targeted for 
ridicule and attacks of all kinds, including murder-such as happened to 
the three judges and retired army officer. Little wonder that the PNDC 
era as a whole was marked by lawlessness and violence on an unprec­
edented scale in line with Rawlings' call for "the democratization of 
violence."  Therefore, the PDCs, WDCs and the'NDC were dissolved in 
January 1984 and replaced with the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution (CDRs) and a CDR Secretariat not so much because of their 
violent activities as because they threatened to become the "parallel 
government."
In creating these organs the PNDC sought to bypass the estab­
lished subunits of civil society and deal directly with the ordinary 
people: no intermediary organizations of the "old older" should inter­
pose themselves between such people and the state.56 True citizen 
participation was thus redefined to mean direct involvement of the 
ordinary people in the revolutionary transformation of Ghana and the 
struggle against "bourgeois decadence." The true citizen was the true 
representative of the exploited majority. Whoever did not answer to 
such a description could not become part of the revolutionary project.
The efforts at ignoring the major elements of civil society had the 
serious consequence of depriving the state of the services of the very 
people with the technocratic skills necessary for its efficient and effective 
operation. Not surprisingly, then, in this populist phase of the PNDC the 
state was in serious danger of falling apart in the face of many staggering 
problems. There were severe food shortages due partly to the drought 
and bush fires, and worsened by the return of about one million 
Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria in January 1983; the physical infra­
structure was on the verge of collapse; social services were fast deterio­
rating; and the standard of living was far worse than it was during the 
second half of Acheampong's dictatorship. Besides, Rawlings' own 
r pulist rhetoric and policies compounded these problems by frighten- 
vay potential Western donors and investors. Ghana's bargaining 
on with the West was considerably weakened thereby. 
Fortunately, Ghana's social and political life did not disintegrate
101
because people adopted certain survival strategies to cope with the 
situation. These included emigration to other parts of West Africa, 
Europe and North America (the "exit" option), the involvement of more 
people in the informal sector resulting in its rapid growth; the prolifera­
tion of welfare societies, credit unions, artisan groups, and farmers' co - 
operatives for mutual support; and the emergence of pentecostal and 
charismatic groups in addition to the established muslim and orthodox 
Christian organizations to offer spiritual and material succour to people 
in the midst of great suffering.57
It was against this grim background that the PNDC made overtures 
to the old social elites by drastically reviewing the original form and role 
of the Defence Committees. In his famous broadcast of 6 March, 1983, 
Rawlings accused the Defence Committees of "exercising power with­
out authority." And in a reconciliatory mood he invited "the profession­
als, men and women of religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone to break 
out of their insulating walls and shells and give the national effort a 
push ." He then pleaded: 'The character and commitment of the 
individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes 
or the position one holds." 58
Thus the revolutionary and class approach to citizenship was 
discarded. Membership of the Defence Committees became open to all 
classes of people; and the requirement of "revolutionary commitment" 
was only a gloss. If the motto of the P/'WDCs was 'Tower to the people", 
that of the CDRs was: "Mobilize, Defend and Produce . "  The CDRs 
were to contribute to economic growth and improvement, and leave 
politics alone.
The gearing of the CDRS towards production and productivity and 
the harnessing of professional expertise were required for the successful 
implementation of the harsh IMF/World Bank-sponsored Economic 
Recovery Programe and later the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ERP/SAP); their harsh implementation by the PNDC alienated not 
only most ordinary people but also a sizeable number of the social elites 
many of whom still safely distanced themselves from the regime. And 
its urban support base eroded considerably. It is arguable that the main 
beneficiaries of the economic reforms were the rural dwellers, notably 
the cash crop producers. But their support for the PNDC was rather 
diffuse and unorganized. The establishment of the District Assemblies 
was designed to canalize such a support.59 In spite of its radical review 
of the populist notion of dtizensliip the PNDC still monopolized power, 
averse as it was to power sharing. In fact, the Defence Committees in
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their heydays did not even serve as channels of communication and 
consultation between the PNDC and "the ordinary people": for ex­
ample, they were not consulted on a crucial issue like the negotiation 
with the IMF/World Bank on the economic recovery programme.
We now turn to attempts made to penetrate, control or take over 
business, labour, farmers', women's and religious organizations. Re­
garding the first two the initiative came from the Defence Committees; 
while regarding the rest the PNDC acted on its own.
In January 1982 the WDC took over the Ghana Tobacco Company 
(GTC) and appointed its own Managing Director. It was alleged that the 
Interim Management Committee (IMC) which replaced the Managing 
Director before the 31st December coup was "reactionary and hostile 
to workers' interests." The Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority 
(GHAPOHA) was taken over by the WDC in February 1982 for the 
alleged corruption of the management. A five-member IMC was 
appointed to run its affairs. In March 1982 the WDC took over the Subin 
Timber Company Limited and appointed a twelve-member IMC to 
manage the factory.60 These actions which contravened the Companies 
Code of 1963 (Act 179) were legalized by the Interim Management 
Committee (Public Boards and Corporations) Law,1982 (PNDCL 6). In 
November 1982 a section of the workforce took over the Ghana Textiles 
Printing (GTP) Limited at Tema, dismissed the management, and 
appointed an IMC comprising workers' representatives. The PNDC 
susbequently endorsed these actions.61
In April 1982 militant elements in the labour movement, not 
without PNDC connivance, overthrew the existing TUC leadership 
under the Acting Secretary- General, J.R. Baiden, and appointed IMCs to 
run the TUC and the seventeen unions. The chairman of the TUC's IMC 
was E.K. Aboagye. Before the 31st December coup, these radical 
elements had constituted themselves into the Association of Local 
Unions (ALU) with Amartey Kwei as a leading member. It is true to say 
that most workers were disenchanted with the old TUC leadership 
under A.M. Issifu for its collaboration with successive governments in 
the 1970s and with its lack of concern for their welfare. However, it is 
truer to say that the PNDC, through the ALU-WDC faction, sought to 
replace real shop floor union organization with the WDCs.62 In January 
1 982 the Accra-Tema workers went on a stage-managed demonstration 
1; pport of the PNDC at which Issifu was prevented from speaking.
C signed soon after this episode.) But Rawlings addressed the
ng and urged workers to decide for themselves whether or not
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they would continue to obey the existing TUC leadership. Petitions for 
abolishing the TUC were later published in the state-owned newspa­
pers.
After his ouster Baiden justifiably said: 'The PNDC is afraid to 
tolerate the existence of legitimate, free and independent institutions 
that might question some aspects of the Revolution ." 63 The labour 
movement succeeded in resisting the take-over when the IMC was 
thrown out with the election of a new TUC leadership headed by A.K. 
Yankey as the Secretary-General. Given the type of repression that could 
be deployed against it, the TUC leadership adopted a policy of collabo­
ration with the PNDC — although there were periodic protests against 
some government policies and actions.
To penetrate farmers' organizations the PNDC actively encour­
aged the formation of the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-opera­
tives (GAFACOOPS) in 1982. The organization could not entice large 
numbers of farmers into its fold for several reasons. First, among its 
leadership were certain people, notably Martin Appiah-Danquah, who 
were linked with the infamous CPP-controlled UGFCC. Secondly, 
under the ERP/SAP the PNDC tended to rely more heavily on the 
private sector for the distribution of agricultural items than on 
GAFACOOPS. Thirdly, as a state-sponsored organization,GAFACOOPS 
was not very strongly placed to negotiate producer price increases with 
the government; a step which would have made it more attractive to 
farmers. Finally, GAFACOOPS was afflicted with mismanagement, 
corruption and struggle for power.64 It collapsed eventually and was 
replaced by the equally state-sponsored National Council of Farmers 
and Fishermen (NCFF) which was not enthusiastically patronized by 
farmers.
Concerning the penetration of women's organizations the PNDC 
has been rather successful with the 31st December Women's Movement 
(DWM). It was founded in May 1982 by Nana Agyemang Rawlings 
and a few others with the active support of her husband. To all intents 
and purposes, it has been a state-sponsored, and not a non - governmen­
tal, organization. There is no doubt that, despite its laudable efforts in 
other directions, its major purpose has been the mobilization of political 
support for the PNDC and the "revolution" as its name shows. Al­
though it has enjoyed considerable PNDC logistical support, the DWM 
has failed to supplant all women's voluntary organizations.
Besides numerous instances of harassment, intimidation and ridi­
cule, the PNDC sought to exercise control over religious organizations,
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notably the orthodox Christian churches, through the Religious Bodies 
(Registration) Law, 1989 (PNDCL 221). This law required all religious 
bodies to apply for government approval through the National Com­
mission on Culture for their continued existence. A religious body 
might be prohibited if the Commission was satisfied, inter alia, that
(i) its activities might lead to civil disobedience, constitute a public 
nuisance, and be contrary to public order, interest or morality; (ii) 
acceptable standards of decency were not observed at its meetings; and
(iii) there were any other reasonable grounds for doing so. The 
Commission's decisions were final; and a prohibited religious body7s 
assets could be forfeited to the state.
The law was clearly meant to cripple religious freedom, and assure 
state control of religious organizations. The Christian Council, the 
Catholic Bishops' Conference and other religious leaders opposed it on 
these grounds. They argued further that the law was unnecessary 
because adequate legal provisions already existed for dealing with all 
types of misconduct enumerated in it. In a 17-point statement the 
Catholic Bishops' Conference, for example, rightly observed that "the 
law was setting a precedent which might be used to proscribe all forms 
of religious expression in the future."65 It is to the eternal credit of the 
orthodox Christian churches especially, that they refused to register 
under this obnoxious law. After a series of futile mediation efforts, the 
matter was quietly shelved. The churches successfully resisted the 
PNDC's attempt to subdue them not only because they have been 
centres of spiritual and economic power but also because of their strong 
commitment to religious freedom. By so doing they struck a blow for 
autonomy as such.
In spite of the culture of fear and silence induced by the regime of 
repressive laws and actions, many individuals and social groups often 
criticized and opposed certain policies and measures of the PNDC. The 
society as a whole, led by the Association of Recognized Professional 
Bodies (ARPB), Ghana Bar Association (GBA), Christian Council of 
Ghana and Catholic Bishops' Conference, condemned the abduction 
and murder of the three high court judges and a retired army officer in 
'82. But for the public outcry, that tragic event would have been 
nietly covered up. The government's violation of human rights, 
c recovery package, education reform programme etc. were 
aticized by many social groups. Many trade unions embarked 
ries of strikes in reaction to the government's intransigent 
o consider their just demands. The opposition of the churches
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as a whole to the Religious Bodies Registration law has already been 
mentioned. The GBA perceived very early the inherent defects of the 
public tribunals and rejected them by disallowing its members to 
appear before them.
Realizing that "nothing can beat" representative, pluralist democ­
racy, many social groups began as early as 1982 to demand a return to 
constitutional rule.65 The GBA staged a strike from April to May 1983 
and called for the immediate return to civilian rule. Encouraged by 
developments in the former Soviet bloc and pressures from Western 
donors from 1987 onwards, the domestic social forces intensified the 
pressure on the PNDC until it finally caved in.66 Obviously, then, civil 
society was not quiescent; and its bases were fairly well strengthened as 
a result of certain developments that occurred during the implementa­
tion of the ERP/SAP.
A major unintended and paradoxical effect of ERP/SAP,that is 
from the PNDC's view point, was the proliferation of voluntary associa­
tions (at the local and intermediate levels of society) covering occupa­
tional, sodal service, community, relgious and human rights interests. 
Most of these groups began to accummulate resources and capital 
independent of the state and establish their own autonomous spheres of 
action. There emerged also a new generation of entrepreneurs who were 
neither linked to the state nor dependent on its resources. More mobile 
and better off than the salaried employees in the state and private sectors, 
they joined the established elements of civil society to demand change. 
These remarkable developments were due partly to the growing 
informal sector where many small-scale industries had sprung up and 
partly to the inflow of resources from abroad. The scope of civil society 
thus expanded to some extent.67
But while such developments were occurring rather impercepti­
bly, the PNDC was simultaneously trying to obstruct the activities of 
some established local entrepreneurs (like Dr. Safo-Adu and B.A. 
Mensah) against the very logic of the ERP/SAP: namely, to give free 
rein to market forces and energize private enterprise. Like Nkrumah, 
Rawlings feared the emergence of a group of economically powerful 
domestic entrepreneurs who might challenge the PNDC's monopoliza­
tion of power. The emergence of the new breed of Ghanaian entrepre­
neurs shovys that, for the sake of economic development at least, the 
Rawlings strategy is in the long run unviable.
Although it reluctantly accepted the demand for a return to plural­
ist democracy, the PNDC was unprepared to share power with, much
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less see it fall into the hands of, the pre-31 st December social and political 
elites. This explains why the transitional programme was crafted 
without consulting them. Probably, the vital elements of civil society 
could have done much more in resisting not only this programme but 
also the PNDC dictatorship itself. There is no mistaking the signs, 
however, that, given the severe constraints in which it operated, civil 
society has bounced back to life. The amazing rapidity with which the 
so-called social clubs were formed just before the ban on party politics 
was lifted in May 1992 attests to this. In this respect the private press, 
whatever its defects, has played a crucial role in disseminating vital 
information about certain government activities which otherwise 
would have been shrouded in secrecy — as usual.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Since independence Ghana's civil society has alternated precariously 
between contraction and expansion, depending on the nature of the 
regime in power. Ghana's experience of pluralist democracy has been 
intermittent and brief because the liberal-democratic culture has not 
struck deep roots in the society as a whole; and yet a society is never 
better than the individuals and groups that constitute it. On the other 
hand, dictatorship has not persisted, over a very long period of, say, two 
decades at one particular point in time because of the subtle resistance 
and aversion to this type of government on the part of certain vital 
subunits of civil society supported by some primary groups. Another 
marked feature is that massive poisonous doses of violence, hatred, 
bitterness and vindictiveness have been injected into our political cul­
ture by especially the AFRC and the PNDC.
Despite its vicissitudes, no dictatorship has succeeded in decree­
ing civil society out of existence. For some vital segments of civil 
society— like the Bar Association, Catholic Bishops' Conference, Chris­
tian Council of Ghana, NUGS (in the greater part of its existence), 
University Teachers Association of Ghana £UTAG), Registered Nurses' 
Association, Medical Association, Traders' Associations and so on, 
have over the years evolved a liberal culture of resistance to state 
erence in their affairs. The pluralist ethos has also proved fairly 
le in these intermediary organizations as well as in a number of 
oups. On the whole, one may conclude that civil society has 
s even more vibrant at present. But it is suggested that current
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developments should not be taken for granted. If civil society is to 
evolve further to provide an enabling environment for the continued 
democratization of Ghana along pluralist lines, then a number of 
conditions must be fulfilled. Failing that, civil society will be rather 
weak to prevent yet another onslaught on our fourth attempt at plu­
ralist democracy.
First, the various subunits of civil society must be characterized by 
the following, among others: (i) membership must be voluntary and 
must cut across existing social cleavages; (ii) the groups must themselves 
be capable of democratic governance since charity begins at home: i.e. 
their internal structures must be democratic, thereby providing mean­
ingful participation for their members; and executive officers must be 
held accountable to the entire membership and must be seen to be 
transparent in their transactions; (iii) the spirit of initiative as well as 
independence of mind and action must be religiously cultivated; they 
must be autonomous both organizationally and financially to prevent 
their becoming appendages to the government.
In these respects our farmers' and workers' organizations, for 
example, have been woefully lacking; they have hung on the coat-tails 
of successive governments for too long. Farmers must cultivate the 
capacity, so spendidly displayed by earlier generations of farmers in the 
colonial days, to form their own organizations without looking up to 
government to do it for them. That way, they will be their own masters. 
If in difficulty, they can enlist the services of the appropriate consultants. 
Trade union leaders must change from the practice of "entrepreneurial 
leadership", whereby the union is considered a business enterprise to 
profit its "owner", to the practice of "bureaucratic leadership", whereby 
the organization itself and one's professional career in it become the 
over-riding concern.68
Secondly, it is important that as many social forces as are capable 
become centres of economic power to enable them both to avoid 
dependence on the state for survival and to resist its power-monopo­
lizing tendencies. Of course, as intimated earlier, the relationship 
between economic power and the capacity to resist autocracy is very 
complex. History is replete with examples of economically powerful 
groups and individuals who were partly responsible for the rise of 
autocracies, as exemplified by Hitler's case. A group of individuals, 
who are slaves to the acquisitive instincts but have not cultivated the 
habits of autonomy (being free from intentional interference and co­
ercion by others) and tolerance, are most unlikely to resist the impulses
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of others to dominate society, if they themselves are able to strike it 
rich. Until a significant number of social forces learn this lesson, no 
amount of economic power will induce them to lend their support to 
pluralist democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic; instead they are most 
likely to aid the cause of anti-democratic, power-hungry adventurers 
still in our midst who know no other instrument for deciding political 
issues than fraud and violence.
In the post-independence era, business groupings, like those of 
farmers, have so far not played a conspicuous role in the resistance to 
dictatorship —  although not a few business people in their individual 
capacities have contributed as best they could. To enable business play 
its expected role, the various business associations — like the Chamber 
of Commerce, Manufacturers' and Employers' Associations —  should 
be strengthened organizationally, and brought together under one 
umbrella organization similar to the Confederation of British Industries 
(CBI), while simultaneously retaining their individual identities. In this 
way, they will be able to counteract more effectively government 
encroachment on their autonomy and become a more powerful social 
force. It is hoped that the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) will be 
nurtured to fill such a role. The same applies to the scattered Trades 
Associations of carpenters, masons, tailors, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, 
bakers, hairdressers, auto-mechanics et al as well as to small-scale 
business groupings. Their importance and relevance for the future 
growth and health of civil society cannot be over-emphasized.
Thirdly, dvil society, for its own sake, must try to contain the 
menace of ethnicity and eventually free itself from it as much as 
possible —  since ethnicity belongs to the category of primary units. 
It is true to say that in independent Ghana ethnic conflict has so far 
not resulted in separatist movements; but ethnicity has surfaced now 
and again as a divisive factor in some districts and at the national 
level. Since political support has derived mainly from the manipula­
tion of local issues and concerns, ethnic identification has not infre­
quently been very much pronounced, particularly during elections. It 
is also evident in people's perceptions of the pattern of the distribution 
of political and public service appointments as well as development 
projects. Fourthly, and related to the third, the intermediary organi- 
i ions of civil society provide many of the building blocks for political 
ies —  as already noted. In Ghana it is imperative that if the 
ging political parties are to be viable vehicles of national integra- 
, then they must be genuinely ethnically cross-cutting by trying to
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reach beyond their safe constituencies to forge informal links with 
those constituencies they may regard as "enemy territory".
Fifthly, as many groups of civil society as possible should wake 
up to the imperative of concerted action in the face of clear and present 
danger to the safety and welfare of our dear republic. It is arguable 
that hitherto, except on a few occasions, there has been a singular lack 
of dialogue and collaboration among the various subunits for mutual 
benefit. Almost all of them have appeared to be rather parochial in 
pursuing their own interests, forgetting that united action -  as and 
when necessary -  could make them formidable social forces to be 
reckoned with by the managers of the state of whatever political 
persuasion. The very limited success of the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces (ADF) and its very brief existence throw into bold relief 
the point being made here.
Finally, to facilitate the constant dialogue and united action just 
mentioned, what we may call a constituent group of constitutional 
democrats will have to emerge. It will comprise a sizeable minority 
of the more active, vital and enlightened segments of the citizenry who 
are committed to liberty and justice (in all its dimensions) and are 
determined to institute, promote and sustain a just constitutional- 
democratic polity, irrespective of the heavy odds stacked against 
them. And they will serve as catalysts and inspirers to the rest of civil 
society. It must be added that these are onerous responsiblities which 
must be undertaken with the greatest sense of humility, tolerance, and 
patriotism.
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Signalling the beginning of the reforms was the Coussey Constitutional 
Committee — an entirely African body charged with drawing up a 
constitution for the country. Most importantly it proferred a legislature 
that would be elected partially by universal adult suffrage fused with 
some indirectly elected members. The implication was the introduction 
of an electoral system — an obvious inducement to competitive politics. 
Indeed, the Secretary of State for the colonies, commenting on the 
Coussey Report, observed that for a parliamentary system to work 
successfully, it would require a well tried party system.1
That political and ideological differences which prevailed in the 
leadership of the UGCC suggested incipient partisan politics to be at 
work. Considering himself as a Marxist, Dr. Nkrumah was pitted 
against the generality of the leadership of the UGCC —  whom he 
regarded as conservatives — indeed reactionaries.2 When he formed 
his own party in June, 1949, he was giving vent to those ideological 
differences.
The Convention Peoples' Party (CPP)
Seeking a society that would realize egalitarian principles, the Conven­
tion Peoples' Party (CPP) opted for a socialist state. In its revised 
constitution of 1961, it claimed that its purpose was to organize the 
common people "and lead the masses in the struggle for the attainment 
of National Independence and Self-determination for the chiefs and 
people."
But far more relevant to the common man was the promise "to 
promote the political, social and economic emancipation of the people,
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more particularly, those who depend directly upon their own exertions 
by hand and by brain for the means of life ."3
Anticipating the Coussey Report which was submitted on October 
26,1949, the CPP according to Padmore, was already well organized 
with a network of branches throughout the colony area and Ashanti. It 
later penetrated into the Northern Territories.4 Elaborating a little more 
on this organization, David Apter noted that the CPP was highly 
organized; it could be likened both to a Communist party and to the 
British Labour party: the latter allowed for more public latitude to 
members than the former, while the former presented the structure of 
democratic control.5 Possessing organizational unity, the party never­
theless allowed members holding differing views to participate effec­
tively. Accordingly, David Apter says that the party was far more 
flexible than a communist party and was committed to the form and 
discipline of unity than any particular dogma or party line.6
The Rival Political Parties
If the Coussey constitution provided the occasion for the exercise of 
even partial suffrage, it unleashed a plethora of parties set to compete for 
political power.
The various minor parties — the National Democratic Party led by 
the well known lawyer — Nii Amaa Ollenu; the Gold Coast Liberal 
Democratic Party, led by Nii Kwabena Bonne; the Peoples' Democratic 
Party and the Freedom Defence Party, all appeared to be parties of the 
right, advocating free enterprise economy. However, the National 
Democratic Party was prepared to see the country undergo about 
fifteen more years of British tutelage to equip the people further for 
the proper management of their economy.
Bereft of its radical elements, the UGCC led by Dr. J.B. Danquah 
was committed to liberal democracy and free enterprise. Its programme 
aimed at ensuring that the optimum diffusion of private enterprise and 
ownership of property would be developed alongside the maximum 
attainment of personal liberties within the framework of the welfare 
state.7 Thus the programme of the UGCC was more enlightened than 
at of the National Democratic Party.
Offered as an instalment in the constitutional evolution of the 
* ntry, the limited adult suffrage was applicable in the cities —  Accra, 
lasi, Cape Coast and Sekondi-Takoradi. Elections in the rural
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areas was indirect, and through electoral colleges.
The outcome of these arrangements was that the ensuing elections 
of 1951 failed to give a better picture of the national strength of the 
political parties. TheCPPsecuredatotal of 36 out of 84 seats; theUGCC 
obtained 4 seats, Independents 3 seats, chiefs and traditional rulers, 32 
seats. Included in the legislature were to be representatives of special 
interests: 2 ; and ex-officios: 3.8
This performance of the CPP assessed by some authorities at­
tribute to the CPP its appeal to the masses and a mastery in the 
manipulation of the party's key symbols. "It had a clear-cut orientational 
focus which (excited) the general public, giving general opportunity to 
participate and serving to reassure and define for the public a programme 
of progress in which self-respect and income would be provided.9
The Coalescing of the Opposition and The Elections of 1954
Contesting the election of 1951 and winning this election having led to 
the formation of government, placed the CPP in a dilemma of having to 
reconcile its slogan of 'Self-government Now" with a partial self- 
government conceded and accepted by it. Although Dr. Nkrumah 
claimed that the move was tactical, Basil Davidson says that there was 
a minority in the CPP leadership — the minority radical wing closely 
identified with the Positive Action of 1949 who were not "as delighted 
as others ." For them, "tactical action had all the smell of defeat."10 Their 
expulsion from the CPP only aided the augmenting of the opposition. 
For the failure of the UGCC to make good showing in the elections of the 
previous year seemed to occasion the formation of a new party —  the 
Ghana Congress Party (May 2nd), with Dr. K.A. Busia as its leader.
Determined to offer effective opposition to the CPP government, 
the Congress which grouped previous oppositon members of the erst­
while minor parties as well as traditional rulers now embraced the 
radical CPP elements expelled from their party.
The need to re-group, if it was designed to prevent the CPP 
achieving full self-government under its leadership, must also have 
been prompted by the impending elections under a new constitution— 
the Nkrumah constitution negotiated by the latter with the British 
government since 1951.
Other opposition groups making common cause with the Con­
gress Party included the Northern Peoples' Party (NPP), and the
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Togoland Congress Party. The former, organized in April 1954 by some 
leading educated men of the North, aimed at promoting the interests of 
the North. Distrusting the people of the south, it objected to immediate 
self-government — preferring self-government within a period of fif­
teen years. But the Togoland Congress, formed about 1951, while not 
averse to self-government, desired that both British and French 
Togolands be unified as an Ewe homeland. Its opposition to the CPP 
was on grounds that the latter desired the integration of the British Trust 
area with the Gold Coast. While the opposition of the NPP against the 
CPP was not solely on grounds of time-table for independence but that 
the CPP lacked respect for traditional rulers.
The Congress Party provided the needed parliamentary leader­
ship for these groups. When carefully assessed, however, the Congress 
appeared to have difficulties of its own which would prevent it from 
being viable. A major problem was the absence of internal unity — 
caused by disputes among the leaders of the party. Furthermore, the 
admission into its fold of radical ex - CPP elements made the Congress 
a battleground between the CPP elements and those "whose education 
and outlook led them genuinely to dislike the authoritarian ways of the 
CPP " n
Notwithstanding liabilities of internal disputes and a record of 
defeat in previous elections, the Congress was geared for the elections 
of 1954. It promised cocoa farmers it would improve prices; and vowed 
to rid the country of corruption. On the other hand, the CPP having 
made the issue of self-government a plank in all its manifestoes and thus 
seeming to have monopoly as chief advocate deprived the opposition 
of any challenging programmes. And to its advantage it had a record of 
electoral victories to entice voters to its side.
Within the parties, there were the competing claimants for nomi­
nation as party candidates which need not occupy us. But the elections, 
democratically conducted, and on the basis of universal adult suffrage 
and secret balloting, confirmed the CPP once more as the dominant 
national party: Out of a legislature of 104, the CPP won 71 seats; 
Independents 16 seats, the NPP 12 seats; the Togoland Congress 1 seat, 
the Ghana Congress Party, 1 seat; and 1 each for 2 other smaller parties.
As for the significance of this particular election, the legislature it 
produced consisted entirely of popularly elected representatives. But 
' need to reflect the continuing British authority in the absence of 
plete sovereignty was that three ex-officio British expatriates served 
binet members, while the Governor could still apply the veto.
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The outcome had considerable meaning for the opposition; they 
foresaw an emerging sovereign state under a government with socialist 
orientations and values which they were opposed to.
Politics on the Eve of Independence
The nature of politics on the eve of political independence (1951-1956) 
was that it had the features of violence and the characteristics of 
previous politics — persuasion and the canvassing of support. It was 
uncompromising and militant, seeking direct political action — coer­
cion and sometimes the application of force to achieve consent.
The National Liberation Movement (NLM)
The probability was that the failure of the Congress Party to achieve 
satisfactory results in the previous elections prompted a need for the 
creation of a new body —  a movement that was known as the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM) in September 2,1954.
Embracing former opposition groups, the NLM could be described 
as a new force emergent in the body-politic; seizing on a variety of issues 
this strategy had the effect of further broadening the base of the move­
ment and making it more national than the oppositon groups of the past.
Most importantly, it demanded a federal form of constitution but 
its other aims appear directed to safeguarding traditional systems and 
values. An example was that it advocated loyalty and allegiance to 
traditonal rulers and the obligation of the youths to show respect to age.
It was apparent that support for traditional rulers would be recip­
rocated. The movement drew support from traditional rulers. Indeed, 
its founding and leading member — the Asantehene's linguist, was a 
traditionalist — and the demand for federalism seemed to have been 
made with the traditional rulers in view — to give them a place in the 
new order of things. Be it as it may, it was necessary to wrestle power 
from the CPP. The demand for federalism was diametrically opposed 
to a unitary system and so created an impasse.
Here, it is necessary to explain that the condition under which 
the colonial power (Britain) would concede independence was that 
consensus should prevail among the people on the nature of the 
constitution required. The necessity to make an impact on the electorate
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and no less the British authorities, therefore, could not be lost to the
Movement.
In support of their demand, some of the arguments made were as 
follows: That there were differences of ethnic and tribal cultures, 
differences in the levels of development and the fact that the various 
regions came under British jurisdiction at varying times. However, 
that such arguments would not achieve the desired results made 
violence necessary. Commenting on this phase of politics, Dr. Nkrumah 
said that "with the failure of a purely political campaign, a campaign of 
violence developed in Ashanti...." 12
Unable to break the deadlock through negotiations both the Gov­
ernment and the opposition were willing to go to the polls. And the 
results of the elections held in April 1956 showed the CPP winning 71 
seats; the NLM and its allies 31 seats.13
This victory of the CPP, the third of such electoral victories seemed 
to entrench the CPP as an obviously dominant party. It had become a 
de facto single party system.
The Single Party System
Commenting on the growth of the CPP, David Apter indicated earlier 
on that it had a membership of over a million, and was the most effective 
mass political organization in Africa.14 Already we have referred to the 
appeal it was able to make to the masses and its mastery in the 
manipulation of the party's key symbols. These factors, no doubt 
accounted for its repeated victories since 1951 so that by 1960 its 
strength in a legislature of 114 was 98.
The party engaged in deliberate mobilization of the populace 
into various units to constitute wings of the party; so that the CPP was 
referred to as a big tree with several branches — the Young Pioneer 
Movement, the Workers' Brigade, the Trades Union Congress, the 
Ghana National Farmers Union, and the National Council of Ghana 
Women. Looking at the long term impact of the party, it needs to be said 
that its organizational methods which proved effective constituted a 
model for future political parties.
The party had become a de facto  one party system; however 
constituted the bedrock of this de facto one party system was the 
olican constitution which by its nature entrenched the CPP for as 
as it would be possible. However, with the referendum held in
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1964 on constitutional change, the status of the party was raised to one 
of de jure.
The party and its leadership, it will be recalled, subscribed to 
socialism. And although it achieved electoral victories through demo­
cratically organized elections it continued to adhere to socialist norms. 
The decision of the Central Committee of the party to constitute the 
legislature of 1965 not by electoral processes but by selection of candi­
dates went against liberal democracy and provided the rational for the 
military, coup d'etat of 1966.15
The Politics of the Second Republic
The Convention People's Party (CPP) — an ideological party — was 
proscribed by law in 1966. Consequently, the beginning of the Second 
Republic marked the beginning of the end of ideological politics. But the 
organization of parties on mass basis did not cease for it had become a 
model of political organization.
The Parties
In anticipation of the elections of August 1969, several parties were 
formed. When examined, the most viable seemed to be the Progress 
Party (PP) led by Dr. K. A. Busia. The National Alliance of Liberals(NAL) 
led by Mr. K. A. Gbedemah, one-time Minister in the Nkrumah regime, 
no doubt, also appeared to have great promise.
The other parties, seeming to lack substantial following, included 
the United Nationalist Party under the chairmanship of Dr. Bannerman, 
the All People's Republican Party led by Mr. P.K.K. Quaidoo and the 
People's Action Party under Mr. Imoru Ayama. Indeed these parties 
appear to have undergone some initial transformations. Sharing com­
mon goals,( which we shall examine soon,) political rivalry among them 
was not based upon any particular ideological differences.
Organization
The approach adopted by the National Alliance of Liberals to asssure 
itself of permanence and continuity was the establishment of an organi­
zational structure of the party. While Mr. Gbedemah occupied the
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leadership of the party, leaving the Chairmanship to Mr. Kobina, — a 
Kumasi lawyer — a national executive was formed through electoral 
processes. Constituencies in each region would meet so as to elect a 
member of the party as the Regional representative of the party to the 
national executive body.
Thus when the two hundred delegates from the twenty-two 
constituencies of the Eastern Region met during the month of June in 
Koforidua, they elected Mr. E.H. Boohene, a lecturer at the School of 
Administration as the regional representative to the NAL national 
executive.
National and regional party officers elected by national delegates 
conferences and regional constituency conferences included organizing 
secretaries, propaganda secretaries, campaign strategists and financial 
secretaries.
On the other hand, the constitution of the Progress Party made 
membership of the party open to all persons who were eighteen years 
old and above. Such persons could apply for and return completed 
application forms to the constituency secretary; the form was then 
considered by the branch committee. The Progress Party was, thus, a 
mass party and members paid dues to enable the party raise money for 
its work.
Although Dr. Busia was the leader, the constitution called for 
election of the leader who should also be the chairman. The elections 
had to be conducted by elected delegates at an annual conference of the 
party. The leader who should hold office for five years presided over 
the Annual Conferences at the meetings of the National Executive. Each 
region had a Vice-Chairman elected at a Regional Conference.
The important national officers of the party included the General 
Secretary and a Treasurer appointed by the National Executive. The 
Progress Party and the National Alliance of Liberals were equipped with 
national, regional, constituency and district party organs which would 
meet annually at national delegates conferences to assess work and 
initiate new programmes.15 But although the All Peoples' Republican 
Party and the Peoples' Action Party like the United Nationalist Party 
were mass parties not enough evidence existed of the effectiveness of 
their organization. And yet in the competitive politics designed to win 
s pport these parties appear to have canvassed the electorate in nearly 
all constituencies.16
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The Issues and the Elections
To clarify issues and prescribe solutions seemed to constitute the essence 
of political contest. Describing tribalism as a negative force, the leader 
of NAL, Mr. K.A. Gbedemah promised that the NAL would work 
towards a new nation devoid of tribalism and nepotism. Concerned 
with other aspects of life such as employment, he assured the electorate 
of more job opportunities and the intention to initiate an agricultural 
policy that would enable the country to produce all her food require­
ments. And for the civil servants, ample security of office without 
coercion or intimidation would be made so long as they were loyal 
to the nation and to the government.17
Since there was absence of ideological differences (as already 
noted); it is only natural that solutions and promises offered to the 
electorate would overlap. The Progress Party, while promising a 
nation that would be liberal democratic and pursuing a welfare system, 
assured the nation it would support the farmers; it would improve 
the quality of education, health, and housing, and provide job and 
employment opportunities for the workers.
The United Nationalist Party (UNP) was committed to a New 
Deal entailing respect for democratic principles and the pursuit of the 
objectives of employment and equal opportunity for all. The party 
would follow comprehensive and realistic economic policies, promote 
agriculture, communications, health and education. The People's Action 
Party of Mr. Imoru Ayama spoke in the same vein as the others except 
that it hoped, when elected into office, to extend the railways to the 
North.18
Upon examination, the manifestoes of the parties had similar 
contents. A vital factor in determining the voters' choice therefore was 
likely to be the differences in the personalities of the leaders. The 
advantage to Dr. Busia was his identification with the Opposition that 
constantly advocated liberal democracy. There could also be the factor 
of tribalism , and the outcome of the elections of 1969 suggested this.
In his research, conducted in 1969, Professor Yaw Twumasi re­
vealed the following: That 63.5 per cent of those registered actually 
voted. Of the total votes cast, the PP obtained 58.68 per cent; NAL 
30.44 per cent; UNP 3.8 per cent; PAP 3.43 per cent; APRP 1.83 per 
cent. Independents 1.82 per cent; each of the major parties contested
138 seats.19
Contesting the elections organized in the 140 single member
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constituencies, the PP emerged with 105 seats and 29 seats for NAL. In 
Ashanti, the PP won all the seats as it did in Brong-Ahafo and in the 
Central Regions — all Akan-dominated areas.
The victory of the PP appeared to be a victory for its leader — Dr. 
Busia — a long time advocate of liberal democracy. Therefore upon 
taking office as the Prime Minister at the end of 1969, the challenge was 
offered him to promote democracy. He had earlier said that "it is the 
person operating the Fundamental Laws of the land that will determine" 
the proper operation of the laws. And the people's best bet was him as 
the leader of the Progress Party.20
In office, and faced with realities, however, he was said to have 
defied court-ruling with the assertion: "No court; no court." He further 
caused the dismissal of 568 civil servants without much reason. Never­
theless he was believed to have promoted democracy for no evidence 
existed of arbitrary detention of persons without trial. He was neverthe­
less overthrown in a coup d'etat in February, 1972. But the re- 
emergence of competitive politics in the Third Republic affirmed the 
nation's abiding concern with the search for liberal democracy.
Politics of the Third Republic
In the preceding pages we observed that the political parties were 
characteristically mass parties. Of the several reasons accounting for this 
phenomenon,there was that of financial need (which was as important 
as the desire to organize support). Careful scrutiny of the parties of the 
Third Republic reveals that the parties retained the organizational 
structures of those of the First and the Second Republics. Indeed, the 
membership of these parties appears to be a carry-over of membership 
from the erstwhile political parties. So that even though party designa­
tions had changed, the changes appear to be in name only.
Deviating from the trends noted above were some emergent 
parties which tended to revolve closely around personalities and whose 
potentialities seemed limited. Among these parties will be included the 
United National Convention (UNO under its founder, William Ofori- 
tt (Paa Willie); the Action Congress Party (ACP) led by its founder, 
olonel F.G. Bemasko; and the Third Force Party, headed by its founder,
' m Bilson. But in a category of its own was the Social Democratic 
(SDF) whose leader emerged from electoral processes. The 
os of these parties will be examined subsequently. We now look at
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the major parties — the People's National Party (PNP), and the Popular 
Front Party (PFP), which represent continuity and change.
The People's National Party (PNP)
The antecedents of the PNP may be traced to the Convention People's 
Party (CPP). Banned since 1966, the CPP nevertheless collectively 
operated clandestinely as a social organization under the leadership of 
Alhaji Imoru Egala, one time Minister in the Nkrumah regime. This 
social organization —  (Funeral Committee) was transformed into the 
People's National Party (PNP) with Egala as its founder. The latter, 
however, designated Dr. Hilla Limann, as the leader of theparty and was 
confirmed subsequently by the Party Congress held in Kumasi in 1979.
Dr. Hilla Limann, apparently, set considerable store on the 
heritage of the party. During the first post-election Congress held in 
Kumasi in 1980, he asserted that "The People's National Party (was) 
committed, within the law, to the pursuit of Nkrumah's ideas and the 
consolidation of his good works ;"21 stressing that "that is why I have, 
in recent times, had occasion to call for a return to the ideals and 
aspirations of the founding fathers. ',22
The PNP appeared to be a replica of the CPP taking the organiza­
tional form of the erstwhile party, including its membership and ideas. 
Indeed, its victory in the 1979 elections was believed to have resulted 
from a unified front of Nkrumaists in support of the PNP.23
Launched in time to contest the elections of the year, and like the 
CPP, it promised to "consolidate and maintain the independence and 
sovereignty of the State of Ghana; promote national reconciliation and 
unity and safeguard the freedom of the people." It sought to ensure that 
the economy would operate in five separate sectors: State enterprises, 
enterprises owned by foreign private interests, enterprises jointly owned 
by State and private foreign entrepreneurs, co-operatives, and Ghanaian 
private enterprises.24
Existing factors which aided the party's achievements shall be 
examined below. A major problem, however, of the party was its 
organizational structure. Did the party leaders in office have the 
endorsement of the members? As the party prepared for its post­
election Congress, the press reported that "the youths were insisting 
that for peace to be achieved in the party, all national officers in the 
party must be elected: and these included, the chairman, the vice­
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chairman, national treasurer, the general secretary and the national
organizer."25
This demand by the youth seemed to be the consensus of many 
members of the party as parliamentarians and law students of the 
University of Ghana, who were party members, made the same de­
mands. Also prevailing dissensions were reflected first in the dissolu­
tion of the Central Committee of the party and then in the indefinite 
adjourning of the Congress in order to save the party from imminent 
split26
The Popular Front Party (PFP)
The Popular Front Party (PFP) when examined, seemed endowed with 
structures, organization and cohesion which were lacking in thePNP. In 
several ways, the PFP left no one in doubt that it was a continuity of the 
Progress Party (PP). An important deviation, however, concerns lead­
ership which had to be determined through a democratic process of 
selection. Such election was never necessary in determining leadership 
of the PP. With the founder, Dr. Busia, being the undisputed leader of the 
party, no contest was necessary.
The organizational structure evolved by the Progress Party was 
inherited by the PFP. The constitution of the PP made provision for the 
election of national officers, regional officers, constituency, and district 
officers. Following the constitutional provisions as prescribed by the PP 
constitution, Mr. Victor Owusu was the democratically elected leader of 
the PFP. It should be noted, however, that perhaps on account of 
personal efficiency, the General Secretary of the PP, Mr. B.J. da Rocha, a 
lawyer, maintained this post under the PFP — an obvious indication of 
continuing membership in both parties.
The continuity of organizational form was coupled with member­
ship that spanned the two organizations. It can be assumed then that 
the underlying values held by the Progress Party continued in the 
PFP— the desire for personal liberties, freedom of the press, better 
health for the people and greater security for the working people 
ough better social security provisions.
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The Other Parties
The United National Convention (UNO, briefly discussed earlier on 
had some affinity with the Popular Front Party (PFP). The leader — Mr. 
William Ofori-Atta (Paa Willie) was an executive member of the UGCC 
and a relation of Dr. J.B. Danquah; he was the son of Nana Ofori-Atta I 
of Akim Abuakwa and shared in the liberal values of that family. The 
membership of the UNC more or less subscribed to the values of the PFP. 
Indeed, it was always probable that these members may have been at 
one time members of the Progress Party or of the United Gold Coast 
Convention.
The UNC desired an administrationiree of corruption and sought 
political reconciliation in the nation; it promised to provide health, 
electricity and better education.
The aims of the Action Congress Party of Colonel Bemasko in­
cluded the promotion of better agriculture for the country by providing 
farmers with adequate and proper inputs. This focus of the Congress 
was different from those of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and The 
Third Force Party.
The SDF desired the promotion of the welfare of, most particu­
larly, the workers, even though it would also promote education, 
national reconstruction and the development of a better economy. On 
the other hand, the Third Force Party emphasized the need for better 
leadership — a leadership which should be honest, dedicated, and bold.
The Elections of 1979
The aims and objectives of the parties have been stated already. And 
there were the differences such as contained in the objectives of the 
UNC, the ACP and the SDF. The Action Congress, like the SDF, had 
definite clients they wanted to cater for, while not neglecting, the total 
national interest. The policies of both the PNP and the PFP were 
comprehensive; they covered about the same areas of life so that the 
electorate did not seem to have clear-cut alternative choices. But the PNP 
appeared advantaged; the achievements of the CPP in the past —  such 
as bringing independence to the people and the vast developments 
such as the infrastructure that ensued were pointed to as their heritage 
of achievements.
The Progress Party, which the PFP inherited, lacked the corre-
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sponding record of achievements having been in power for only a 
period of two years. When the electorate went to the polls they decided 
for thePNP. It gained 71 seats while the PFP obtained 42 seats; UNC13 
seats, ACP 10 seats and the SDF 3 seats. Concerning the Presidency, 
Dr. Hilla Limann obtained 1,118305 votes and Mr. Victor Owusu 
686,097 votes.27
The process of politics reflected in the politics of the Third Republic 
in itself testified to the on-going search for liberal democracy. This search 
continues into the Fourth Republic. What are the prospects for a liberal 
democratic polity?
Conclusions: Prospects for Democracy in the Fourth Republic
Liberal democracy has been an ideal pursued but not yet realized. In 
the First Republic the political process had been governed by the norms 
and principles of liberal democracy. But given the ideology ofsocialism 
to which the dominant political group (the CPP) subscribed the prin­
ciples and norms governing the process of politics came gradually to be 
those of socialism. But neither did the interventions of the military 
permit the perpetuation of liberal democracy.
As Ghana enters the Fourth Repbulic, it will seem to have armed 
itself with certain constitutional provisions which are enforced 
through specific laws.
The Constitutional Provisions
Guaranteeing the right of the people to organize political parties and 
also advocating the freedom of such organized parties to participate in 
shaping the will of the people, the constitution of the Fourth Republic 
nevertheless imposes certain constraints thus:
Every political party shall have a national character and member­
ship snail not oe  based on ethnic, religious, regional or other
sectional divisions .28
Iditionally, the provisions enjoin that "the internal organization of a 
al party shall conform to the democratic principles and its actions 
id purposes shall not contravene or be inconsistent with the constitu-
>n or any other law ."29
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In order to ensure compliance, however, the provisions forbid any 
political party from operating as such unless it has been properly 
registered with the Electoral Commissioner. The Commissioner, on the 
other hand, has power under PNDC Law 281 of 1992, not to register a 
party which does not meet the requirements.
That the following parties have been registered as qualified to 
operate as political parties:
1. The National Patriotic Party (NPP)
2. The National Democratic Congress (NDC)
3. The People's National Convention (PNC)
4. The National Independence Party (NIP)
5. The People's Heritage Party (PHP)
The presidential candidates of these parties are:
1. Professor A. Adu-Boahen
2. Ht - Lt. J. J. Rawlings
3. Dr. Hilla Limann
4. Mr. Kwabena Darko
5. General Emmanuel Erskine
Concern exists that liberal democracy should triumph. The concern is 
expressed in the Directive Principles of State Policy which stresses that 
"Ghana shall be a democratic state dedicated to the realization of 
freedom and justice..." 30 But against stipulated or stated desires, 
authorities over conditions under which military interventions will be 
weak are those where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong; 
where civilian associations and parties are strong and numerous and 
where the procedures for the transfer of power are orderly, and where 
the location of supreme authority is not seriously challenged. What are 
the prospects for a lasting democracy in Ghana? The political culture 
has been changing and it is probable that Ghana presently fulfills the 
stated conditions.
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Chapter 8
POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATION: 
THE CASE OF W OMEN
J. Sandra Pepera
Introduction
The representation of women, and issues of concern to women in Ghana, 
at government and at executive level, has remained depressingly low. 
Depressing because (a) numerically women are slightly over 50% of the 
population in Ghana, 0?) they have traditionally and consistently played 
a central role in the struggle for national liberation from colonial rule and 
post-Independence nation-building, and (c) of the massive contribution 
they make to the socio-economic life of the nation.
The focus of this paper is to introduce the reader to some aspects of 
the relationship between political parties and various social groups in 
our society. For the purposes of this paper political parties are defined 
in the Constitution of the 4th Republic as "freely formed organizations 
of citizens" that are national in character and orientation.1 Further, a 
political party is free to:
(i) participate in shaping the political will of the people;
(ii) propagate and pursue political ideas and social and economic
programmes of a national character; and
(iii) put up candidates for election to public office.2
Therefore, it seems clear that in a political system that is based 
around the competition between differing political groups organized as 
parties, citizens, in order to promote particular and sectional interests, 
will seek a voice within these parties in order to project these interests to 
the national level. Usually, we find that at least four, sometimes five, sub- 
societal groups are specifically represented in the organizational struc- 
ure of political parties. These are: women, the aged, the disabled, the 
/outh, and sometimes separately from "the youth," students.
hana's political history, the major parties have always had at least 
a "women's wing" and a "youth wing."
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In this chapter I will examine the way in which political parties 
have in the past promoted and projected (and might in the future 
promote and project) the particular interests of women in Ghana to the 
highest levels of national life. I have concentrated on women, as they 
represent the largest sub-group. In thisinstance “women" iscoterminous 
with "female," which means that the concern is for the representation of 
a group that numerically constitutes at least 50% of the total population 
of Ghana, and, as mentioned in my introduction, contributes signifi­
cantly, (at times critically) to the political, social, and economic life of 
this country. What seems beyond doubt is that women area major, semi­
organized, social group, that must be included in any attempt to 
understand politics in Ghana.
It seems clear that whilst Ghanaian women — individually and 
collectively —  have actively participated in the politics of the anti­
colonial struggle and post-Independence national politics, the political 
system has failed women.3 The importance of women's participation 
has always been recognized, but this has brought little actual progress 
or improvement in the condition of women in Ghana. The visible 
representation of women in Ghana, is both quantitatively and quali­
tatively low, and has done nothing to remove the invisibility sur­
rounding women.
The status of women in Ghana can be statistically represented as 
follows: women in Ghana are slightly over fifty per cent of the popula­
tion. Whilst 70% of the total population of Ghana live in the rural areas, 
around 80% of the total female population lives in the rural areas. This 
means that 50% of all rural workers in the farming sector are women, 
but only 25% of those classed as "farmers" or "farm managers," are 
women.4 Why? Because even though they are responsible for produc­
ing about 60% of our food, women are denied access to credit, find it 
difficult to secure the ownership of land, and are by-passed by extension 
officers who are geared towards the larger farms and agricultural units.
Ghana has a high incidence of maternal mortality in comparison to 
other nations with similar birth rates, and 69% of women tested in 
antenatal clinics in 1987, were shown to be anaemic due to malnutrition. 
Now if the pregnant woman is malnourished, what hope is there for the 
baby, and what might be happening to the children she already has at 
home, and to the aged parent who is living with her, and so on.
In the "lean" season, 36% of women were found to be under­
weight, dropping to 19% during the rest of the year, but the equivalent 
male rates are 23% in the "lean" season, and 3% otherwise. 32.5% of
134
the population of Ghana is literate, with 42% of all males classed as 
such, yet only 23% of females, and the drop-out rate for young girls is far 
higher than for boys, so the future female literacy rate does not look too 
promising either.
Whilst the economy struggles to recover, and some of the tradi­
tional extended family ties are being strained to and past breaking point, 
more women are being classified as the heads of their households 
than before: 25%, 34%, and 26%, in Accra, other urban, and the rural 
areas respectively.
Only 9% of persons serving on public bodies as government 
administrators, managing directors of corporations or enterprises and 
legislative bodies were female in 1984, and the numbers have not 
improved significantly since then.5 With the high female school drop­
out rate, the prospects for increasing this number recedes as fewer 
young women emerge from the educational system literate in the 
language of business and government — English.
In the District Assemblies which were established in 1988 in each 
of the 110 districts in Ghana, ostensibly to implement a radical decen­
tralization programme and increase popular participation in decision­
making at the community level, only 9.1% of their membership are 
female, and the majority of these belong to the government appointed 
one-third of the assemblies' membership, rather than to the directly 
elected majority.
In the Consultative Assembly which drafted the 4th Republican 
Constitution, there were only 25 women out of some 260 members, and 
whilst the nine-person ruling Provisional National Defence Council 
itself has always since 1983 had one woman member, there are 
presently no women Secretaries of State, whilst a few have been and 
are deputies. There are only two women ambassadors in Ghana's 
diplomatic corps.
It seems that even as we continue the national search for represen­
tative government, there is still a school of thought that believes that 
"women's issues" are somehow distinct and separate from the real 
business of politics and government.
In an article written seventeen yearsago by Jean CXBarr, the author 
stated that future "development" was likely to be more dependent on 
he female population than on the male population for the present, near 
! distant future. The statement is no less relevant today. Our national 
lopment plans must increasingly target women and an improve- 
in women's experience of education, life-style and employment, if
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the overall picture for Ghana is to improve dramatically.
Ghanaian Women and National Politics: Representation
Politics in Ghana has traditionally focused on social groups. It is the 
resilience of these groups that has maintained the interest of the popu­
lation in political activity, and the capacity of Ghanaians to swiftly 
regroup and organize themselves politically at the national level.
The history of women's participation in Ghanaian politics, al­
though only sketchily drawn, shows conclusively that in the anti­
colonial struggle, when and where women perceived that their interests 
were under direct threat from the actions of the colonial authorities (and 
this was usually, though not exclusively, in relation to a policy or colonial 
representative which attacked the political position which the majority 
of Ghanaian, in fact African women derive from their economic role in 
our subsistence societies) they were prepared to take positive action — 
see the Cocoa boycotts etc.. And Nkrumah, the master party organizer 
that he was, understood intimately the need to draw women into the 
Convention People's Party (CPP), and advocated a role for them as 
vanguard activists, and even in the clumsy and undemocratic attempt to 
ensure women's representation in Parliament (the Representation of the 
People(Women Members) Acts of 1959, and 1960), showed a genuine 
commitment to propelling women on to the national political stage .6
Unfortunately, and perhaps reflecting the social and intellectual 
basis of the Danquah-Busia tradition, their silence on the position of 
women even within the party hierarchy has been deafening. In the 
debate that surrounded the CPP government's 1959/60 proposal for the 
election of 10 women Members to the National Assembly by electoral 
colleges,7 the Opposition were vocal in their denunciation of the move 
as "undemocratic and unconstitutional," which it was, without ad­
dressing the issue of how to overcome the societal barriers that pre­
vented women from successfully competing for seats in the Assembly.
The figures for the return of women to the legislature at each 
general election, since 1954, when Miss Mabel Dove was the only 
woman returned, were as follows: in 1956, no women were returned, in 
1960, under the amended Representation of the People (Women Mem­
bers) Act, 1960,10 women, all CPP, were elected by the Assembly on a 
regional basis,8 in 1965,19 women were returned to the Assembly- 
Nine of these were those who had entered in 1960,10 were new, and of
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course following the 1964 Referendum and the promulgation of a 
one-party state in Ghana, all those returned in 1965 were members of the 
CPP. The first woman to hold national office, Mrs S. Alhassan, 
was made Minister of Social Welfare.9
The Second Republic, saw only a single woman returned to Parlia­
ment, at the general election, and she won a seat in the North, as a 
representative of the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL). So insignifi­
cant was this victory, that the Legon Observer, did not even bother to 
single it out in all its pages of post-election analysis and commentary 
that continued virtually until the end of 1969! But even more interest­
ingly, the Progress Party (PP), which won the election by a massive 
margin, only fielded one female out of a total of 138 candidates nation­
ally, whilst 2 women stood as Independents, NAL fielded 4 women, the 
United Nationalist Party (UNP), 1 woman, and the All People's Repub­
lican Party (APRP), 1 woman .10
Whilst the PP's only mention of women in the preamble to their 
Constitution read:
(to) 10. ENSURE that increasingly the control of the economy shall 
be in the hands of Ghanaians (market-women and Ghanaian busi­
nessm en),11
Komla Gbedemah was busy announcing at the NAL Southern Region's 
women's rally, that:
four women are being put up by the NAL as candidates in their 
own right for the forthcoming elections.
As a mark of the seriousness which the Party attaches to the represen­
tation of women, it is my pleasure to record that in the Northern and Upper 
Regions, two very eligible men stood down in order to make room for a 
woman (my emphasis).12
In the 3rd Republic, 5 women were returned from a total of 20 
candidates standing in 19 constituencies. Of these, 4 were from the 
People's National Party (PNP), reflecting the CPP group's tradition in 
the organization and promotion of women, and one from the Action 
Congress Party (ACP). 2 of the PNP women were names from the past: 
iss Victoria Nyame, who won Sunyani in 1979, had been one of the 10 
women elected to the National Assembly by the Assembly in 1960, 
list Miss Agatha Ama Awuah, who won Denkyira in 1979, had come 
ird in the same seat in 1969, standing for the APRP. The total number
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of women candidates fielded were: PNP, six ACP, three; Popular Front 
Party (PFP), one; United National Convention (UNC), three; Third Force 
Party (TFP), three; Social Democratic Front (SDF), four.11
Women have been and continue to be under-represented. But 
even when they are represented, it seems that the benefits to women 
as a group, when they do occur, are almost incidental to their presence. 
This has much to do with a lack of awareness of women as a collectivity 
with special needs and demands to make of the body politic. It is 
possible, that women in Ghana will have to first develop a truly 
national, truly non-partisan, truly classless, political movement or 
pressure group, before effectively identifying their concerns, and 
ensuring that these are carried up and down the corridors of power.
I suggest that the absence of such an independent body (an 
important vacuum in the associational life of civil society in Ghana) 
has contributed to the ability of those seeking the political heights, to 
opportunistically latch on to "women's issues," and mobilize women 
behind their actual priority: national political power and/or political 
legitimacy.14
Ghanaian Women and National Politics: Policy
But, as has been said time and again, the problems of the body politic in 
Ghana can hardly be laid at the door of democracy and/or party 
politics, since we have enjoyed so little of both. More critically, neither 
"regime" nor "revolutionary" politics as we have experienced them in 
the greater part of our post-independence political history, has im­
proved either the representation or the position of women in Ghana.
We have already mentioned the C PFs initiative for ensuring 
women Members of the National Assembly, but what did the Nkrumah/ 
CPP years specifically do for the position of women in Ghana? 
Certainly, national programmes such as the extension of free 
education and health services, would have benefitted some women 
within the general population, and Nkrumah, perhaps following the 
example of the progressive policies of the Eastern bloc, took personal 
interest in the creation of a military Women's Auxiliary Corps, and 
encouraged the same opportunities for training and advancement for 
the female"members of the armed forces.
Under the law, women in Ghana seem to be equitably treated. 
They have the right to engage in economic activity, and own property
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absolutely. They may or may not get married, they can bear children 
outside marriage with no loss of rights for these children and little 
social stigma. Women can sue or be sued in their own name, lend 
money to husbands and expect a refund. But even here, the picture 
is incomplete without the mention of the regular eviction of a widow 
and her children on the death of a spouse, or their inability to obtain 
credit, official assistance and agricultural inputs, for their farming 
activities, or the fact that in some areas women do not have equal access 
to land and have lesser inheritance rights within families than male 
members.15
The National Council on Women and Development (NCWD), 
established by the Government of Ghana, in 1975, as a response to the 
International Women's Year, and to ensure that the objectives of the 
United Nations Decade for Women, are achieved in Ghana, has been 
the most consistent and persistent watchdog of issues concerning women 
in Ghana. Unfortunately, the NCWD has suffered in its ability to work 
effectively for women in Ghana in two ways: first, because it is 
essentially a bureaucratic arm of the state, it has been unable to take 
up an aggressively political campaigning role; and secondly, in more 
recent times, it has suffered political marginalization as the PNDC 
established its own "women's wing" to mobilize the women of Ghana 
behind its own programme —  the 31st December Women's Movement 
(31st DWM).
Ten years ago women traders were scapegoated by the regime 
as the cause of the nation's political, economic and social crises. Those 
early 'revolutionary times saw violent attacks on the economically 
derived political position of women, and many women lost income 
and assets through the destruction of their wares and markets. How­
ever, the regime soon realized the importance of mobilizing women 
to its cause, and this has manifested itself in Nana Konadu Agyeman- 
Rawlings' high profile role as the President of the 31st DWM.16 But 
even those laws which have assumed the position of testaments to the 
PNDC's commitment to the improvement of the status of women (the 
Intestate Succession Law, and the Customary Marriages Registration 
law), have been shown to be seriously flawed and are in need of 
amendment.17
Furthermore, the representation of women at the level of PNDC 
y and the essential policy-making levels has remained surpris- 
Impressionistically, there appears to be a marked difference 
a ndards applied to evaluating a woman's performance in high
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office. It appears that the number of women District Secretaries to have 
been removed or investigated for various alleged misdeeds, is dispro­
portionately large, given the total number of women in the position 
of District Secretaries.
The managing boards of the state-owned press houses — Graphic 
and New Times Corporations — were reconstituted earlier this year, 
without a single woman on either. We should be surprised that this 
omission happened at all, but also that no public outcry was raised by the 
31st DWM, which claims to be the only national, non-governmental 
women's organization, directed towards the political, social, and eco­
nomic liberation of Ghanaian women.
Ghanaian Women and National Politics: the 1992 Political Parties
In preparing for this paper, I looked at some of the constitutions of 
the 1992 political parties. At least one such constitution made it 
possible for the National Executive Committee of the party to be 
entirely male, except for the ex-officio presence of the Director of the 
Women's Section, which it was presumed would be a woman. For such 
a constitution to be produced in 1992, does not suggest that some of 
the new political parties seriously consider that the role of their women 
members extends beyond the traditional roles of cheerleaders, praise 
singers and refreshments providers.
It would seem that with the party constitutions as a starting point, 
certain mechanisms could be inserted that would give women more 
than a chance of playing a central role in the Party. It will be necessary 
for the party leaders to practise positive discrimination in their internal 
deliberations and election practices, as well as in their selection of 
candidates to contest parliamentary seats. It will not be good enough 
simply to say that women are free to stand, and any woman good 
enough will make it through. The odds are stacked heavily against 
them.18
The NAL solution of 1969, seems particularly useful: some male 
candidates in the Ghanaian equivalent of "safe seats," should stand 
down in favour of women candidates from the same party, so that 
women will make it to the legislature.
Those women who do find themselves in Parliament in the 4th 
Republic, whether in government or opposition, should form a cross­
party women's caucus. This caucus could then pool resources to be able
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to effectively lobby the Assembly, initiate debate on issues of concern to 
women, monitor legislation for gender bias, and follow-up on policy 
implementation.
From Chapter Six of the 4th Republican Constitution, the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, I have identified five gender-specific articles: 
Art. 35, sections 3-6; Art. 36, section 6; Art. 37, section 4; Art. 38, section 
3; and Art. 39, section 2. The Directive Principles are the broad guidelines 
or the framework for government activity and policy-making, but they 
are not the only articles with something to say on areas of national life 
that deeply affect the position of women. However, I do not think it 
would be too much to ask of the young political parties that, at least, in 
the first instance, they address the issues raised in the Directive Prin­
ciples in their forthcoming manifestoes. Further, it should be possible for 
us to monitor the policy/decision-making activities of the new govern­
ment against the Directive Principles, and the party manifestoes, for a 
sincere commitment to setting an environment in which women in 
Ghana are able to develop their full human resource potential.
G ause 22 in Chapter 5 of the Fourth Republican Constitution 
entitled: "Property Rights of Spouses," is aimed at mitigating the 
humiliating circumstances in which many women in Ghana find them­
selves on the dissolution of a marriage. In sections 2 and 3, it states:
(2) Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into 
force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the 
property rights of spouses.
(3) With a view to achieving the full realization of the rights 
referred to in clause (2) of this article —
(a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly
acquired during marriage;
(b) assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall
be distributed equitably between the spouses upon 
dissolution of the marriage.
Thus far the principles seem clear. But when it comes to law­
making, how is the issue of proving that any property in the marital 
estate was "jointly acquired", to be resolved? Even now, the greatest 
difficulty facing women confronted with the dissolution of their mar­
riage, is the burden of proof that any property acquired during the 
marriage was jointly so. For example, a woman who has been a 
omemaker and supporting partner for twenty years without any 
^pendent income, is unlikely to be able to produce any receipts or 
ocumentation as to her financial contribution to the acquisition of
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property, although her non-financial contribution to the estate's growth, 
would be quite substantial. Yet, and unfortunately, the idea that behind 
every man is a woman, is not a legal concept!
How do we guarantee that the spirit of the Constitution becomes 
the letter of the law with respect to the property rights of spouses? 
Perhaps by the use of fixed proportions as a means of distribution; 
perhaps by minimizing the space for interpretation by the Courts, where 
judges, et cetera, are predominantly male. But, if there are no women, 
let alone female spouses in Parliament, who is going to ensure that the 
law as enacted will address their legitimate concerns?20
Political parties as political institutions will be at the centre of the 
political system in the Fourth Republic. As associations representing the 
concerns of specific social groups, and as vehicles for the promotion of 
those concerns at the national level, political parties can act as a mecha­
nism for bringing women to centre stage in national politics. There 
seems little doubt that if this is not done, Ghana's chances of national 
development and growth are minimal.
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4. All statistics in this section are taken from the ROG/UNICEF report -
Children and Women in Ghana: A Situation Analysis, 1990
5. Report by Government of Ghana to Committee monitoring the Conven­
tion on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
at the United Nations, 1991
6. The Representation of the People (Women Members) Act of 1959, (Act No.
72), provided for the election of not more than ten women as additional 
Members of Parliament, by regional women's electoral colleges consti­
tuted of women elected from each of the districts of the region. The 
allocation of these ten seats was as follows: three from the Northern 
Region, two each from the Eastern and Western Regions, and one each 
from Volta, Ashanti, and Brong-Ahafo. As tire necessary mechanisms 
were not in place before the dedsion to make Ghana a Republic, the 
Representation of the People (Women Members) Act of 1960, (Act No
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8), repealed the previous Act, and provided that the National Assembly 
itself could elect ten women asadditional Members of Parliament, in the 
same ratio as before. This was done, and ten women were sworn in 
to Parliament on the eve of the Republic.
7. Parliamentary Hansards, 10th November 1959, Cols 292-318, and 7th June
1960, Cols 12-14.
8. Parliamentary Hansard, 27th June 1960, Col 210. The women were sworn
in on the 28th and the 29th June I960!.
9. Recorded in the Parliamentary Hansard, 1 st Session of the 1 st Republic of
Ghana, 10th June 1965.
10. The Legon Observer, 5th September 1969.
11. The Constitution of the Progress Party, 1969.
12. Speech made by Mr. K.A. Gbedemah, Leader of the National Alliance of
Liberals, at the Southern Region Women's Rally in Accra, 1969.
13. The Legon Observer, 27th July 1979.
14. See Tsikata, Women's Political Organizations, 1951-87
15. See Manuh, T. Women's Exercise of Power and the Law in Ghana
16. See Tsikata, above. Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings is the wife of the
Chairman of the PNDC, Flt-Lt J.J. Rawlings.
17. For example, one intention of the Intestate Succession Law is presumably
to ensure that children, especially minors, are not deprived of the 
benefits of their deceased parent's estate. But legal aid lawyers in Accra, 
have recently been petitioned by a fifty-six year old man, for help in 
acquiring his share of the nine-sixteenths of his late father's estate which 
is allocated to all the recognized children of the deceased. The deceased's 
spouse at the time of his death was a thirty - year old woman, and the 
youngest siblings of the petitioner are both under eight years of age. 
This is not an unusual situation. The sum total of the deceased's estate 
is a very modest two-room house in central Accra. As the Law stands, 
all the deceased's children from the youngest to the fifty-somethings are 
entitled to a share of nine-sixteenths of his estate. The custom by which 
the Law has been applied suggests that the "estate" will be liquidated 
in order to distribute the entitlements, thereby leaving the widow and 
two young children without a home. A classic example of the anomalies 
that can occur when proposed legislation is not exposed to the widest 
possible debate.
18. The deposit for Prospective Parliamentary Candidates is £100,000.00 (one
hundred thousand cedis), For Presidential Candidates the deposit is £2 
million (two million cedis!) — a huge sum of money for most women 
to find, and be prepared to lose. And this is quite apart from other 
election expenses, and the cost of running a parliamentary office if she 
wins.
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19. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
20. For an "insider's" experience of this point see Dolphyne, The Emancipation
of Women, pages 47-49.
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I begin this chapter with the same disclaimer as in the previous one: 
that is , I speak as a practitioner, and not as an academic expert. I speak 
as someone convinced of the virtues of pluralistic democracy and the 
role of opposition — but regretting the fact that my party latterly has 
had too much experience of that role!
I recall one experience in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)—  
which accepts as members all countries which have institutions they call 
"parliaments"— two or three years ago. At the final vote, country by 
country, we heard the national votes announced: North Korea (unani­
mous) Zambia (unanimous) Canada (4 for, 4 against, 4 abstentions). The 
Canadian announcement was greeted by laughter, but represented the 
result of real debate and genuine differences. I wondered whether there 
can really be such unanimity in any country.
For the former Soviets and their allies such unanimity arose from 
the arrogant assumption, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology that the 
single party knew and represented the real interests of the people, 
whatever the people themselves misguidedly may have thought. Their 
politics envisaged an ultimate happy state where all "contradictions" 
would have ceased— a state of harmony, wholly unreal, and the search 
for which leads to dictatorship.
In the case of newer countries the single party, which led the 
struggle for independence, saw rapid development as so self-evidently 
in the national interest that there was no case for multi-partyism, which 
would create and encourage differences and divert scarce talent. Even 
a benign autocracy, such as that of United National Independence Party 
CUT IP) in Zambia with a lively internal opposition, was based on a 
iction which can so often lead to corruption and croneyism.
In Western democracies, at times of war where there is a single 
itional objective, party politics is suspended for the duration of the
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emergency. The assumption is, however, that as soon as practicable, 
politics will return to " n o r m a l A n d  in Uganda, following the military 
victory of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1985-6 there is no 
party activity in Parliament, but leaders of the parties do take leading 
Government portfolios, apparently on the assumption that this is a 
transitional period.
I reject the Marxist illusion that there can be an ultimate state of 
harmony. Political activity involves the clash and reconciliation of 
interests. Such differences will always exist and to override or ignore 
them will lead to differing forms of authoritarianism and civil strife. The 
party system is one well tried mechanism to accommodate such differ­
ences. Multipartyismand the pluralism of interest groups competing for 
attention is now the wave of the future around the world as communism 
is seen to be the god that failed.
At the end of the 1970s Brezhnev could look back with satisfaction 
at the advance of Soviet interests and allies in the developing world over 
the decade. In 1981 he boasted to the 26th Party Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU): "In literally all fields 
World Socialism is advancing steadily." A decade later communism is 
dead, save in a few scattered dinosaur states: and democracy advances 
as dictators fall to people's power. The second cold war came to an end 
and the subsequent super-power co-operation has had profound effects 
on the African political landscape.
One remarkable change was the breaking of the impasse over 
Namibian independence. A consensus constitution was agreed which 
represented not the absolute triumph of one party. New and old now 
work together. The effects are seen elsewhere. Kenneth Kaunda, with 
extreme dignity, acknowledged his defeat in the elections and now 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and UNIP MPs represent 
their country together at international conferences. In West Africa, there 
are triumphs such as Benin, dangers of reversion such as Togo, and other 
countries where the jury is still out
I stated that one tradition is that the party system is suspended on 
the assumption that one day the immediate problem will be solved and 
politics will return to "normal." This was the case in France in 1958 when 
it appeared that only President de Gaulle, with authoritarian powers, 
could solve the Algerian problem, which the traditional party system 
could not. Will President Yeltsin have to revert to greater 
authoritarianism to tackle Russia's economic problems? Can 
democratic regimes in Africa sell structural adjustment programmes
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to their electorates?
Significantly, even when party regimes are overturned by the 
military, there is a return to the normality of party rule after a period 
(Ghana in 1969 and 1979, Nigeria in 1979 and numerous examples in 
Latin America and Asia).
I remain convinced that the best means of accommodating con­
flicting interests by peaceful means and of offering meaningful partici­
pation to the people and legitimacy to government lies in a multi- 
party system. As Uwazurike has said: "Nearly universally the
single party system has degenerated into a form of oligarchic 
patrimonialism that was even unknown in pre-colonial Africa."1
The dangers of multi-partyism are well rehearsed by critics. 
Multi-partyism emphasizes diversity when national unity may be 
deemed essential. It may give scope for regional, ethnic or religious 
interests to prevail. It may fragment into an ungovernable chaos —  see 
the present problems in Poland or the large number of parties formed in 
Togo. There are, however, tried constitutional devices to reduce these 
dangers. In most circumstances parties can best bring together people 
and government.
I concede that there are peculiar problems in the politics of transi­
tion. How can a smooth transition be encouraged? How should one deal 
with representatives of the old regime, some of whom may be consid­
ered to be guilty of human rights abuses? Even with such a background 
and with all the temptations, policies of national reconciliation are most 
likely to lead to an enduring democratic system. A spirit of revenge will 
simply build up the danger of future reprisals when the opportunity is 
offered (we see the continued place of Pinochet in Chile, and the fact that 
Ian Smith lives as a private citizen in Zimbabwe.) Nation building 
demands a generosity of spirit. It is, however, infinitely more difficult at 
a time of world recession. I recognize, as a comfortable Westener, I have 
perhaps laid too much stress on political as opposed to social democracy.
The concept of an opposition may be difficult in some political 
cultures. Chief Emeka Anyaoku, the Commonwealth Secretary-Gen­
eral and a Nigerian, said: "1 do not know of any African language whose 
political lexicon includes the concept of a leader of the loyal opposition." 
However, to insist on the concept of a political enemy too has its clear 
(1 angers. The British tradition has been that of consensus and accommo- 
tion. An opposition is not regarded as subversive or destablizing. 
Why? Because, ultimately, it is recognized by all sides that there is a 
ional interest, that the will of the majority as freely expressed in
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elections must prevail, and the rules of the game are well known and 
normally respected. If the House of Commons is sometimes turbulent, 
better the turbulence there than in the streets. Parties work together on 
the allocation of committees and in a number of bi-partisan fora. The 
spirit of dominance is dangerous. There is a degree of co-operation 
across party, particularly in the field of foreign affairs. I have been a 
strong critic of aspects of the British Government's African policy, 
particularly in Southern Africa, yet I was invited by the Government to 
attend this seminar.
What about countries with deep internal cleavages? If parties are 
based on regions which are not in government, the whole region is 
disenfranchised. Sharp social differences in Central America, with the 
exception of Costa Rica and Belize, made the establishment of democ­
racy more difficult. The North-South divide in West Africa calls for an 
effort of reconciliatory statesmanship on the part of leaders. On what 
basis would different parties be formed in West Africa —  traditional 
party memories? Left versus right? Urban versus rural? Modernist 
versus traditionalist?
If there are difficulties in achieving a national approach, there are 
clearly well-tried devices for diffusing power and encouraging co­
operation — second chamber, federalism, blocking mechanisms and 
entrenched clauses in constitutions, a Bill of Rights, minimum level of 
electoral support before representation in Parliament, and so forth.
All these mechanisms will fail if there is no fundamental spirit of 
give-and-take which can ultimately override all particular differences, 
where no party believes that it has a monopoly of wisdom, and where 
no party exercises the politics of exclusion. Cromwell said in despair, 
"Think, ye may be mistaken." There spoke a true democrat. It is not 
form which matters, but spirit. An election, however important, is only 
the first step in establishing a vital democracy.
My firm conclusion from history and today's examples is that one 
of the key elements which can encourage participation and ensure 
political stability is the multiparty system. There is a strong wind of 
democracy blowing in Africa. Adapted to particular circumstances and 
with any necessary safeguards, the multiparty system will be an essen­
tial component of that democracy.
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Chapter 10
D EM O CRA CY W ITH OUT POLITICAL PARTIES: 
TH E CASE O F DISTRICT ASSEM BLIES
Mike Oquaye
Introduction
The establishment of District Assemblies (D As) may be seen as a logical 
sequence in the search of the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) for a participatory, grassroots democracy. The PNDC was 
of the view that previous governments had failed the people because 
the system of representation resulted in governments that were remote 
from the electorate, and numerically placed power in the hands of 
a few rich and influential people.1
At all levels of political participation, from the localities to the 
national level, a system of simple, direct representation without political 
parties was envisaged by the PNDC. In setting up the (NCD), Rawlings 
said that:
democracy is not realized merely by having a machinery for 
registering voters and getting them to vote every four years, but 
also by there being a machinery for identifying tfie needs of those 
voters in between the election periods and monitoring the realiza­
tion these needs.2
Rawlings has expressed the view that democracy cannot be found 
in the arsenal of political parties. Parties have no place in grassroots 
democracy. He said:
rivalries and animosities among political parties sharpened as the 
country grew older. These were not in the form of healthy 
competition in which one party in power strove to do its best so that 
the electorate might re-elect it. Ra trier, while bu ild ing its own funds 
by some dubious means, a political party also bought support by 
providing opportunities for bribery, theft, embezzlement and 
trade malpractices. Gradually, these were becoming the vogue in 
our political and social life, while the rewards for honesty turner 
out to be a self-inflicted punishment.3
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Rawlings did not perceive democracy in terms of the ballot box but 
in terms of a communalistic decision-making process in which every 
individual would be involved from the local level on. Indeed, the formal 
process of going to the polls must be avoided but if it cannot, then 
political parties should not be part of the process, in any case. Rawlings 
expressed the view that: "some regard democracy as the process of 
choosing between a restricted group of people by means of the ballot 
box. The process of this kind of democracy ends when the voter puts his 
piece of paper inside the ballot box"4 Rawlings advocated a system 
where "consultations and debates go on at the grassroots levels and 
every individual has a greater opportunity than ever before to partici­
pate in the formulation of policies."5
In this connection, political parties are seen as the major obstacle to the 
liberty of the individual to freely participate in local government.
This simple approach to politics is so vital that P.V. Obeng saw the 
District Assembly concept unfettered by political parties as a logical 
sequence in the PNDC's search for democracy. He said that:
the District Assembly concept seeks to fulfil two promises the 
PNDC made when it first came to power: to bring the government 
to the doorstep of the people and to ensure participatory democ­
racy.6
Of course, in Obeng's view, political parties constitute obstacles in 
bringing local government to the doorstep of everyone.
The Blue Book and PNDC Law 207
In m id -1987, in a document popularly known as the "Blue Book", the 
PNDC released its plans for DAs to unveil a further stage in the evolving 
democratic process.7 It dealt with the number of DAs, their structure, 
functions, nomination and election of members, their tenure and condi­
tions of office as well as duties. The modalities for the conduct of 
elections were also dealt with. The Blue Book formed the basis of PNDC 
Law 207 (The Local Government Law, 1988).
The emphasis was placed on the individual and not on political 
organizations/parties which were eliminated altogether. To qualify to 
stand for a DA election, a candidate should be a citizen of Ghana, aged 
18 years and above, be of sound mind, must have fulfilled his tax and rate 
obligations, and should be ordinarily resident in the district.8
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In the nomination of candidates, we observe the following:
(i) every person who is qualified to vote in the District has a right to be
proposed as a candidate;
(ii) candidates shall be nominated in their personal capacities by 25
individual qualified voters in the electoral area;
(iii) no candidate may be proposed in the name of an organization;
(iv) no person shall be disqualified from standing as a candidate by
reason only of his status, position, profession, religion, creed, 
ethnic origin, race, occupation or traditional standing; and
(v) photographs of the nominated candidates shall be posted at van­
tage points in the electoral district. This will be accompanied by 
a brief life history provided by the candidate.9
These provisions obviously underscored the emphasis being placed on 
participation on an individual basis without the supposed trappings 
of political parties.
District Election Committees (DECs) were provided for to effect 
individual participation as follows:-
(i) The NCD shall establish a (5) five-member DEC from among
citizens who would have volunteered themselves for this pur­
pose;
(ii) the DEC shall, under the supervision of the NCD, create a platform
for the candidates to present themselves and their programmes 
to the electorate and to respond to questions and queries;
(iii) the DEC shall verify the qualifications of the candidates and the
accuracy of their self-dedared life histories;
(iv) the DEC shall ensure that NO candidate will mount a public
platform other than that created by the NCD for presenting 
himself, his programme or attempting to respond to questions 
and queries.10
In order to ensure that the elected Assemblyman is personal ­
ise
responsible to his electorate as an individual and not as part of a party 
machine, Law 207 provided that the mandate of an elected member of 
a DA could be revoked by the electorate should he lose the confidence 
of the electorate. The Assemblyman, who cannot hide behind a collec­
tive entity, to wit a political party, may be recalled on the grounds that:
(i) the member has abandoned the idea and programmes which he
personally presented to the people and for which he was elected 
as an individual;
(ii) he has systematically neglected his duties;
(iii) he has committed acts incompatible with his office .as a
member of the District Assembly.11
Nomination and Campaign
In order to secure a candidature a person had to be nominated, not by a 
political party, but by 25 registered voters in the District. After vetting, 
the DEC had the power to prune the candidates to 2 or 3. The process 
of pruning was bizarre since the DECs had absolute discretion to accept 
or reject a candidate. Several persons complained that the process was 
a closed shop in favour of persons favoured by District Secretaries and 
the local Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). In some 
cases, candidates from the revolutionary organs were quickly pushed 
forward to block certain unwanted candidates. Behind the scenes, 
therefore, it appeared that the CDRs were doing the work of political 
parties in a restricted fashion.
The non-party platforms made interesting study. Those who 
supported the process argued that this manner of campaign was a 
victory for grassroots participatory democracy in that by the single 
platform system, no candidate had an edge over the other because of 
financial and other considerations.
During the process, the DECs received various reports from the 
public and conducted enquiries. These were used to disqualify some 
candidates outright. Others were invited to appear in public, mount the 
forms and face their accusers. In some cases, the candidates failed to 
turn up thereafter.
For example, three candidates for the District Assembly election in 
Mzerna East District, —  Mr. Ben Matthew Baidoo of Gwira Eshiem
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in the Ankobra River State electoral area, Mr. Ehimah Ebi of G wira Baso 
electoral area and Mr. Thaddeus Lemane of Dominase electoral area, all 
in theGwira traditional area, were reportedly disqualified "for various 
electoral offences including, forgery and dishonesty."12 TheChairman of 
the Nzema East DEC, Mr. Joseph Mochiah, said that Mr. Baidoo, for 
example, failed to report on the day a platform was mounted for him to 
meet the people. Mr. Baidoo allegedly forged signaturesand thumbprints 
of a number of his nominees while Mr. Ebi confessed, on being con­
fronted, that he had served a three-month jail term for theft while he 
was an employee of the Prestea Goldfields Ltd. Mr. Lemane allegedly 
forged a thumbprint of one Ndele Ebba as one of his nominees.13
In some cases, wild allegations were made which could not be 
substantiated. At a platform at Akrofuom near Obuasi, the Adansi West 
DEC faced a situation where some of the electorate called for the 
disqualification of three candidates whom they accused of "bad 
behaviour" over the years. Nothing concrete was advanced to support 
this allegation and the members of the DEC reminded the people that 
disqualification of candidates was the responsibility of the DEC who 
would act only upon concrete evidenceand thorough investigations into 
allegations. On this occasion, the DEC schooled the public on the laws 
of libel and slander and cautioned them to be careful about their 
utterances so that their newly-won right in participatory democracy 
could be appropriately exercised.14
Notwithstanding the absence of political parties, the platforms 
often became very dramatic as local people showed their enthusiasm. 
For example in Mankessim, in the Central Region of Ghana, a candidate 
was arrested just as he stepped down from the platform after presenta­
tion of his manifesto. The candidate, who was also a chief in the area, was 
Nana Appah Kurankye VI, who was seeking election in Edumadze- 
Twafo-Akyinim electoral area. He was alleged to have failed to re-pay 
a loan of c57,245.00 which he had taken from the Aburaman Rural Bank. 
It was alleged that in February 1988 the chief used his influence to obtain 
the loan which he promised to repay in five days' time. He had not 
repaid the loan by November 1988.15
In the Asutifi Ehstrict in the Brong-Ahafo Region, Mr. Evans 
Oppong, a 38 year old candidate was accused of stealing a clock 
belonging to a local postal agency when he was a postal agent several 
years earlier After a hectic public quizzing by his accusers, Mr. Oppong 
said he handed the dock over to the Town Development Committee 
(TDC) before leaving for Nigeria. This response attracted the attention
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of the Chairman of the TDC who instantly mounted the platform and on 
behalf of theTDC denied that Oppong ever returned the clock. Oppong 
reportedly disappeared from the scene. Earlier on, Oppong who had 
promised to work towards the betterment of the people, was asked by 
one questioner, how he could be trusted when he fled the country when 
the going was tough in Ghana to seek greener pastures in Nigeria.16
In the Jasikan District in the Volta Region, one Mr. Emmanuel 
Kumado, was winning applause as the most outstanding public speaker 
among a number of candidates until he was exposed for being in the 
habit of harvesting fish from other people's nets in the Volta Lake. Other 
people appeared to give on-the-spot evidence to establish, inter alia, 
that Mr. Kumado was caught in one such act in 1983. He had to admit 
in public that he paid a fine of 10 bottles of akpeteshie (local gin) at a 
traditional court presided over by Amega Xatsawotsope.17
In some cases, the system was apparently manipulated by some 
members of the public, supposedly CDR men, who manufactured 
allegations to discredit certain candidates. On Saturday, 11 February 
1989, a platform was mounted in Accra Central by the DEC to introduce 
three candidates who were contesting the elections to the electorate. The 
rally, chaired by Mr. H.E. Golightly, Chairman of the Ashiedu-Keteke 
DEC at Kokompe (a suburb spare parts area in Accra), had to be called 
off at one stage.
The problem arose after a candidate, Mr. Jerry Nii Akwei Thomp­
son, a 43 year old accountant, had pledged to promote health, education 
and sanitation in the area. Suddenly, a section of the public who were not 
asking questions in an orderly manner that would invite answers, 
started shouting and hooting that the candidate was corrupt and a man 
of dubious character. There were wild allegations that the candidate had 
embezzled funds belonging to "Eshee Nyomo Feemo Kpee" a benevo­
lent society in Accra in 1984.
Mr. Thompson was meticulous in answering his accusers factually 
when he had the chance, showing that he had used his time and skill 
sacrificially for the society and had only left the society because of 
"certain anomalies" on the part of others. However, when the time 
allotted Mr. Thompson was up, a section of the crowd raised a commo- 
on and refused to allow other candidates to present their manifestoes, 
is noteworthy that subsequently Mr. Thompson won the seat with 
*78 votes against 1,356 votes polled by J onathan Jeff Adote a 50 year old 
< nsioner and Mr. Daniel Nii Okai a 38 year old poultry farmer who 
me a miserable third.18 It had become apparent that certain persons
159
had been procured to harass Mr. Thompson, an accountant, who stood 
his grounds. Several professionals and businessmen did not seek 
election because of the possibility of vituperations which the new system 
apparently encouraged under the guise of personal merit and not party 
affiliation.
Political parties present manifestoes stating their programmes and 
plans. In the absence of political parties, individuals were asked to say 
what they had to offer if they were elected. Candidates were asked 
questions relating to problems in the localities to test whether they had 
personally identified those problems and if they had identified those 
problems how best they thought they could be solved.
In general, however, it appeared that in questioning candidates, 
the public expected them to have some packages as panacea to their 
maladies. Hence questions were asked, and every candidate's mani­
festo included promises to resolve issues of development, agriculture, 
agro-industrialization, housing, education, health, good sanitation, health 
centres and clinics, good water, electricity, child welfare etc.
Sweeping promises were made by several candidates throughout 
the country. In the Asutifi district in the Brong Ahafo Region, for 
exarnple, Mr. Yaw Amankwah, a 30 year old farmer promised to ensure 
adequate sanitation by providing incinerators and KVIP systems if he 
was elected. Mrs Cecilia Antwi, a 31 year old teacher noted that female 
education in the area was discouraging and she would take steps to 
correct this anomaly if elected.19
Mr. Yaw Mensah Aborampah, a 28 year old teacher said he would 
work for the supply of electricity in the whole area. Mr. Kofi Nsiah a 30 
year old former assured the electorate that he would ensure that levies 
paid by the people were used for development projects. Mr. Kwabena 
Amponsah Manu, a 42 year old farmer, said he would liaise with the 
people to provide themselves with basic amenities such as treated water, 
a health centre and KVIP system. Mr. A.W. Berko 49, and Mr. Maxwell 
Anane, 32 (both teachers) promised to provide the town with water, 
toilet and other facilities.20
It was noted that most candidates promised to provide various 
amenities and undertake a wide variety of projects in a 'Tather Christ­
mas” fashion. When a questioner asked one candidate in Kumasi how 
he proposed to finance his catalogue of promises, the answer was: with 
your help and o f  aban (meaning the central government) we shall do 
i t .” 21
The situation was often confusing but this was inevitable in >
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Table 1
















Ashanti 10 814,620 203,171 24.9 19.4
Brong Ahafo 8 549,138 102,955 18.7 38.0
Central 8 528,609 117,324 22.2 19.4
Eastern 9 626,503 103,837 16.6 35.5
Greater Accra 3 525,834 53,416 10.2 25.0
Northern 7 445,538 80,939 18.2 42.7
Upper 7 487,614 78,669 16.1 51.1
Volta * 7 465,811 71,050 15.3 55.3
Western * * 5 367,834 75,929 20.6 27.4
Total 64 4,822,501 887,290 18.4 34.9
* The results did not indude one ward of Tongu District Coundl 
* * Eleven wards in the Western Region refused to take part in the electionsfor not 
being given a separate District Coundl.
Source : Oquaye, Mike. Politics in Ghana 1972 -1979
absence of political parties which would have provided viable, alterna­
tive manifestoes. The time given for platforms was too limited, and 
meaningful discussions could not be held. Freedom of expression was 
limited and generally not more than two platforms could be mounted in 
any one electoral area. In the circumstances, it could be said that the 
system might have restricted rather than broadened the perimeters of 
participation.
Voting and Participation
For the purpose of conducting the DA elections, thecountry was divided 
into three zones. Zone One comprising Ashanti, Eastern, Central and 
Western Regions voted in December 1988; zone two comprising Upper 
East, Upper West and Northern Regions voted in January 1989 and zone 
three which was made up of Greater Accra, Volta and Brong Ahafo 
Regions voted in February 1989.
The NCD argued that this was to ensure optimum use of its limited 
facilities from one zone to the other. Others argued that in the absence 
of political parties to whip up enthusiasm, the PNDC wanted to trans­
port its zealous cadres from one zone to the other to ensure by all 
means possible that there was a good turn-out.
Official figures gave the turn-out at the elections as 58.8% P2 This 
compared most favourably with the District Council elections held in 
November 1978, when only 18.4% of the eligible voters actually went to 
the polls.23 Table 1 gives the details of the 1978 elections.
The details released by the NCD regarding the 1988/89 District 
Level Elections on a comparative basis are shown in Table 2
The Ministry of Local Government published interesting details 
about the high turn-out in the Ashanti, Central, Eastern and Western 
Regions which give us the following picture: In Ashanti, the turn-out 
was as high as 69% in Amansie East, Bosomtwi-Atwima-Kwanwoma. 
It is notable that in 14 of the 18 electoral districts, 60% and above turn-out 
was recorded. However, in Kumasi proper, the turn out was as low as 
45% This was the lowest followed by Ejura-Sekyere-Dumasi (47%), 
Asante Akim South (53%) and Afigya Sekyere (58%).
In the Central Region, Upper Denkyira topped with 70%. The 
lowest recorded was in Cape Coast with 50%. Six out of 12 Districts in 
the Central Region had a turn-out of 60% and above. In the Eastern 
Region, the East Akim District topped with 71.6%.
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Western 20.6 34.04 55.3
Central 22.2 33.34 59.3
Eastern 16.6 35.95 60.8
Volta 15.3 33.65 59.8
Ashanti 24.9 41.99 60.8
Brong Ahafo 18.7 33.16 60.2
Northern 18.2 32.09 60.6
Upper 16.8 32.82 64.7(Avg.)
Greater Accra 10.2 35.59 44.3
National Average 18.4% 35.25% 59%
The lowest turn-out was in Manya-Krobo with 49.5%. 9 out of 15 
Districts had a turn-out of 60% and above. In the Western Region, the 
highest turn-out was Ahanta West with 63.72% The lowest turn-out was 
in Shama Ahanta East with 50.12% Only three Districts recorded a turn 
of 60% and above.24
Major disparities were noted between the turn-out in rural and 
urban centres. In the capital, Accra (including Tema), the percentage 
turn-out ranged from 34.4% to 46.29 % except in two rural districts where 
the pattern was different. In Dangbe East the turn-out was 61.4% and 
in Dangbe West, 50%. This contrasts sharply with the turn-out in 
Ablekuma (37%) and Kpeshie (34%) in Accra.
This pattern pervaded the southern part of the country which is 
generally more developed than the northern part. For example, apart 
from Ho (Volta Region) and Koforidua (Eastern Region) all the districts 
surrounding the Regional capitals in the Greater Accra, Central, Western 
and Ashanti Regions had a comparatively lower turn-out. Even in the 
Northern, Upper W est, Upper East and Brong Ahafo Regions voter 
turn- out diminished as you approached the capital though the turn-out 
on the whole was higher in these areas.
In the Upper West Region, for example, the rural districts of 
Nuduleand Sissala had 70% and 79% respectively— far higher than the 
recorded figures in the capital, Wa. However, there was relatively low 
turn-out in certain districts of the Northern Region where conditions 
were similar but there was a far lower turn-out as follows —  East 
Mamprusi (53.5%) Tolon/Kumbugu (53.0%) and West Gonja (51.5%). 
In the Brong Ahafo Region, the capital Sunyani recorded 58% in the 
district while in the Kintampo district (a very developed area) the turn­
out was 53% despite the very high turn-out in other areas.
The working of political parties had usually shown more active 
participation of the urban people contrasted with rural counterparts. 
The reverse occurred in the DA elections. Several factors account for the 
rural-urban disparity in the reverse order. In the first place, by 1987, the 
PNDC had lost favour with the urban working class and had shifted 
attention to the rural people who were being wooed consistently. With 
the sharp emphasis on rural development, and the PNDC's presentation 
of the District Assemblies as organs for local development, the rur 
people saw the process as a unique opportunity to bridge the gap 
between rural-urban development. The rural people were, therefore 
anxious to vote without being prompted by political parties.
Secondly, the PNDC which had been against chiefs in the p
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began to court the chiefs in a new policy of reconciliation. This policy 
worked more effectively in the rural areas for two reasons — the rural 
chiefs were more gullible whereas the urban chiefs were more wary of 
the PNDC; furthermore even where the chiefs were willing to embrace 
the new alliance, the influence of chiefs in mobilizing their people for the 
purpose of voting in any election has always been more effective in the 
rural than in the urban areas. In the capital, Accra, for example, the 
influence of chiefs in this direction is virtually nil.
Thirdly, the urban dwellers could not conceive the possible impact 
of the District Assemblies and how they could withstand the dominance 
of the PNDC at the centre.
Fourthly, the lower turn-out in the urban areas could be seen in 
terms of a protest vote against the PNDCs refusal to return the country 
to constitutional rule. This protest movement, spearheaded by the 
NUGS, GBA, TUC, KNRG etc. was more urban than rural.
In speaking of the high turn-out on the national scale, the first point 
to note is the unique role of the revolutionary organs, including the 
Defence Committees. They helped in vetting candidates and gave 
credibility to the public platforms many of which would have been 
empty without them. It is worthy of note, however, that most of these 
cadres were unemployed young men who were drafted as paid ad hoc 
political agitators by District Secretaries.
Secondly, the newly-created Districts which were more rural than 
urban, had a high turn-out not necessarily because of the people's 
interest in that particular election as such but the voters in these areas 
wanted to vote to show their appreciation for being given their "own" 
Districts and also to justify the creation of the new Districts. This was the 
case in Sissala, for example. In Krachi the PNDC had given back a rich 
area ceded from the District, upon a personal petition made by the 
Krachi Wura (Chief) to Rawlings. The Krachi Wura made it his business 
to organize public rallies and beat his gong-gong to mobilize support for 
the elections.
Thirdly, the governmental machinery from the NCD to the PNDC 
members and Secretaries, Regional and District Secretaries, took upon 
themselves to tour the various Districts and influence a good turn-out 
ith promises that the elections were going to ensure the devolution 
of power to the people. In some cases, people were coerced to vote. 
Accra, Mr. E.T. Mensah, chairman of the City Council, closed all
cets including the famous Makola Market and posted home guards 
ere. The impression was given that if you did not go to vote, you
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would be noted and penalized.
Fourthly, the 31st December Women's Movement made a great 
impact. The Movement has established a wide network embracing 
every town and village in Ghana and helped in the establishment of 
nurseries, bakeries, gari factories, garment dyeing and processing facto­
ries, farms etc. throughout the country. To many women, it has been a 
source of inputs for their vocations and means of livelihood. The 
Movement did not only encourage women to vote massively to ensure 
that the right people were elected to protect the gains that women had 
made under the auspices of the Movement, but also insisted that as many 
women candidates as possible should actually stand for the elections 
and be elected to the Assemblies. During this period, "T" shirts, caps, 
cloth and other attractions were generously dished out by the Move­
ment to win support and ensure women's participation.
Fifthly, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) was 
roped in by the government in an unprecedented alliance whereby 
voters were transported free of charge from their towns, villages and 
abodes to polling stations. Withthehootingvehiclesstandingbyandthe 
invitation by cadres and officials to get on board, a mighty attraction was 
created. Other transport organizations chipped in. In Berekum for 
example, the Berekum branch of the Progressive Transport Owners 
Association (PROTOA) released 30 vehicles to the Berekum DEC to help 
in the District Assembly elections. The vehicles also conveyed polling 
officers and ballot boxes to the various polling stations.
In the absence of political parties (they are essential to stimulate 
political activity, and as I had argued previously, their absence contrib­
uted to the low turn-out in the Local Council elections in 1978Fthe 
factors enumerated above were in effect responsible for the exceptional 
situation that occurred in the 1988/89 District Level Elections.
It should be asked: should the PNDC be out of the scene together 
with the organs which worked towards the large turn-out, what would 
the picture be without the operation of political parties? The chances are 
that such eltxrtions would be poorly patronized. The point is that there 
were some powerful institutions, bodies and political personalities 
behind the process, who were not only partisan in nature, but well- 
endowed with governmental resources and power. The 31 st December 
Women's Movement could be described in the circumstances as a 
"national women's party. " Without such patronage, financed and 
sustained by the military government to promote its own agenda, and 
in the absence of political parties, the results in 1988/89 could well
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Tabic 3
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS

























Accra 61 7 77 18 14 82 44 6 4 26 339
Ashanti 459 25 360 13 15 94 112 11 4 87 1180
Western 165 5 180 5 10 38 42 — — 7 452
Eastern 346 19 241 14 1 129 116 14 3 77 960
Volta 209 7 281 7 17 95 78 7 3 36 740
Central 208 18 183 26 7 82 92 4 13 49 682
Upper
East 108 20 118 7 7 79 13 6 5 17 380
Brong
Ahafo 277 22 301 3 9 86 73 1 3 6 781
Upper
West 59 17 115 8 1 18 12 1 2 26 283
Northern 295 20 273 8 0 106 42 10 3 35 792
Total 2187 160 2129 109 81 839 624 60 40 360 6589
% 33.2 2.4 32.3 1.7 1.2 12.7 9.5 0.9 0.6 1.9 100
Source: Local Government Information Digest No . 7,1989 p.19
have been a repetition of the November 1978 fiasco. Acheampong's 
"Society of Friends" etc were poorly organized and ineffective.
Background of Assemblymen
With regard to the social background of the candidates who came out 
victorious, it is noted that they did not belong to the professional, 
business, and intellectual groups in society. In the Western Region, a 
conservancy labourer won a seat against a legal practitioner. Almost 65 
per cent of all the Assembly members are farmers (even though some 
unemployed persons described themselves as farmers) and the other 35 
per cent comprised public servants (mainly clerical officers), traders, 
artisans, elementary school teachers, fishermen, traditional rulers (of 
lower status) health workers (mainly of the lower and middle level) 
religious leaders (mainly of the spiritual and syncretic following), and a 
few lawyers. See Tables 3 and 4 for occupational distribution of 
Assembly members. This includes members nominated by government 
which improved the qualitative character of the Assemblies to some 
extent.
A sampling of the results shows that in the Upper East Region, an 
illiterate farmer won against a businessman. Other victors in that area 
included small scale farmers, 2 blacksmiths and nurses including one 
male nurse. In the Volta Region, the Akatsi District revealed that out of 
the 18 seats in the District, teachers won 8, farmers won 9 and a driver 
won one. Mrs. Eugenia Abla Kumasa, a female teacher won the Torve 
Electoral Area seat. In the Jasikan District, another female teacher Miss 
Edith Mensah won the Baika-Somanya Electoral Area seat against two 
male contenders. In the Hohoe District where 108 candidates vied for 48 
seats, 9 were women, 48 were teachers and 40 were farmers. Two were 
priests while the rest were civil servants, pensioners and members of 
other vocations. In the Golokuati Electoral Area, four of the eight seats 
were won by teachers, one by a pensioner, one by a Civil Defence 
Organization (CDO) man, and one by a woman farmer, Mrs Elizabeth 
Avege.
The conclusion drawn from these developments is that the simple 
system of direct and individual participation without political parties 
enabled people who would otherwise have been relegated to the 
background, to become Assemblymen.
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Accra 17.9 2.0 22.7 5.3 4.1 24.1 12.9 1.7 1.1 7.6
Western 36.4 1.1 39.7 1.1 2.2 8.3 9.2 — ------- 1.5
Central 29.7 2.5 26.1 3.7 1.0 11.7 13.1 1.8 0.7 9.2
Brong
Ahafo 33.4 2.7 36.3 0.3 1.1 10.4 8.8 0.5 0.3 4.8
Upper
West 20.8 6.0 40.6 2.8 0.3 16.9 4.2 0.3 0.7 7.0
Upper
East 28.4 5.2 31 1.8 1.8 20.7 3.4 1.5 1.3 4.4
Northern 38.9 2.6 36.0 1.05 0.0 13.9 5.5 1.3 0.3 4.5
Volta 28.2 0.9 37.9 0.9 2.2 12.3 10.5 0.9 0.4 1.4
Eastern 36.0 1.9 25.1 1.4 0.1 13.4 12.0 1.4 0.3 7.9
Ashanti 38.8 2.1 30.5 1.1 1.2 7.9 9.4 0.9 0.3 7.3
Source ; Local Government Information Digest No. 7, 1989 p. 21
Problems Encountered
Assemblymen have encountered several problems in the performance 
of their duties including logistics, lack of funds, paucity of reliable 
data etc. but it is apparent that some of these problems are inherent 
in the feeling among several Assemblymen that they are their own 
masters, have attained their status by individual merit and are not 
subject to any visible party machinery. On the other hand, their interest 
appears to have fizzled out suddenly.
One possible explanation for the waning of interest of Assem­
blymen in their work is the absence of the Party Whip to stir them 
into action. Throughout 1991 and 1992, several DAs found it difficult 
to obtain the requisite quorum to proceed with their business. In 
this connection, the presiding member of the Tolon-Kumbungu DA, 
Tolon, suggested to Mr. Ahwoi that the provision that two-thirds of 
the Assembly must be present to elect a presiding member, should 
be changed and construed in terms of a simple majority "because 
according to what we read from the dailies, most Assemblies do not 
find it easy to get a quorum for voting."26
In mid-1992, it was reported that the Bolgatanga DA had ad­
journed its first ordinary session for the fourth time because it had 
persistently failed to obtain a quorum. For that reason a presiding 
member could not be elected, either. In an exasperated editorial in 
response to this development, The Ghanaian Times, echoed: "Recall 
them all."27
Some Assemblymen assumed the posture of local overlords and 
identified themselves personally with the Assembly, assuming personal 
powers in the process. As the PNDC Secretary for Local Government 
Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi himself observed,
according to reports reaching us, some individual Assemblymen 
have printed their own letter heads ... and are using these to 
intimidate public officers and also claim undeserved favours.28
The zeal to display their newly-acquired status of self-importance 
led some Assemblymen to act ultra-vires. For example, the District 
Secretary for Afigya Sekyere, Agona-Ashanti, Mr. Yaw Oppong 
Kyekyeku, addressing the second meeting of the Afigya-Sekyere Dis­
trict Assembly, revealed that some members of the District Assembly 
Town Development Committees (TDCs) and CDRs have entered into
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unilateral agreements with timber contractors to fell trees in the area 
without reference to the District Assembly. It had become apparent that 
an assembly member had signed a whole agreement unilaterally.29
Some Assembly members understood the District and Local 
Tribunals system to mean that they could set up their own courts. 
Perhaps they wanted to continue with the People's Courts set up by 
some Defence Committee chairmen at their pleasure. In Kade, for 
example, the District Secretary for Kade, speaking for the Justice and 
Security Sub-Committee of the Kwaebibirem District Assembly, warned 
that no District Assemblyman /  woman could constitute his or her own 
court to try cases. He advised that if there should be the need for any 
Tribunal, the Assembly could take a decision on it and the PNDC 
Secretary responsible for Tribunals would be contacted for necessary 
action to be taken.30
There was the report of an Assemblyman who had employed 
the services of body-guards. Another report was made of a Presiding 
Member who insisted he should be allocated an official bungalow 
in accordance with his new status.31 As the Information Digest put 
it, "such unnecessary show of power and unwarranted power struggle 
divert attention from the real issues of development for which the 
Assemblies have been set up."32 In no time some Assemblymen had 
caused the Assemblies to issue them with special identity cards and 
at least in one instance an Assemblyman had put a flag on the bonnet 
of his car. The Ministry of Local Government had to issue a directive 
stopping these practices."33
A confrontational attitude was also adopted in some cases towards 
other government officials and PNDC appointees. Clashes occurred 
and offensive letters were written. An example is the sordid con­
frontation between the Assin District Assembly and Mr. Ato Austin, 
PNDC Secretary for the Central Region. Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi had 
to be sent down from Accra to intervene whereafter, at the 2nd 
ordinary meeting of the Assembly, members adopted a motion to 
apologize to Mr. Austin for "misconducting themselves before him." 
The Assembly also adopted a motion to withdraw a resolution calling 
or the removal of the District Secretary. It further proceeded to 
ithdraw the whole minutes of the previous meeting —  which was the 
rst meeting of the Assembly and in which several vituperations 
id been recorded — as "full of errors and omissions."34
It was also common for Assembly members to get themselves 
angled in various disputes which lowered the estimation of mem-
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bers in the eyes of the populace. These disputes spilled over into 
the Assemblies creating problems among members. In the Kwaebibirem 
District, two members of the Assembly got actively involved in a land 
dispute between the traditional authorities of Akyem Akwante and 
settler farmers in the area, joining hands with one faction in the crisis. 
When the crisis escalated, the Security Sub-Committee of the Assembly 
which investigated the matter castigated the Assemblymen for en­
couraging factionalism which tended to ''worsen the already volatile 
situation in the area."35 The Assemblymen named as Messrs Sowah 
and Ayidah, according to the Committee, encouraged the settler farmers 
to stay away from a meeting summoned by the Committee at Kade 
to strike a compromise between the two parties. According to the 
Committee, the Assemblymen ill-advised the farmers to engage in 
a fruitless litigation, thus dissipating monies accruing from the sale 
of their cocoa.
After the services of a surveyor had been engaged with the co­
operation of the High Court at Koforidua, to carry out a survey, it 
became clear that the settler farmers had actually encroached upon 
land belonging to the Akwante stool by cultivating 75 hectares in 
excess of what their ancestors had bought in 1927. The security sub­
committee proceeded to settle the matter amicably.36
A struggle for power seemed to have characterized the activities 
of the Assemblies. In August, 1989, Chairman Rawlings himself had 
the occasion to deplore this tendency which he described as "unnec­
essary and irresponsible."37 Chairman Rawlings lamented that the 
"negative and rather disturbing" action of some Assemblymen were 
not only destroying the good image of other Assembly members but 
also "the virtues of a novel democratic system".38 In the words of 
the Chairman, there had been reports of Assemblymen dissolving 
CDRs, conflicts between presiding members and District Secretaries 
and some Assemblymen behaving like "tin gods" when entrusted with 
power.39
There has been so much misunderstanding within the system 
that, for example, at a rally held at Saltpond to introduce the Assem­
blymen for the area to the chiefs and people, the Central Regional 
Organising Assistant for CDRs, Mr. E.K.T. Addo, told the Assembly­
men that they could not perform their duties properly if they did not 
understand the spirit which motivated the 31st December Revolution 
He decried reports that some Assemblymen had started to "question, 
challenge and even undermine some of the political structures ai
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concepts of the Revolution."40
Conclusion
After the inception of DAs, several critics saw them as another attempt 
by the PNDC to buy time and avoid the inevitable— party politics. It is 
noted that the expectation that non-party DAs would evolve into 
Regional and National Assemblies without political parties has also 
fizzled out.
Nevertheless, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana while endorsing 
political parties at the national level, forbids them at the District level. 
It is provided that (1) A candidate seeking election to a DA or any lower 
local government unit shall present himself to the electorate as an 
individual, and shall not use any symbol associated with any party.
(2) A political party shall not endorse, sponsor, offer a platform to or in 
anyway campaign for or against a candidate seeking election to a DA 
or any lower local government unit.41
It is submitted that if Ghanaians should learn the intricacies of 
party politics, its attendant tolerance, compromise etc, the process 
should begin at the local level. Furthermore, it is easy to perceive that 
parties would be driven underground at the District Level yet control­
ling the process and thus honouring the constitutional provisions in the 
breach. In the meantime, however, the PNDC has constitutionalized 
non-party politics at the District level as a contribution to the nation's 
political development.
Nevertheless, it is the prognosis of this paper that political parties 
will soon take control of District Assemblies in Ghana. After all, as early 
as 1858, the Mambii Party was formed in Accra to contest the first 
municipal elections held in the Gold Goast by universal adult suffrage. 
It may therefore be argued that the party system at the local level has 
got pride of ancestry and cannot be killed.
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Chapter 11
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, ELECTIONS 
AND DEMOCRACY IN GHANA
Kwame A. Ninsin
Elections do not amount to democracy: 
they are merely a step towards democracy.
Introduction
In its report to the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the 
Committee of Experts (CE)1 postulated a direct relationship between 
electoral systems and the type of government— democratic or undemo­
cratic. The Committee was, nonetheless, aware of the fact that such 
relationship, if any, could not be logical. However, it dismissed the 
majoritarian system as intrinsically undemocratic: because it tends to 
confirm the incumbent regime in power, and does not ensure fair 
representation of the nation as well as responsive and accountable 
leadership. To avoid such weaknesses the Committee proposed that the 
Consultative Assembly (CA) should consider the merit of a variant of the 
system of proportional representation, in particular, the additional 
member system (AMS) which is currently being practised in Germany. 
When a motion was tabled before the house to provide for proportional 
representation or its variant, the proposal was roundly rejected on 
grounds that it would be a recipe for fragmentizing the party system and 
weakening parliament.2 The vote against the motion was so massive that 
one could hardly ignore its import — namely, that in the view of the 
majority of its members the majoritarian system is best suited to the 
circumstances of the country.
This chapter discusses the arguments of the CE in the context of 
the country's quest for a stable democratic order. It argues that rep­
resentation is not necessarily democratic, and democracy is not about 
representation alone. So the efficiency of a particular electoral system 
in ensuring representation should be measured against other impera­
tives of the political order —  such as the stability and effectiveness of
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regimes. In particular, the efficiency of any electoral system should not 
be determined in isolation. Rather, it should accord with the prevailing 
political culture of Ghanaian society.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one examines 
the position of the CE in relation to the results of past elections, which 
were based on the majoritarian electoral system, and discusses the 
merits and demerits of its claims. Section two examines the significance 
of elections as an instrument for achieving democratic representation. 
It argues that the relationship between elections and democracy is 
mainly theoretical and, at best, tenuous. In practice, elections —  like 
many other forms of political action — have different meanings to 
different societies. In the light of this section three examines the meaning 
that the Ghanaian electorate attaches to elections and to the notion of 
representation. I argue on the basis of the evidence that for the Gha­
naian electorate voting or electing a representative has instrumentalist 
meaning: it is intended to secure for the individual and the community 
tangible developmental advantages. On the one hand, the represen­
tative is regarded as an agent of, especially, the community. On the 
. other hand, the individual voter has no conception of himself as an 
- autonomous political actor manifesting through his vote a bundle of 
democratic rights. The fourth and final section summarizes the argu­
ments and derives a number of conclusions from them.
Ghanaian Elections: How Democratic or Representative?
Regrettably the Akuffo-Addo Constitutional Commission did not 
attach much importance to the mode of choosing a representative as a 
measure of democracy. In its view it was adequate to ensure that the 
franchise was universal, elections would be free and fair, and the entire 
electoral process would be supervised by an independent electoral 
commission. These alone would guarantee the choice of a representative 
body that could be considered democratic and "the authentic expression 
of the national will."3 Accordingly, the Commission tacitly accepted the 
majoritarian single member constituency electoral system as the means 
for choosing members of the next parliament which lasted from Septem­
ber 1969 to January 1972.
Based on analyses of the 1969 elections, which were conducted 
under free and fair conditions, the CE disagreed. In its view the 1969-7 
parliament was neither representative nor democratic.4 On one har
176
the Progress Party (PP) which won 58.7% of the popular votes secured 
75.0% (105) of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the National 
Alliance of Liberals (NAL) which received 30.4% of the popular votes 
secured just 21 % (29) of the parliamentary seats. The minority parties 
obtained 10.9% of popular votes and only 4.0% (6) of the parliamentary 
seats. On the basis of the votes received therefore the parliamentary seats 
were disproportionately distributed. In other words, representation in 
parliament was not consistent with the preferences expressed at the polls 
by the electorate: "If each vote had an equal weight... on the distribution 
of parliamentary seats, the PP would have obtained 82 seats instead of 
105; the NAL 43 seats instead of 29; and the other parties 15 seats 
instead of 6." In the opinion of the CE it is only when various organized 
electoral interests are as much as possible represented in the supreme 
legislative organ of the nation that one could talk about democratic 
representation. This is what the Committee described as "consensus 
democracy." "The fact is that consensus democracy is inherently more 
democratic as a result of its inclusive character."
A similar argument of disproportionate representation was 
adduced against the outcome of the 1979 parliamentary elections. The 
CE argues rather persuasively that the PNP won parliamentary seats on 
the basis of 9,086 votes per seat; the PFP with 12,897 per seat; and the 
UNC as much as 23,851 per seat."Put another way, while the PFP, UNC 
and ACP together obtained 363,125 votes more than the PNP the three 
parties combined received six fewer seats than the PNP." However 
convincing the CE's argument may be, it is based on a static and 
universalistic view of elections. In contemporary democracies the notion 
that elections secure the representation of sovereign individuals equally 
has long remained at the level of theory. In practice elections have 
become a means by which the electorate is able to choose a common 
authority that is invested with the legitimate power to manage the affairs 
of society on behalf of its members. At any rate the principles underlying 
elections may not bear the same meaning worldwide. Thus while in 
Ghana an election may be seen as a mechanism for securing democratic 
representation, in practice it serves a different purpose. Local conditions 
td norms may impart an entirely different meaning to it. Before I dilate 
i the meaning of elections to the Ghanaian electorate, let me touch 
jfly on the relationship between elections, representation and democ- 
scy as it is expected to be in theory.
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Elections and Representation
Elections in democratic polities are based on the ancient maxim that the 
people are sovereign. Universal sovereignty implies universal equality. 
Elections merely enable the sovereign people to be democratically 
represented5 on a centrally organized body. But does representation 
necessarily lead to a democracy? For example, before the 1956 general 
election a variety of systems of representation operated in the country. 
Surely the legislative councils of the British colonial regime, which 
emphasized commercial and mining interests, on one hand, and chief­
taincy, on the other, was derived from a certain notion of representation. 
Similarly, the legislative bodies which were established on the bases of 
the 1951 and 1954 elections must have been premised on different 
principles of representation.
Undoubtedly these principles were different from the ones that 
governed the 1956 and subsequent elections.6 For example, the classical 
colonial paternalistic attitudes towards the colonized peoples denied the 
latter of the right to self-government and upheld the principle of 
representation for special interests to determine the composition of the 
colonial legislature. Hence expatriate mining and commercial interests 
were represented while their indigenous counterparts were not. For the 
1951 legislature, property qualification or the ability to pay tax was 
combined with the need to represent corporate interests like chieftaincy 
and those engaged in commerce and mining to arrive at a certain system 
of representation. It could be argued that the supreme principle that 
underpinned representation before Ghana attained independence in 
1957 was the assumed inequality of the interests which constituted 
colonial society.
From 1957 onwards, the bases of representation and election have 
changed. Equality became an important democratic principle on the 
basis of which the electorate were made to choose their representatives. 
The principle of equality was derived from the idea of the universal 
franchise or the principle of "one man, one vote." It was assumed that 
once every adult member of the country, who satisfied existing require­
ments, was able to vote there was a fair chance that his interests would 
be represented in the legislative body alongside the interest of othe; 
The political party became the mechanism for mediating and integrate 
various interests as well as harmonizing conflicting claims and aspira 
tions for the common purpose and also for efficient government. Seco i 
the principle of equality of persons was derived from the principle of t
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sovereign individual. These two constituted the claim to self-govern­
ment.7
The fact, however, is that modem democratic government is now 
firmly anchored on indirect, as against, direct representation. The ques­
tion that has agitated radical democrats is the kind of mechanisms that 
are available to the sovereign citizenry, or could be created by them, to 
ensure that their representatives remain responsive and accountable to 
them, and also to achieve greater equality and personal freedom for all. 
They are not concerned about how various organized factions engaged 
in the electoral politics would be fairly represented. In other words, the 
most urgent problem facing the radical democrat is how to ensure that 
democracy could be achieved under representative regimes rather than 
securing democratic representation. This issue should be of paramount 
interest, especially to the people of Ghana where extensive illiteracy, 
pervasive superstition and persistent ancient myths and beliefs will 
continue to hinder the growth of democratic consciousness and culture.
Even in old democracies like Britain it has long become an estab­
lished doctrine that the representative, once elected, is not a delegate. 
Rather, he is as autonomous as those who elected him. Nor is "Parlia­
ment a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; 
...but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one 
interest, that of the whole... You choose a member indeed; but when you 
have chosen him, he is not a member... (of your constituency), but he is 
a member of parliament."8
An equally compelling factor that heightens the need to ensure 
democracy outside the electoral process is the modem trend towards 
oligarchy in democratic organizations and regimes. Robert Michels has 
already drawn attention to the oligarchical tendency in modem democ­
racies9, just as Gaetano Mosca underscored the existence of a "political 
class" —  the core group of professional politicians that continues to 
renew its ranks periodically.10
For us in Ghana, the problem posed by representative democracy 
is further compounded not just by mass illiteracy, ignorance and super­
stition. It is also complicated by the fact that no representative body in the 
short history of representative democracy in this country has ever 
reflected the social composition of the electorate. Invariably members of 
certain social classes or strata, who are not representative of the occupa- 
ional or social composition of the country, dominate the elected bodies. 
Analyses of Ghanaian parliaments of 1965,1969 and 1979 and the 1968 
Constituent Assembly show that invariably members of the profes­
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sional strata, and those in commerce, industry, and the public services as 
well as big farmers have dominated the important organs of state.11 It is 
equally revealing that even thedistrict level elections (of 1988/89) which 
were designed to produce grassroots representative assemblies suc­
ceeded merely in bringing into power the representatives of the middle 
level elite who had been out of active politics since the PNDC came to 
power. According to a Ministry of Local Government publication12, 
56.9% of the assembly members were teachers, civil and public servants, 
self-employed, and medical and para-medical staff. Agriculturalists, 
and not peasant farmers, constitute the single largest group —  33.2%- 
followed by teachers with 32.3%.
These fragments of evidence would seem to lend credence to the 
existence, at least, of a political elite whose composition keeps changing 
with social change; and that, in practice, the people do not govern 
themselves: a tiny social minority governs on their behalf. The problem 
of elections and democracy can therefore not be reduced to the equitable 
or proportional representation either of factions engaged in electoral 
politics or of disadvantaged social interests.13 After all, elections do not 
amount to democracy. At best, they constitute a means towards the 
attainment of democratic government. Therefore, it is important that in 
our discussion of the link between elections and democracy we probe the 
mind of the citizenry in order to grasp the sort of meaning they attach to 
elections. Accordingly, the next issue I would like to examine is the 
reason behind the electoral choices that the Ghanaian electorate makes.
Why Do Ghanaians Vote?
Why do Ghanaians vote? To answer this question, we should go beyond 
the simple assumption that there is a logical relationship between 
elections and democracy. We should explore the dynamic factors that 
shape the electoral choices that Ghanaians are intermitently called upon 
to make. For surely elections would not have the same significance in the 
political life of Ghanaians as it does elsewhere. In what follows, I attempt 
a concise review of studies of Ghanaian elections with a view to isolating 
the key determinants of voting behaviour.
There appears to be overwhelming agreement among students of 
Ghanaian elections that a broadly consistent range of factors have 
determined electoral outcomes since the 1950s. In his pioneering stud 
of Ghanaian politics, Austin14 drew attention to the powerful influent
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exercised by local or community conflict and issues as well as the critical 
role played by local associations in mobilizing electoral support. Since 
then his thesis has been collaborated by several other studies. Twumasi15, 
for example, identified similar factors and the important role played by 
voluntary grassroots development associations in mobilizing voter 
support for the successful candidates in the 1969 parliamentary elec­
tions. As the case of the contest between Busia's PP and Gbedemah's 
NAL shows, even where personality factors and past political record as 
well as moral stature played a crucial role in determining the success of 
Busia's party in the 1969 election, the fortune of individual candidates of 
the two parties depended to a considerable extent on how successfully 
such individuals could mobilize community issues and concerns. In­
deed, 'The real locus of campaign activity in 1969 was the local collec­
tivity. In each constituency different, specific, and traditional rivalries 
were resurrected, support of indigene and strangers was courted, 
various local leaders were wooed, and local conflicts were revived. This 
pattern was repeated in 1978 and 1979 ..."16
Another set of local factors which has consistently influenced 
voting behaviour include personal obligation to candidates, traditional 
loyalty, ethnicity and other primordial considerations.17 Policies, 
programmes (or manifestoes) and ideologies have usually played a 
strikingly insignificant role in shaping voters' choices.18 After all, the 
parties themselves have a record of carefully staying away from 
programme, policy or issue oriented campaigns.19 It was under the 
influence of such findings that Austin later concluded that so long as 
Ghana remained a predominantly peasant and small town society, 
"tradition as locality", communal and the personal relationships of the 
community are bound to decisively influence voting behaviour. And, 
therefore, issues of social inequality or class will continue to be less 
salient.20
This conclusion would seem unequivocally to distinguish the 
Ghanaian voter from his counterpart in the established democracies — 
for example, Great Britain. Even though British voters are not considered 
ideological, they are nonetheless influenced more or less by party 
policies and programmes, pertinent social issues, and party affiliations. 
Voters tend to be generally issue-oriented. Traditional party affiliations 
merely combine with such concerns about policies and issues to deter­
mine the final choices that voters make. One could argue therefore that 
in so far as issues and traditional party affiliation (i.e., Labour or 
’onservati ve) affect voter choice, the British electorate would be equally
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concerned about issues of social justice or class.21 By implication the 
British voter is concerned about general issues of democratic rights and 
liberties. The British electorate would therefore see the efficient function­
ing of democracy in the extent to which the institutions of state have 
pursued, or promise to pursue, social justice as defined by the rights and 
liberties of the individual as well as the group. For invariably the issues 
of bread and butter, or work, taxation, the environment, etc are at the 
very heart of the rights and liberties of the individual.22
In contrast with its British counterpart, the Ghanaian electorate is 
influenced by the community's interest, which is always its need for 
development. This seems to be the significance of the role played by 
"tradition as locality" in Ghana's electoral politics. It would imply that 
the Ghanaian electorate do not vote as sovereign individuals aiming to 
implement certain democratic ideals or rights but as members of the 
community aspiring to improve their material conditions. But even if 
considerations of either abstract or concrete democratic rights do not 
play an important role in shaping voter choices, the voters nonetheless 
know that they need a representative and so do vote to choose one.23 
Hence in Asunafo the people "elected a m an... to stand for them in the 
national tourney in which community struggled against community for 
goods and evils which the central government distributes."24 This raises 
a question about the role of the representative as conceived by the 
Ghanaian electorate. For naturally the role of the elected representative 
in British politics as enunciated by Burke25 cannot apply with equal force 
to the elected representative in Ghanaian politics.
In trying to understand the Ghanaian voter's conception of his 
elected representative, we should recall Owusu's thesis that political 
action of the Ghanaian electorate is based on instrumentalist calcula­
tions.26 In concrete terms, the voters choose a representative, legislature, 
or government expecting that this individual or body would mediate 
between them and the state in the distribution or allocation of goods and 
services. It could, therefore, be argued that the representative would be 
perceived by his constituents as an economic broker mediating essen­
tially market or exchange relationships.27
I will argue that this instrumentalist orientation in Ghanaian 
politics operates at two parallel levels, that is, at the level of the indi­
vidual and the community. The two are inter-related. Thus, while the 
voter may be using his vote to create opportunities for material gain, 
he is at the same time joining other voters of his community to choos< 
an economic broker who would mediate between them as a comn \
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nity and the state as the purveyor of development projects and other 
services. I would therefore agree with Chazan28 that "Elections essen­
tially have to do with linkages: with the connection between state and 
society, between the local community and the national arena, between 
the economy and the polity, and between nonformal process and 
formal institutions."
In the light of this economic conception of the role of the repre­
sentative, elections must assume a unique role in Ghanaian politics. 
I would argue that elections should be seen as occasions when the 
"little communities" comprising Ghanaian society constitute or recon­
stitute their relations with the state for the purpose of realizing eco­
nomic or developmental goals. The local community is the primary 
unit within the relationship that is established with the state; and the 
voter is one of several agents. It means that the electorate of any 
community would choose or elect a representative according to their 
assessment of the candidate's capacity to function effectively as an 
economic broker for the community. Invariably the aspiring parlia­
mentarian should have demonstrated a commitment to local develop­
ment if his chances were to be really good. For, at the back of the minds 
of each community in a constituency lurks the need to ensure the 
community's smooth development. Hence in previous elections a close 
relationship existed between the parliamentarian and the development 
of the local community.29
In the light of the foregoing, we should conceptualize two comple­
mentary political imperatives operating in a typical electoral situation. 
On one hand the electorate expects to have as its representative a 
person who could effectively mediate between their community(ies) 
and the state - somebody who could secure development projects for 
them. On the other hand, the successful candidate should not only 
demonstrate a commitment to local development. He should also 
possess enough entrepreneurial political acumen to enable him to 
mobilize, or capitalize on, local community issues for his election. 
Accordingly, electoral politics were often nothing more than a contest 
in which the competing candidates could make more convincing 
promises, and back them up with effective mobilization of local groups 
as well as communal and other issues to advantage. This is why 
Ghanaian elections have been bereft of critical and sustained public 
debates about alternative programmes and policies. Above all, since 
he mainstream candidates of all major political parties shared similar 
social or occupational background30 and ideas atx>ut the management
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of the economy and society,31 the electorate was usually presented with 
no real alternatives other than their communal self-interest —  which 
is the need for developing their "little communities" —  as a guide for 
rational choice. 'Election results in Ghana (therefore) reflect the voters' 
judgement on competing elites and their patronage potential."32 Of 
course, such electoral choices are rational; because as electoral out­
comes affected a community's prospects for development there was 
always a keen collective sense of the need to back the winning party.33 
In such a situation party identification was purely symbolic.34
The concern to back the winning party was always shared equally 
by the candidate. It is the community's success in backing the winning 
party that ensured that elections would perform their function of linking 
local society to the state.
The economic underpinning of electoral choices seems to affect the 
electorate's decision whether or not to come out on election day to vote. 
A study of voter turn-out provides evidence which seems to suggest that 
where the electorate is confident of the economic viability of the state, it 
has shown greater interest in the linkage functions of elections and 
consequently turned out heavily on election day to vote. When the state 
experienced economic crisis so that its capacity and that of state-level 
political elite for patronage diminished, voter turn-out also declined.
The following analysis of elections provides conclusive evidence to 
support this postulate.35 The period following the 1966 coup d'etat and 
the liberal economic policies of the regime improved the economic 
situation quite well compared to the pre-1966 period. This appears to 
have been reflected in voter response to the 1969 parliamentary election. 
In that year's exercise 1,493371 registered voters (or 63.2% of a total of 
2363,665) cast their vote. This turn-out was equal to 47.3% of the 
estimated total electorate. Compared to data for the 1960 referendum, 
voter participation in 1969 amounted to a massive growth of 30.0%.
By the close of the 1970s when the economic crisis was clearly 
undermining the capacity of the state to perform its patronage func­
tions, the voter turn-out in the elections of that period also showed a 
revealing decline. In the 1978 Union Government (Unigov) referen­
dum 1,983,698 (or 42.5% of the 4,668,875 registered voters) actually 
voted. Those who voted formed just 35.4% of potential voters. Cor 
pared to the 1969 voter turn-out, there was a fall of 20.7%. During 1 
twelve months following this referendum a clear trend towards vo! 
apathy and abstention from polls began to emerge. In the di 
council election of that year only 18.4% registered voters tui 1
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to vote while the parliamentary and presidential elections also of 1979 
produced an equally low voter turnout of 35.3%.36
Surely one cannot explain voter apathy or abstention just by one 
factor, namely, economic decline and the knowledge that the capacity of 
state institutions and state-level political elite to mediate in the distribu­
tion of material benefits has also become suspect. A nu mber of factors — 
including environmental, social, and psychological ones — could ad­
versely affect peoples' decision to either vote or not vote at any one time. 
But it becomes difficult to adduce cogent reasons for non-voting after 
sustained efforts have been made to mobilize the electorate to register as 
well as vote. In 1978 the government had not only ensured a higher voter 
registration (83.7% of the eligible voters, compared to 74.8% in 1969) but 
in the referendum that followed both the government and opposition 
groups had intensely mobilized the public to vote for their respective 
positions. So the poor turn-out at the 1978 referendum, and more 
especially in the two subsequent elections of 1979, could only be ex­
plained by the declining significance of elections in so far as people were 
sure that the economic crisis had rendered state-society relations eco­
nomically less beneficial. On the basis of those results, it could be argued 
that elections were gradually losing saliency as a means for organizing 
or reconstituting state-society relations. Finally, in so far as the linkages 
which were established between society and the state were intended to 
achieve beneficial economic or material returns —  for both the indi­
vidual and his community — the results also seem to show an objective 
or rational assessment of the capacity of aspiring economic brokers to 
deliver the goods.37
Summary & Conclusion: Consensus or Majoritarian Democracy?
If Ghanaians do not vote to express their sovereignty either as individu­
als or collectivities, then what is the need for preferring a version of 
proportional representation over the simple majority or the first-past- 
the post electoral system? The CE argues for consensus democracy on 
grounds that it ensures a fair representation of the electorate through a 
system of proportional representation. The basis of the CE's argument 
is that the party with a winning majority does not always command a 
!<iar majority nationwide; and so it is not representative of the majority 
the voting public. The Committee believes that proportional represen- 
i tion, especially its variant— the Add itional Member System (AMS)—
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will ensure that all parties with sufficiently large support among the 
electorate would be represented in parliament. It will, in addition, enable 
a winning party to supplement its representation by bringing into 
parliament people with exceptional skills or knowledge who would 
otherwise not scramble for elected office. Others have argued that this 
variety of PR would ensure representation for under-represented and 
disadvantaged social groups like — women, the youth, etc.38
Such proposals ignore the underpinning rationality of Ghanaian 
elections which I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Appar­
ently, the CE's proposal was inspired by the assumption that Ghana's 
problem with forging a stable democracy arises from deep social divi­
sions or that version of pluralism which is known as tribalism. This 
misconception enamoured the CE to LijphaiTs model of consociational 
democracy39 which was derived from the experiences of societies with 
a real problem of "profound social divisions and political differences." 
But as Lijphart points out the societies under reference are industrialized 
and their problem of pluralism emanates from the effect of industrializa­
tion and the social division of labour which accompanies it. The same 
error of judgment was committed by Arthur Lewis whose proposals 
about the appropriate structures for ensuring a stable democracy40 also 
influenced the conclusions and recommendations of the CE in this 
particular respect.
Nor could it be strongly argued that the Burkean thesis —  that 
parliament is not a collection of constituency representatives but a 
national institution embodying the democratic will or interests of the 
nation -  would adequately reflect the uniquely instrumentalist logic of 
electoral choices in the country. If, on the other hand, parliament 
becomes an autonomous national body once elected, then there is no 
need to agitate for representation of particular interests, or for consen­
sual representation. Besides, Ghanaian electoral politics seems to sug­
gest that parliamentary democracy cannot be attained through one or 
the other form of proportional representation but rather through the 
representation of various communities and equitable access to the 
nation's resources. Ghana's parliaments may therefore be best described 
as coalitions of little community interests which are subsumed under 
electoral constituencies. Because of this unique nature of Ghanaian 
parliaments its members are expected to represent their respective 
constituencies as a whole and, in particular, seek their interests when it 
comes to the distribution of development works. In this regard there is 
no distinction between the parliamentarian whose party won majority
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seats and the one whose party is in the minority. Both have equal 
responsibilities towards their constituents.
If the Ghanaian electorate has any understanding of democracy 
through representative institutions at all, then it is the right of access to 
the nation's resources which election, as a mechanism of democracy, 
provides for individuals and communities. It is in this sense that Ghana's 
state institutions like parliament, cabinet, etc. would differ decidedly 
from their British counterparts. Thus a Ghanaian parliament, for in­
stance, is unambiguously an assembly of constituency representatives.
Given this ideology of representation, any version of proportional 
representation is most likely to endanger national unity, regime stability, 
and efficient government. It is likely to fragment the party system by 
encouraging representation, inside parliament, of the variegated com­
munity interests that exist in any one electoral district. Undoubtedly, this 
potential will easily encourage the emergence of parochial, sectional and 
ethnic or tribal parties whose actions may jeopardize the unity of the 
nation. The fragmentation of the party system will certainly be repro­
duced at the level of state institutions, especially in the form of a 
balkanized parliament. A balkanized parliament is a weak parliament; 
and is likely to have a disastrous effect on regime effectiveness and 
stability.
Such a situation may jeopardize the dominant rationality of elec­
tions: namely, to establish exchange-based linkages between society and 
the state. For, contrary to Austin's conclusion,41 the dominant rationality 
of Ghanaian elections subsumes a certain positive view of national 
institutions. Indeed, participation in elections is legitimized by the 
expectation that national-level state institutions like parliament, the 
cabinet, etc. will not only prevail; but they will also be stable, strong and 
economically viable so that they would be able to provide the necessary 
economic or material resources which elected representatives are ex­
pected to assist in sharing for the benefit of their constituents. Hence the 
electorate's response to the fiscal crisis, which has usually undermined 
the state's ability to discharge its essentially patronage or distributive 
functions, has been massive abstention from the polls. The decline in 
voter turn-out during the 1978-79 period was due precisely to these 
velopments viz., the endemic instability of national-level state insti- 
ti ons, and the dwindling resource base of the state.
he challenge of building a stable democracy therefore does not lie 
he introduction of a system or procedure that is bound to fragment 
! weaken institutions that are conducive to the growth of democracy.
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R< her it lies in whether the nation has the political capacity to initiate a 
co xerted endeavour aimed at strengthening and consolidating the 
lo; ic of institutional unity and stability which pervades the Ghanaian 
state. Theexperienceof those nations that have practised the majoritarian 
system compared to those that have practised various versions of the 
proportional representation system, provides ample proof that the 
majoritarian system promises to be supportive of the logic of institu­
tional unity and stability.
Finally, democracy means more than the right to choose a rep­
resentative. It also means the capacity to influence elected represen­
tatives and policy-makers operating within the state bureaucracy as 
w°ll as the opportunity to exert such influence. These points are of 
particular importance to us Ghanaians; because nowhere in the world's 
successful democracies could we find that the people actually govern 
themselves. The most important factor in a successful democracy is 
what has been stated by V. O. Key Jr. namely, the right and freedom 
exercised by the citizenry occasionally to assert their sovereignty. In 
his own words, "The people may not really govern themselves, but 
they can stir up a deafening commotion if they dislike the way they 
are governed."42 Therefore, to realize a successful and stable parlia­
mentary or representative democracy would require building and 
strengthening a network of mass democratic institutions (like political 
parties and other non-state political organizations) by which the rank 
and file of Ghanaians could periodically assert their sovereignty against 
arbitrary actions and dictatorial regimes. Ultimately, an election, how­
ever important, is only the first step towards the establishment of a 
democratic order.
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Chapter 12
THE DEMOCRATIC ETHOS AND INTERNAL PARTY 




When the PNDC took over power in 1981, even though it had used 
undemocratic means to gain political power, the regime showed by 
its actions that it was convinced about democracy. This was done in 
the establishment of the National Commission for Democracy. The 
functions of the Commission as elaborated in the PNDC (Establish­
ment) Proclamation law 1982, PNDCL 42, Section 32 were, among 
others:
(i) to disseminate within the society awareness of the objectives
of the revolutionary transformation of the society being em­
barked upon by the Council in the interest of real democracy;
(ii) to assess for the information of the Governm ent the
limitations to the achievement of true democracy arising 
from the existing inequalities between different strata of the 
population and make recommendations for redressing these 
inequalities;
(iii) to formulate for the consideration of Government a programme 
for a more effective realization of a true democracy in Ghana.1
From this concern of the PNDC it was clear that from the very begin­
ning of the revolution the Government was very concerned about 
democracy. The NCD was to work towards realizing the objectives 
of democracy. The NCD therefore set out to collect and collate views 
on the political aspirations of the people and their notions of demo; 
racy. One pertinent issue that the NCD raised for the consideration ot 
the Consultative Assembly that was set up to draft the new Consti 
tution for the Fourth Republic was the development of a democrat
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ethos. This was:
The development of democratic political culture-democracy within 
institutions of state, private organizations, voluntary organiza­
tions, professional associations and traditional institutions 
as learning grounds for the development of a democratic national 
political culture, the NCD as the institutional framework for pro­
moting this.2
The essence of the PNDC setting up the NCD is to see how to make the 
ideals of democracy become part and parcel of the Ghanaian way of 
doing things i.e. to develop a democratic political culture. This chapter 
looks at the ideals of democracy and the extent to which they are 
manifested itself in the internal organization of the political parties that 
have sprung up to contest the elections to the Fourth Republic.
A History of Democracy
Democracy was first organized and clearly discussed in the Greek city 
states of the 5th century BC, especially Athens. That was the era of 
direct democracy in which all free men in the Greek city states went 
to the acropolis to take part in the discussion and decision-making on 
all issues that affected the city states. But the democracy of the Greek 
city states has gone through a good deal of changes and challenges 
over the years to the present. In some circles democracy was seen as 
a revolutionary challenge to established authority and old interests. 
Others have seen democracy as a symbol of defiance, protest and 
liberation as well as an attack on privilege and class rule.
Democratic institutions and ideals have however gone through 
quite a struggle. After a long period of "non-use" democracy came 
into prominence in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries and contin­
ued to grow in the 19th century. In the 20th century it emerged on 
the winning side of the first and second world wars. Opponents of 
democracy have included the aristocrats and oligarchs (a few who held 
the ruling power in the city states of the ancient world). Its opponents 
aave also included the nobility of Europe in the medieval era between 
i he 6th and 15th centuries as well as the absolute monarchs of the 16th 
nd 17th centuries, the merchant princes in virtually all the eras when 
'he power of the people threatened their riches, the majority of the 
eaders of organized religion, the commanders of almost every army
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in the past and most of them in the present, and the 20th century 
dictators.
One important thing to keep in mind when discussing democracy 
is that no two democracies look exactly alike. There is a large number 
of contrasting institutions and procedures all of which may justly be 
called democratic; and the degree to which things are done democrati­
cally may differ from country to country. Among the institutions and 
procedures are: the basic structure of the government, the functioning 
of the party system, the meaning and priorities assigned to the different 
ideals and philosophies. There are also the relation between the citizens 
and their officials, and the character of the social and economic order 
with which the political order is mingled.
The Democratic Ethos
To guide our discussion of internal party democracy we need to be 
dear in our minds about what the democratic ethos is. The democratic 
ethos consists of all those essential traits of democracy: i.e., the char­
acteristic spirit, moral values, ideals or beliefs of democracy. As dis­
cussed earlier, the foundations of democracy were laid in ancient 
Greece. The word democracy is Greek, and the system it denotes 
developed first among the Greeks and matured between the 6th and 
4th century BC in the dty state of Athens in particular. The Athenians 
became very much involved in a vigorous debate about the prindples 
of a good sodety and their application. This process of continual 
discussion became the core of their political life. This open discussion 
of issues has educated generations down to the present and it has 
become one of the cardinal aspects of the democratic way of doing 
things.
In his work Herodotus3 describes democracy as supreme power 
of the state in the hands of the many as opposed to its being in the 
hands of one person (Monarchy) and in the hands of a few (Aristoc­
racy). He identified three prindples of democracy as equality in the 
application of the laws, participation by the dtizenry in the making 
and administration of the laws and equality (freedom) of speech. 
Another Greek historian, Thucydides, chronicles the struggles between 
Athens and Sparta in his work on the Peloponnesian Wars.4 He dte 
Perides' famous speech in 431 BC spelling out the essentials of Athe­
nian democracy. In the speech, Pericles identifies democracy as a
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government by the many instead of the few. In private disagreements, 
the laws provide equality of the rights for all. But in the affairs of the 
state, however poor a man might be, he is not prevented from par­
ticipating in the government of public affairs if he has anything good 
to contribute. In general, Greek philosophers detected in a democracy 
three broad ideals. First, there is the social context which involves the 
elimination of debt, slavery, and property qualifications for political 
office, and opportunity for the individual regardless of family status 
or wealth. Secondly, there is the governmental system i.e. public 
deliberation and decision-making by all citizens resulting in majority 
rule. Thirdly, there are the philosophical ideals, namely, equality, 
freedom of speech, adaptability, and obedience to the authority of laws 
and of public officials.
Modem Democracy
Modem democracy is radically different from the direct democracy of 
the Greek city states. Modem developments have made it difficult to 
practise direct democracy. Modem democratic practice has adapted 
to the long strides that society has made from the early days of ancient 
Greece. Modem democracy is representative rather than direct due 
to population growth and the development of towns and cities. Now 
democracy has to be practised in a country larger than a city state. 
Furthermore there is mass participation in politics as opposed to the 
practice of the Greek dty states where participation was limited to free 
men only, while slaves and women were kept out. The characteriza­
tion of a modem democracy pre-supposes the following (a) the people 
should hold ultimate power through universal adult suffrage with 
each citizen having one vote i.e. one person, one vote; (b) a minimum 
of two political parties to offer a choice of candidates and programmes 
to the electorate in free elections at reasonable intervals; (c) a consti­
tutional guarantee of civil liberties of citizens like the freedom to speak, 
publish and associate with others; (d) the need for a free press (e) the 
existence of an independent judiciary; and (f) tolerance of opposing 
views and the ability to compromise.
One fundamental aspect of democracy is that it is a system in 
hich the people are considered the ultimate holders of power and the 
government is established to serve their needs. The people's role in 
politics is more related to their right to vote. The essence of government
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by the people is that the adult population of the country have the right 
to decide on who rules them and what policies are to be pursued through 
their right to vote. A community lacks democracy to the extent that a 
large number of adults are denied the right to vote. The right to vote is 
closely bound up with political decision-making and the party system. 
The NCD report however drew attention to what they considered to be 
the essence of democracy for the consideration of the Consultative 
Assembly. To the NCD, democracy represents the embodiment and 
achievement of the aspirations of all for a better life, dignified and free 
and that it is characterized by a system of representation that reflects the 
true and purposeful wishes of the people. Democracy contains that 
body of principles, attitudes, ideas and orientations which grant human 
and economic rights and bestows freedom and justice.
The question centres on a belief system that is the basis of democ­
racy because it articulates the needs of the entire society. It also outlines 
the political, spiritual and economic rights of the members of the society 
which guarantee a truly democratic system of government. Any work­
able democracy should deal with every unique experience. It ought to, 
in our peculiar historical condition, begin by decolonizing the mind. Our 
political parties of the past only gave the appearance of democracy. 
Indeed, they were weapons for waging economnic wars on behalf of 
specific interest groups. Elections organized along party lines remained 
political festivals which made available to the elite community the 
nominal consent of the majority. They succeeded in strengthening the 
privileges of only the rich who were party founders.5 To what extent 
thendoes political parties capture the essence ofdemocracy for a society?
Political Parties and Democracy
One of the pillars on which democratic governance rests is political 
parties. It is the parties that help the people to choose a government to 
run the affairs of the state and also to choose a parliament where the 
representatives of the people will debate and discuss national issues and 
act on behalf of the people in authorizing policies and making laws. Tht 
parties play a central role in democratic politics because everything tha 
is politically important, be it social, institutional or ideological, come 
alive in the party. The parties serve as a bridge uniting various sections 
of the society and the state. The party is, therefore, influenced by both tl 
society and the state.
196
From the society, the parties derive much of their substance and 
from the state much of their form. The mobilization of diverse interests 
in groups, their opposition or shared goals, provide the basic material 
out of which parties can grow and formulate their political philoso­
phies. The mobilization of the people by political parties statisfies a 
very important aspect of modem democracy. This is the requirement 
of the need for the mass of the citizens to participate in periodic and 
honest elections. At these elections the people are offered a genuine 
choice between candidates and programmes. It is for this purpose, and 
the wish to win political power, that political parties mobilize the 
people, aggregate their diverse interests into national party programmes 
that aim  at the public good.
The parties engage in a political contest in which they campaign 
to influence the electorate to accept their programmes by voting them 
into power. They also engage in the education of the electorate on 
political and economic issues. A political party organizes the people 
to participate in politics on the assumption that all other parties are 
playing the political game within a democratic environment. The 
parties are therefore eagle-eyed to kick against anything which they 
consider undemocratic. For this reason they want to see to it that 
national elections are free and fair, there is freedom of speech, there 
is a free press that allows the free discussion of all issues, and there 
is an independent judiciary.
The assumption here is that if the political parties expect to operate 
within a national democratic environment, then the parties themselves 
must be democratic, i.e. the parties must conduct their internal affairs 
in a democratic manner. It is the position of this paper that it is only 
a party that conducts its internal affairs democratically that can be 
relied upon to operate the national democratic process when it wins 
the people's consent to form the government of the Fourth Republic. 
It might be argued’that even if a party is undemocratic internally it 
has no choice but to operate the national institutions democratically 
if it wins power because it will be operating within a democratic 
constitutional framework. The point being made here is that even if 
the national democratic institutions set out by the Constitution make 
it difficult for the government to behave undemocratically, if the party 
itself is used to an undemocratic internal structure and way of doing 
things, it will, in its own time, find ways and means to subvert the 
national democratic ways of doings things.
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Internal Party Structures and Democracy
One good measure of a democratic internal structure of a political party 
is how the party's leaders are chosen to contest national office and to 
run the party's own affairs. The best example is the US presidential 
elections. The US system uses the power of elections at the party level 
to select the presidential candidates to contest national elections. The 
election process is one supreme event in which the people speak for 
themselves. It enables citizens, who are subject to law, to affirm 
themselves as the masters of those who make the law, i.e. the legis­
lators. During elections in a democratic system the citizens are asked 
to declare, individually and collectively, what they want. Much, there­
fore, depends on the ways in which elections are conducted. If the 
process of election fails, democracy also fails.
In the US presidential elections, the impact of elections as a demo­
cratic requirement is felt in the internal mechanisms of the parties in the 
process of selecting presidential candidates. This is very much so in the 
US primary elections for the November presidential elections. That 
process literally tears each of the two US political parties apart into a kind 
of multi-party system in which candidates representing various view­
points within the same political party are allowed to compete against one 
another for the votes of the party faithfuls as the presidential candidate. 
This primary election culminates in the national party convention at 
which the delegates vote for one of the candidates as their presidential 
candidate. The US primaries enable the parties to display openly their 
internal differences to the greatest possible extent. After the nomination 
has been made, all emphasis is placed on party unity without which the 
electoral college majority cannot be won. This is a system that ensures 
that even within the parties no one group monopolizes the opportunity 
to be the presidential candidate; and this reinforces democracy at the 
national level as well.
The US system might be the most open democratic system of 
choosing leaders; and we might point out that the degree of democracy 
that a country exhibits with regard to the selection of its leaders, may 
differ from country to country even within the Western liberal democ­
racies. For example given the way the British elect their prime ministers 
one would say the US system of selecting leaders is more open and 
democratic than that of the British. For this reason one would not expeU 
the same level of democracy in a third world political environment \, ith 
regard to the selection of leaders of political parties to contest na lui U
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elections. All the same one expects to see a semblance of the democratic 
way of doing things within the parties if the future of democratic politics 
is to be guaranteed at the national level.
Democracy and Ghanaian Political Parties
The party system and the Ghanaian political sytem has been character­
ized as a corrupt machine which has not been allowed to grow. The 
NCD, pointing this out noted that:
The pitfalls of political parties, corruption and general mismanage­
ment, have been attributed to the fact that independence in Ghana 
was so rushed that the political parties hardly had time to take 
roots. The idea of a multiparty system is inherently good, but this 
system has been abused in Ghana and not been given the opportu­
nity to grow as a result of military interventions.6
We would now examine the crop of political parties that have sprung up 
to see how they measure up to the changes noted above and the broader 
issue of internal democracy.
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana is the country's fourth attempt at 
having a political system that operates on democratic principles We 
have noted the vital role that political parties play in the democratic way 
of doing things, and the equally important role that the electorate play 
in the election of representatives and the government to run the affairs 
of state. First we will turn attention to the issue of democracy within the 
political parties that are aspiring to contest the forthcoming presidential 
and parliamentary elections in November and December. The discus­
sion here is based on the assumption that to the extent that there is cause 
to doubt the practice of democracy within the political parties, the future 
of the operation of a democratic national political system is most likely 
to be undermined.
Since the ban on party political activity was lifted on May 18,1992, 
a number of groups aspiring to form political parties have sprung up. 
The main groupings prior to the lifting of the ban were the Kwame 
Nkrumah Welfare Society, the Danquah-Busia Club, and the Eagle Club 
and the Heritage Club. Ghanaian party politics seem to now group 
around three broad traditions. The National Commission for Democ­
racy (NCD) report7 had drawn attention to the fact that even though for 
a long time the country has seen two political traditions —  the Conven­
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tion People's Party (CPP) and United Party (UP), with the June 4th and 
31st December revolutions, there has evolved a third tradition consti­
tuted by the PNDC and its organs. This has been borne out by the 
emerging political parties. The political parties that have emerged have 
been broadly either CPP, or PP or PNDC. The parties are as follows: 
The CPP groups — National Convention Party (NCP), National Inde­
pendence Party (NIP), People's Heritage Party (PHP) The UP group - 
National Patriotic Party (NPP); and the PNDC group — National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) and Eagle (sic) Party. The formation of 
these parties has been a good omen for democratic national politics. At 
the national level, it looks like all the ingredients of a democratic political 
system are in place, namely: the lifting of the ban on party politics, an 
independent body — the Interim National Election Committee (INEC) 
to oversee free and fair elections, a referendum on the proposed consti­
tution, a free press — especially the emergence of the independent 
tabloids that has allowed a fairly free discussion of national issues 
outside the two national dailies that are government-controlled, and an 
independent judiciary under the 1992 Constitution. It seems therefore 
that at the national level all has been laid out for a national democratic 
political system.
What seems to be missing in these national democratic arrange­
ments is the existence of a mechanism to ensure democracy within the 
political parties. This is what this chapter sees as the danger to the 
national democratic political system envisaged in the 4th Republic. As 
far as the parties are concerned they have been largely left to conduct 
their affairs as they deem fit. To the extent that if there is any requirement 
on them at all it is what this writer sees as an exhortation. According to 
the political parties law the internal organization of a political party 
should conform to democratic principles; and its actions and purposes 
should not contravene or be inconsistent with any other law. The law 
does not set out what is meant by democratic principles. Despite the 
good intentions of those who drafted the political parties law it cannot 
be taken for granted that all the political parties would conduct their 
internal affairs in the democratic tradition. This is being borne out by 
developments within the political parties since they were formed 
in May 1992.
In the first place, no mechanism is in place —  despite what the 
political parties law says — to ensure that democratic principles are 
pursued within the parties to choose their leaders. One evidence is the 
number of political parties springing up as a result of splits. This is
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particularly so in the CPP and the PNDC parties. Splits, when they occur, 
suggest the lack of democratic principles like tolerance and compromise. 
The CPP front has split into four main parties, namely, the PNC, the NIP, 
the PHP and the NCP. The leader of the PNC - Dr. Hilla Limann left the 
CPP fold to form his own party on realizing that he might not get the 
leadership if he stayed in the fold. The rumblings and various reasons 
being given for not staying together in the CPP fold smacks of an internal 
party machine being manned by people whose minds have been made 
upon who should be the presidential candidate, and of the lack of a spirit 
of compromise.
The situation suggests that many Ghanaians want to be presiden­
tial candidates; and when they see no meaningful internal mechanism 
in their party to ensure that they ha ve a fair chance of being elected as the 
presidential candidate, they move out to form a new political party in 
which, presumably, there will be no challenger to their leadership. So far 
it has been only the NPP that has adopted a democratic mechanism for 
choosing its presidential candidate. On realizing that as many as seven 
members of the party were interested in being the presidential candi­
date, the party asked all the candidates to tour the country to canvass the 
Danquah-Busia supporters. A party congress was arranged with del­
egates from all the constituencies in the country and they voted one of 
them as the party's presidential candidate. This is the closest that any of 
the political parties has come to the US primary presidential elections; 
and it is the most democratic way to ensure that within the party, the rank 
and file will have a say in the selection of the party leaders. The PNDC 
camp is showing how intolerant they can be, given the rivalry going on 
between the Eagle Party and the NDC. The two parties have claimed that 
they would continue the work of the PNDC and would draft the PNDC 
chairman —  J.J. Rawlings— as their presidential candidate. Following 
he formation of the NDC and the unwillingness of the Eagle Party to join 
the NDC, the leadership of the Eagle Party were set upon and beaten by 
a group led by a leading member of the NDC who is also a secretary of 
state in the PNDC government. Later the houses of the leaders of the 
-gle party were searched for arms — a quantity of which was found 
in the house of one of the leaders by state security agencies.
What the CPP and PNDC group of parties have exhibited so for is 
clear lack of democratic principles within the parties. There is lack of 
!erance and a spirit of compromise within them. The party congresses 
«  groups were non-congresses. The PNC went to congress to more 
?ess approve Dr. Limann as their candidate with a feeble challenge.
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The NIP Congress was a showcase for one man, Mr. Kwabena Darko, 
who won hands down. The PHP ended up having no contest as the two 
challengers to General Erskine all stood down for him. The best case of 
lack of internal party democracy was the NCP. The party went to 
Congress and elected a new leader who, in his acceptance speech, 
encouraged the splintered CPP groups to come together. The party 
leader Mr. K. N. Ackaah, a few days later made an about turn and joined 
the NDC without a democratic party decision. The result of this was that 
the party is split. The NCP leader has become the running mate of the 
NDC presidential candidate— Fit -Lt. Jerry John Rawlings and the rank 
and file have joined other parties. The NDC and Eagle parties went to 
congress just to affirm their confidence in — Flt-Lt. Rawlings as their 
presidential candidate. The Eagle party has since joined the NIX! 
together with part of the former leaders of the NCP.
It is the view of this writer that despite all the concerns of the NCD 
and the political parties law to ensure democracy within the parties, it 
has not been possible for anybody to ensure that democratic principles 
prevailed in the parties. The Interim National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) was only to supervise the election of party leaders at the 
congresses. There was no way INEC could also ensure there is no 
corruption within the party machine. The law only requires the parties 
to submit within twenty-one days before the elections to INEC, a 
statement of their assets, liabilities and expenditures. The conduct of the 
NDC in the use of government vehicles for its political campaigns 
forced the INEC Chairman to call a press conference to condemn it. That 
is a very good example of corruption by a political party.
Given this inability of the system set up to deal with the twin issues 
of corruption and internal party democracy, it is the view of this writer 
that the lack of internal party democracy is likely to throw up presiden­
tial candidates who have benefitted from an autocratic selection process 
within their parties. Such candidates and their parties, if they win the 
elections, are most likely to subvert the national democratic institutions, 
because they might try to replicate at the national level what went on at 
the party level. In which case that President and his party will put the 
4th Republican democratic politics in danger.
Conclusion
After looking at the developments on the political parties front in the 
run-up to the 4th Republic, it is the position of this chapter that a serious
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look should be taken at the internal structures of the political parties 
with regard to their process for selecting their leaders. A review should 
be made aimed at adopting the USA primary presidential election 
process or a modified version of it. This would be one positive way of 
ensuring that the parties do not pay lip service to the democratic way 
of doing things. Simply put, if the parties are aspiring to win power to 
run a democratic 4th Repbulic then, they must, themselves, be seen to 
be democratic in the way they select their leaders. If it can be shown that 
tolerance and compromise can be practised within the parties them­
selves, then one can expect that in their dealings with one another at the 
national level these parties will equally be tolerant and capable of 
compromise. It looks like those who framed the constitution of the 4th 
Repbulic did not reckon with the fact that so many Ghanaians would 
want to be president, and so only exhorted the parties to be democratic 
in their internal structures and operations.
The picture presented by some of the parties has been near anarchy 
as a result of the fierce struggle among contenders for nomination as their 
party's presidential candidate. It is not enough to ask INEC to supervise 
the elections within the parties. The parties went to congress but where 
no elections were held, as the case was with the NDC, Eagle Party and 
the PHP, there was no way INEC could have any idea about how 
internally democratic the parties were. Even where elections were held 
that did not show how internally democratic the parties are. It is the view 
of this writer that the political parties law has woefully failed to ensure 
internal party democracy and prevent party corruption. It is possible a 
party may not even convene a congress. INEC could be asked to take a 
second look at the internal selection process of the parties with a view to 
recommending changes along the lines of the U S. system. That would 
be helping the parties come to terms with electing their leaders 
democratically in the future.
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THE O PPO Sm O N  IN A MULTI-PARTY GOVERMENT: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE GHANAIAN EXPERIENCE
Gilbert Keith Bluwey
Introduction
The impending transition from military rule to a multi-party consti­
tutional order implies the re-instatement of formal opposition as an 
integral part of our system of government. On the one hand, it is 
implicit in multi-party politics that one party (or a coalition of parties) 
would win the competition for the occupancy of the Castle while the 
other party (or group of parties) would lose. On the other hand, the 
bulk of the losers would remain in their camp to taunt, jeer and 
generally query the winners on every major issue till the next general 
elections. Moreover, the Constitution itself recognizes this latent 
adversary phenomenon and provides for the orderly conduct of 
government and opposition relations.
The record, however, shows that three of the six regimes (which 
also have held power much longer than the other three)1 had not only 
rejected the idea of an organized opposition but had also treated the 
opposition as a canker in the political system rather than as part of its 
normal processes. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples' 
Party (CPP) haunted and harrassed the Opposition and drove it into 
extinction before proscribing it in 1964. The military regime of General 
Acheampong openly denounced multi-party politics and by implica­
tion, the existence of organized opposition to the government. The 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has never seriously 
been adverse to multi-party politics. Under its guidance, elections into 
local government bodies (1988/89) were conducted without political 
parties. Its abhorrence of organized opposition may also be discerned 
from the schedule of the elections meant to usher in the executive and 
legislature for the Fourth Republic. By staggering the elections, with 
the presidential elections taking place before the parliamentary, the 
schedule ensures the emergence of a very weak parliamentary oppo-
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sition. It is obvious that parliamentary candidates of the elected 
president's party would benefit from the bandwagon effect of the 
tetter's victory. The president's party would therefore emerge with a 
majority which would relegate the parliamentary opposition to a state 
of microscopic significance. The PNDC has signalled a hardtime for an 
organized opposition in the Fourth Republic in two other major ways. 
First, the PNDC has indicated an intention not only to succeed itself in 
the Castle but also to go into the Fourth Republic with the entire band 
of revolutionary organizations.2 Second, the PNDC has ignored calls 
by prominent politically neutral social groups to create a free 
political climate before the elections.3
Another point of serious concern about the opposition in the 
next dispensation is the apparent lack of appreciation by non-PNDC 
political groups about these threats to the survival of an organized 
opposition. The Ghana Bar Association and the National Union of 
Ghana Students (NUGS) had boycotted the Consultative Assembly 
for very good reasons. But they have both succumbed to PNDC 
covert infiltration of their ranks and have therefore looked away as 
the latter forces its own programme down the throats of Ghanaians. 
The emerging political groups have also concerned themselves mainly 
with preparations for the campaign battle — en route to the Castle. 
They have so far done nothing to compel the PNDC to liberalize the 
political climate for a genuine democratic transition.
The sum of all these is that formal opposition as an integral part 
of government in the Fourth Republic has only very bleak prospects. 
Yet, the Ghanaian, as indeed world-wide experience shows, believes 
that accountability, mass participation, rule of law and respect for 
human rights and market economic principles flourish only where 
an alternative government lurks in waiting for the peaceful replace­
ment of an unpopular government.
This paper will first attempt to update our knowledge of the 
roles played by classical opposition in the established democracies 
along with the benefits for such political systems. Second, it will 
recapitulate the lot of the opposition in Ghanaian politics. Finally, the 
paper will review existing attitudes towards opposition in the next 
political dispensation and recommend measures to guarantee the 
survival of a formal, vibrant opposition in Ghana. The thesis of this 
paper is that classical opposition is a sine qua non of liberal 
democracy and market principles and can thrive in Ghana in spite of 
the apparent fragmentary cultural base.
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The Nature, Roles and Benefits of Classical Opposition
The established democracies of Europe, Canada and the United States 
consider political opposition as a logical extension of the cherished 
freedoms of association and expression. The opposition is, therefore, 
given formal recognition in the scheme of government. Material 
rewards such as special emoluments, official residence and commen­
surate secretarial, administrative and even propaganda logistics are 
provided for opposition leaders. In countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Canada where state media organizations exist, the 
opposition enjoys equal access to them and has equal representation 
with the government on the governing boards. Both government and 
opposition groups meet the same police requirements for holding 
public meetings and rallies. The police, by tradition, are generally 
fair to both sides. The courts also courageously uphold the rights of 
opposition groups to exist, speak and take actions within the law to 
promote their own political fortunes. In short, political practice and 
constitutional provisions guarantee organized opposition as an inte­
gral part of the governing processes in the established democracies.
Classical theorists are generally agreed that organized opposition 
confers three main benefits on the political system, namely: representa­
tion of minority interests and values; provision of rare or restricted 
information both to government and the public; and the exercise of 
surveillance and control over the policies and actions of the govern­
ment.4 In sum, the opposition tells the government what the public 
cannot stand and motivates the populace to take steps which would 
compel the government to rule largely in accordance with the spirit and 
letter of the Constitution.
For more than two decades after independence, most new nations 
rejected the idea of an organized opposition as a necessary complement 
of government. In a statement which has since been accepted as seminal 
on the question of formal opposition, Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP 
had said:
Independent African States are faced with urgent and pressing 
problems of reconstruction, for the solution of which all tne avail­
able national resources, both human and otherwise, must be 
mobilized. This situation is almost analogous to a state of war and 
national emergency which is always met in the older established 
countries by the formation of national or coalition governments. 
Moreover, a multi-party system is entirely alien to the traditional
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concept of government in African society.... A one party system 
(therefore) provides the best answer for (sic) the problem of 
government in Africa.5
The generality of African leaders until 1990, shared in the Nkrumah 
declaration. To them, democracy did not require a two- or a multi­
party system, with an organized opposition and periodic elections. 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was among the foremost opponents of 
formal opposition.6 In several writings, he argued persistently that for 
the Greeks —  the originators of democratic thought and practice — 
democracy simply meant government by equals who discussed issues 
until they reached agreement. He drew clear similarities between the 
Greek practice and the African traditional system and concluded that 
organized opposition was neither theoretically and historically ten­
able, nor practically desirable in the new states of Africa. Nyerere, 
along with several other African leaders, held that the new states 
needed national unity for rapid socio-economic development. The 
unity could be achieved through national mobilization in a single 
mass-party organized along Leninist lines. Organized opposition, he 
concluded, was a luxury for rich nations which the poor, struggling 
African states could ill-afford.
The anti-opposition posture of African leaders found amazing 
sympathy with several empirical analysts. David Apter, for example, 
wrote in 1962 thus:
The role of a political opposition has proved ambiguous in most 
newly independent nations. ... There are many reasons why 
this is so. Most new nations have come into being after a 
prolonged period of struggle with colonial authorities which has 
caused nationalist leaders to monopolize loyalties. Also, oppo­
sition groups, having themselves been associated with nation­
alism at some stage of their existence, often have an anti-gov­
ernment reflex. ... Indeed, many opposition leaders in new 
nations regard the new governments much as they did their 
colonial predecessors, i.e., as basically illegitimate/
David Apter and the intellectual apologists of the anti-opposition 
stance of African leaders forget that the opposition leaders were also 
nationalists whose concerns for socio-economic development were no 
less than those in government. Indeed, it was quite clear even in those 
murky days that the theories of one-party rule in Africa were mere 
rationalizations of the unbridled ambitions of the leaders to become
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life-presidents. The indulgence of these rather numerous intellectual 
apologists of one-party rule contributed in no small measure to its 
spread throughout Africa. In the long run, it engendered the massive 
repression, corruption and graft that have characterized African politi­
cal behaviour. It is also partly responsible for the spate of military 
coups that engulfed the continent over the past two decades.8
The Opposition in Ghana
The break in the united nationalist front in 1949 marks the beginning 
of opposition politics in Ghana. In a sense, the desertion of the United 
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) by Nkrumah and the radical youth 
was a natural parting of ways by two ideologically opposed groups 
that had maintained an uneasy co-existence under one umbrella. 
Regardless of the actual events leading to the break-up and the 
motives of the leading actors in the scenario therefore, the founding 
of the CPP on June 12, 1949 marks the introduction of multi-party 
politics into Ghana. In the subsequent eighteen months, the Gold 
Coast benefitted from the alternative strategies of outright confron­
tation and active collaboration with the colonial regime advocated 
respectively by the CPP and the UGCC.
While the application of positive action (demonstrations, strikes 
and boycotts) resulted in the appointment of the Coussey Commis­
sion, the advocates of collaboration sat in conference with the emis­
saries of the colonial administration to draw up the Coussey Consti­
tution. In spite of its rather numerous deficiencies, the Coussey 
Constitution provided a framework of representation and govern­
ment which was amenable to a peaceful transition to responsible 
government. The Coussey Constitution ran its course and was 
peacefully replaced by the 1954 Constitution. Proceedings of the 
Legislative Assembly (1951-1954) clearly show that classical opposi- 
;on of the Westminster variety prevailed.
The relatively peaceful tenor of Ghanaian politics turned rather 
tenly into a spate of violent confrontations between government 
1 opposition groups following the founding of the National Libera- 
on Movement (NLM) in 1956. Sanity deserted both groups of 
icians and statesmanship became a scarce commodity. Organized 
v iolence resulting in arson, street fights and brutal assassination of 
Political rivals blurred the substance of the issues in dispute.
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The Government lost its head and the Opposition lost the leitmotiv 
of its existence.9
Barely a year after the attainment of independence, the govern­
ment embarked upon measures to liquidate the opposition —  "to 
show the opposition where power lies ."10The Avoidance of Discrimi­
nation Act (1958) proscribed all existing parties founded by regional, 
ethnic and religious groups and forbade the formation of any such 
group in the future. This forced the myriad of opposition parties to 
regroup under a grand political umbrella called the United Party.11 
In July 1958, the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) was passed. Under 
it, the Minister of the Interior could order the imprisonment without 
trial of any Ghanaian for five years. Several other pieces of punitive 
legislation were passed between 1959 and 1962 to restrict the liberties 
of individual Ghanaians and to mop up the opposition out of exist­
ence.12 Professor Kofi Abrefa Busia, the parliamentary leader of the 
Opposition had fled into exile early in 1959. Dr. J.B. Danquah, the 
doyen of Gold Coast politics and his nephew William Ofori-Atta had 
been in and out of jail until the former died in the Nsawam Prisons 
in February, 1965. Several other leaders of the Opposition were either 
in jail or in exile by the close of 1962. Finally, in 1964, the CPP majority 
in parliament passed an Act proscribing all political parties and 
establishing the CPP as the sole party in the country. Henceforth, 
it was a treasonable offence punishable with the death penalty to 
attempt to form or join a political party in Ghana other than the CPP.
The intolerant attitude and punitive measures of the CPP drove 
the Opposition underground to engage the CPP in terrorist warfare. 
The culmination of the Opposition's efforts was the military coup 
d'etat which overthrew Nkrumah and the CPP on February 24,1966. 
Thus, between 1958 and 1966 Ghana operated a parliamentary sys­
tem of government in which organized opposition was missing. The 
CPP did not recognize the existence of minority views. Under its 
socialist persuasions, the nation was one body of peasants and the 
proletariat. A homogeneity of interests and a system of universally 
shared values were assumed. The philosophical framework for 
political participation, interest articulation and aggregation was the 
Leninist prescription of democratic centralism. Information was the 
preserve of the top echelons of society who filtered directives to those 
below an assumed hierarchical structure. The arena of political 
participation thus shrank as everybody was reduced to the status of 
a servile tool of:
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His High Messianic Dedication, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah; 
the Fount of Honour; Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; 
General Secretary of the Party and President of the Republic of 
Ghana.13
But if Nkrumah's towering dominance over the state was puz­
zling, the absolute absence of resistance by such prominent private 
power wielders as the chiefs and the business elite was both horri­
fying and shocking. Nkrumah had never been on good terms with 
the chiefs who however had enormous influence over their subjects. 
Although the state occupied the centre-stage in the Ghanaian economy, 
independent tycoons existed who could have challenged government 
with effect. Certainly, discontent and resentment against Nkrumah's 
policies and methods were widespread. The puzzle therefore was 
that no centre of private power did anything positive to challenge the 
government or call a halt to the reign of terror mounted by Nkrumah 
and the CPP. It takes a whole nation to fight tyranny, and for that 
matter, to preserve democracy. The Ghanaian elite failed to defend 
the right of "the other person." to say what he had to say even if every 
other person disagreed with him.
The lot of the Opposition in the Second Republic (1969-1972) 
was a mixed blessing. The Constitution recognized the office of the 
Leader of the Opposition. Following the Westminster parliamentary 
example, the Opposition was accorded formal representation on stra­
tegic statutory bodies. Besides these constitutional concessions, the 
lot of the Opposition was in no way enviable. The police would not 
freely grant permit for Opposition rallies; private organizations such 
as the Ghana Trades Union Congress and the NUGS which showed 
leanings towards Opposition views were haunted by perpetual se­
curity surveillance. Individual government leaders exhibited arro­
gance and contempt towards Opposition leaders. The political tem­
perature rose steeply and it was no surprise that the army once again 
stepped in to reduce the steadily mounting tension between rival 
civilian political groups.14
Once again, the chiefs, religious leaders and other prominent 
voices failed to defend the Opposition. But the more unsettling fact 
he inability of the Council of State to do its constitutional duty 
ng to moderate the actions of the government. The ceremonial 
ient who also had the constitutional duty of protecting the 
won <er side against the stronger, provided no evidence of action.
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The capitulation of the Third Republic to the PNDC on 31st 
December 1981 was in no way attributable to the failure of the Oppo­
sition. Indeed, the Third Republic saw the emergence of an Opposition 
that was simply up to its constitutional tasks. Led by the Popular Front 
Party (PFP) the Opposition demonstrated towering commitment to the 
constitution and the political survival of the Republic. The Peoples' 
National Party (PNP) also saw the need for the Opposition as an 
integral part of the governing processes of the state. There was 
therefore mutual respect where hitherto mutual suspicion prevailed. 
The government showed no inclination to mobilize its absolute parlia­
mentary majority rigidly behind every piece of proposed legislation. 
The Opposition picked up that as a signal for co-operation and consen­
sus-building —  more useful than joining in a coalition government of 
allparties. It responded with objective and a political assessment of 
government proposals ranging from the nomination of candidates for 
ministerial and other high state offices to debates on the annual budget. 
The government of President Hilla Limann showed considerable tole­
rance of the Opposition which the latter duly reciprocated.15
But neither the Council of State, nor the National House of 
Chiefs, nor any other private pressure group was responsible for the 
co-operation which existed between government and Opposition in 
the Third Republic. Much perhaps, was owed to the political con­
science of President Hilla Limann. It has been widely rumoured 
(sometimes with derision) that President Limann went to bed with the 
Constitution under his pillow. Whatever the case, President Limann 
was clearly a man wedded to the spirit and letter of the Constitution. 
He accepted the cardinal principle of multi-party politics that the 
government is formed by one political party which must permit and 
guarantee the existence of other political parties. The Opposition also 
signalled its willingness to co-operate and to play by the rules when its 
presidential candidate accepted defeat and graciously congratulated 
his victorious opponent very early in the counting of the votes. Thus, 
unlike the joy and spontaneous acclamation which greeted the collapse 
of the First Republic and the partial rejoicing in oppositon camps at the 
fall of the Second Republic, the PNDC intervention was greeted with 
no measure of enthusiasm. Even at that early stage, many felt that the 
intervention was unnecessary and it was a stab in the back of democ­
racy. It was thus due more to a lack of courage than to disenchantment 
with constitutional rule that the pepole did not resist the PNDC 
intervention.
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It is perhaps necessary to mention in passing that Opposition 
neither thrived nor showed its head under any of the three military 
regimes in Ghana. In fact, under each of these regimes, private political 
activity (outside the framework provided by the regime) was legally 
proscribed. The few individuals and groups that tried to offer alterna­
tives to junta policies were swiftly bundled away into the cooler. In any 
case, since military regimes are invariably bom out of force, they 
depended on force to survive. Private views opposed to their positions 
therefore have had no place.
The Opposition in the Fourth Republic
We have already noted that the existence of a formal Opposition is 
implied by the idea of multi-party politics. As in 1969 and 1979, the 
Constitution of the 4th Republic recognizes this fact and provides for 
Opposition representation on all major statutory and constitutional 
bodies. The Opposition has been given representation on the Council 
of State, the National Development Commission, the National Security 
Council and on several such strategic bodies. It will also play a key 
role in the vetting and confirmation of nominees for cabinet and other 
high positions in the State. The Directive Principles of State Policy are 
dear on the rights to free association, speech and assembly. In fact, 
the paper guarantees for the existence of organized Opposition are 
adequate. However, given the experience of the past and the PNDCs 
determination to hand over power only on its own terms, even the 
most optimistic observer would exercise a great deal of caution in 
holding any high expectations for a free rein for the Opposition in the 
4th Republic.
There are indeed several bottlenecks in the way of organized 
Opposition in the next political dispensation. Among these are: the 
inhibitions posed by the cultural environment; deficiencies in some 
structures created by the constitution; and the anti-democratic nature 
of the transitional process.
Ghana is still some distance away from attaining a state of inte­
grated democratic culture. That is to say, certain basic traditional 
on is of behaviour which do not promote democratic behaviour are 
lerished in important social circles. The prime example is the 
that protects the person of anyone in a leadership position 
st open criticism. Although the traditional system permits indi­
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viduals to question the judgment of the leaders of society, it does not 
tolerate organized opposition as an alternative to the leadership. 
Indeed, in the traditional setting, leadership is a life-time trust subject 
only to good conduct. A permanent group of opponents pledged to 
unseat the leadership is therefore a taboo which carries the death 
penalty —  or in modem times, such heavy fines as would send the 
party or parties into exile. The striking point is that it is not only at 
the point of political leadership that the norm prescribing respect and 
servility towards leadership prevails. Even in such places as the 
university, the dvil service and in the school system as a whole, those 
in leadership positions evoke the primacy of office to dictate terms 
and expect passive acceptance of their dictates. The same tendency 
is evident in the manoeuvers that are currently taking place within 
the emergent political parties.
There are also, several prominent voices which are not only 
against multi-party mle but also against the idea of an organized 
opposition as an integral part of government. In these groups (which 
have no links whatsoever with the proponents of the one-party re­
gimes of yester-years) are voices calling for a sort of a "national" 
government. They seem to agree that individuals and parties could 
contest the elections; they could even retain their private political 
organizations. But the victorious party should invite every such 
identifiable group to accept some cabinet and other high positions of 
state. A national, bi-partisan programme for development should be 
worked out by the "national" cabinet and the entire nation should 
support it under the leadership of the "national" cabinet.
The philosophical underpinning of this posture is that a people 
elects a representative to help mle the country and bring development 
into its area and not to oppose — to become an enemy of the gov­
ernment. This thinking, in consonance with the traditional norm, 
considers the notion of an alternative government an evil. It also, by 
implication, accepts a government clamp down on the opposition as 
at least natural — a natural act of self-defence. Thus, as in the past, 
a government denial of social amenities to areas that voted for the 
Opposition, would be considered natural, legitimate and probable. 
The cultural environment, therefore, appears to pose an enormous 
obstacle to the emergence and survival of formal opposition.
Some aspects of the cultural inhibitions to spirited government- 
opposition politics find expression in the constitution. The apparent 
national aversion to political convulsion has left a deep imprint on the
216
national psyche which is not likely to disappear too soon. The idea that 
neutral arbiters play very fruitful roles in maintaining peace and 
stability has found expression in an institutional form. Since 1969, the 
nation's constitution writers have found pleasure in prescribing an 
advisory body for the Chief Executive of State. Christened the Council 
of State, this body has been designed for persons of "experience" and 
presumed statesmanship, and who have shown no open support for 
any political group within the country. The primary function of the 
Council of State has been to advise the Chief Executive in secret and to 
urge him to observe basic principles of morality and humaneness in all 
his actions. The bulk of the membership of the Council have no real 
expertise on specific areas of public policy. Certainly, such members as 
a former Chief Justice, a former Chief of Defence Staff and a former 
Inspector-General of Police, would have professional advice to tender 
on specific issues. Others such as regional representatives and the 
President of the National House of Chiefs would only give general 
political advice probably based on moral grounds. The 1992 Constitu­
tion, for example, requires the Chief Executive to appoint as many as 
eleven members (more than 40% of the entire membership) of the 
Council. It omits the leadership of the Opposition. And although the 
President must seek the consent of the legislature in the nomination of 
the eleven members, that provision gives an unfair representation on 
the Council to the President alone.
As already noted, the idea of a Council of State derives from the 
belief that it is necessary to counter the ambitions of an elected executive 
with the sober reflections of experts, moralists and humanitarians who 
act behind the scenes. It is, perhaps derived also from the British concept 
of a second legislative chamber composed of experts and others who, 
because of birth into distinguished families, are assumed to be more 
British than those of ordinary birth.16 The deficiencies of such a legis­
lature acting either with Parallel authority or less with an elected one, 
have been demonstrated by academic as well as practical public voices 
in Britain against the House of Lords. There is therefore no real reason 
why Ghana should not have opted for the United States example of an 
elet ted second chamber. Among other things, an elected second cham­
ber would be in consonance with the tenets of republicanism and 
representative government. Its meetings would be open to public 
and the people would hold the legislators directly responsible 
latever position each takes on every issue, 
ieyond the obvious and oft-quoted advantages of an elected
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legislature, there are basic deficiencies in the composition of the 
Council of State for the 4th Republic. These deficiencies are not likely 
to enhance the lot of the opposition. First, the President has a free 
hand in selecting who among the several past Chief Justices, Chiefs 
of Defence Staff and Inspectors-General of Police would be invited 
to serve on the Council of State. Second, in the absence of any 
criterion by which the eleven special members would be selected, the 
President virtually has a free hand in loading the Council with servile 
persons. Third, since the Council would convene in secret, the 
government has a free hand in evoking the authority of the Council 
in support of controversial decisions. This is possible because the 
Council has no constitutional right to issue public rejoinders to gov­
ernment decisions. And in any case, the large presence of govern­
ment nominees would mean that a majority disclaimer would invari­
ably emerge against any rejoinder to a government pronouncement. 
In sum, the Council of State is more likely to become a major instru­
ment for winning public support for government decisions than an 
impartial arbiter between government and opposition groups. The 
Opposition would then be seriously handicapped in its efforts to 
restrain the Government.
The third obvious threat to the emergence of a viable formal 
opposition in the next Republic is the content of the transition process 
designed and decreed by the PNDC. In addition to the points noted 
above is the cardinal fact that the PNDC has refused to see itself as 
a regime that came into office outside the rules and through the barrel 
of the gun. The refusal to admit to its essential origins has led to a 
further misconception that the youth it has put into uniform and 
armed with light weapons, as well as its own sponsored 31st Decem­
ber Women's Movement are the legitimate representations of a 
homegeneous national movement towards the re-introduction of 
another version of a peoples' democracy in Ghana. That these and 
the Police Ladies Association, which are openly the campaign fronts 
for the PNDC chairman, are directly supported from state funds 
means that the Opposition would bear a fundamental grudge ag ainst 
these state agencies if the PNDC and its allies win the electio n s. 
Besides, the elections would lose the flair of a fair contest. And w h ile  
the Opposition would naturally seek avenues as equally ille g itim a te  
as the unfair use of public funds by the PNDC to fiiel its ca m p a ig n , 
the PNDC in government would, in turn, seek to block the O p p o ­
sition. The future is indeed bleak for healthy g o v e m m e n t-o p p o sitio n
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relations in the next Republic.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that formal opposition as an integral part of the 
governing processes of Ghana is necessary for the survival of democ­
racy. It has also demonstrated that at least three conditions exist in the 
Ghanaian society which would inhibit the growth of formal opposition 
in the next Republic. In this part of the paper, we will consider steps that 
could be taken to at least, limit the impact of the inhibiting conditions on 
the survival of opposition (and of multi-party politics) in Ghana.
It is of primary importance that the transition process be governed 
by the democratic principles of equal opportunity for all competing 
groups and the total exclusion of coercion and use of state agencies for 
the benefit of some groups in the campaign for the Castle. Since the 
courts have shown no courage to defend the rights of vulnerable 
groups,17 such prominent groups as the Trades Union Congress, the 
National House of Chiefs, the Association of Registered Professional 
Bodies of Ghana and religious leaders should step up the call to the 
PNDC to submit scrupulously to the tenets of fair-play. In addition, the 
Western democracies and all the International Financial Institutions 
should announce prominently that they would not recognize any 
government which emerges out of a truncated, undemocratic transi­
tional process. There is need for a combined internal and external 
pressure on the PNDC to respect democratic norms. A government 
conceived and delivered by populist dictators in an equally populist 
environment is not likely to be a government that places the individual 
at the centre of state actions. Adolf Hitler conducted fairly free elections 
in 1933 but his government turned out to be anything but democratic. 
That was possible because the national socialist party swept away every 
private centre of power under the guise of a national economic emer­
gency. The involvement of external powers is important because of the 
monopolization of absolute powers by the PNDC.
The joint voices of the internal and external powers should demand 
immediate demobilization of the personal security forces of the 
1 NDC. Foreign governments, especially those of France, Germany and 
United States should cease to give cash and other forms of aid to the 
December Women's Movement and the Police Ladies Association, 
lly, these neutral voices should demand the grant of general and
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unconditional amnesty to all Ghanaians either in exile or in jail for their 
political views. The press should also be liberated from the current tight 
control wielded over it by the PNDC through the Castle Information 
Bureau and the Ministry of Information. Journalists should be 
emboldened to investigate and publish (even if they err occasionally) 
the facts. In this connection, the decree which prohibits public criticism 
of the PNDC, its members and functionaries should be abrogated. 
These would, all together, engender a liberal political atmosphere to 
prepare the nation for democratic partisan politics.
There must also be an atmosphere tolerant of the Opposition in 
the post-transition era. This imposes enormous tasks on the Judiciary, 
the National Assembly and private influential groups. The Judiciary 
invariably plays a crucial role in democratic presidential systems such 
as we intend to have under the Fourth Republic. In anticipation of this 
role, the Constitution amply guarantees the independence of the 
judiciary. However, unless the judges are courageous enough and 
possess the perspicacity to perceive the long-term effects of their 
pronouncements on the body politic of Ghana, these guarantees would 
be of less worth than the ordinary paper on which they are written. 
Judicial courage to defend the individual against the state should be 
cultivated and developed.18
A lot also depends on the National Assembly. Its rule of conduct 
should place the Opposition firmly in the centre of its control systems. 
That is to say, the Opposition should be given ample room —  not 
necessarily a dominant room — to pronounce on all major issues 
especially on the appointment and conduct of high officers of state. 
The National Assembly should also give formal recognition to the 
Leader of the Opposition and the Shadow Cabinet by providing for 
material rewards such as special emoluments, official residence or 
subsidized residence, secretarial and propaganda logistics and a 
respectable position on the national order of precedence. It must also 
ensure that the security services, particularly the police, respect the 
free movement, speech and assembly of opposition leaders. Where 
the police have good reason to refuse an Opposition permit to hold 
a public meeting, this should be referred to a speedy hearing and 
determination by the local magistrate grade one court.
Finally, such statutory as well as private institutions as the National 
House of Chiefs, the Ghana Bar Association and the Trades Union 
Congress should see the survival and vibrant activism of the Oppo­
sition as an important guarantee of the survival of the democratic
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enterprise in Ghana. No effort should be spared to protect journalists 
from any obstructions to free practice of their trade. In this connection, 
public demonstrations of support through prominent denunciations 
against government persecution of journalists should be forthcoming.
This chapter recognizes the need to nurture democratic culture 
in Ghana. However, it rejects the idea of state-sponsored institutions 
for the political education of the people. I hold as do such eminent 
empirical observers of political behaviour as Ali A. Mazrui, Karl W. 
Deutsch, Robert A. Dahl, David E. Apter and Bingham Powell and 
Gabriel Almond —  among several others, that democratic political 
culture is a function of acquired habits gained through practice and not 
one that comes through formal, rigid instructions. You can teach a 
person mathematics or the English language through formal instruc­
tion. But the habit of governing himself, he must learn through a process 
of trial and error brought to him by exposure to the challenges of living 
as a civilized political animal.
In sum, it is important that public opinion recognizes the im­
mense contributions of formal Opposition to the survival of democ­
racy. It must rally to its defence against the Castle even if it occa­
sionally exceeds its bounds. The National Assembly, the Judiciary 
and all private centres of power must act to assure the Opposition 
that its role as an integral part of government is as noble and 
desirable as that of the group in the Castle.
NOTES
1. The CPP (1957 -1966), the NRC/Supreme Military Coundl I and II (1972
-1979) and the PNDC since January 1982 have together held office for 
about 80% of the entire life of the Republic of Ghana.
2. I am refering to the CDRs, the Commandos, the Militia and the 31 st DWM.
3. They indude the Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Christian Council of
Ghana and distinguished individuals such as former Chief Justice F.K. 
Apaloo and retired General Ashley-Larsen. Each has called for the 
dissolution of the armed CDRs, Mobisquads and Commandos and the 
integration of the personnel into appropriate state organs; the grant of 
unconditional amnesty to all exiled and imprisoned opponents of the 
PN DC; the abrogation of press control decrees and other decrees meant 
to protect PNDC members and appointees against public criticism; free 
access to state newspapers, radio and television by all political groups; 
and an end to the use of state resources by the PNDC, its chairman and 
front political organizations in their campaign for the Castle.
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4. For a detailed discussion of the functions of the opposition in democratic
states refer to any basic work on political science or government. In 
particular, see D. G. Kansculas (1974), Karl W. Deutsch (1976), Robert A. 
Dahl (1976), Rodee, Anderson, Cristol (1976) and Alan A. Ball (1978) 
among others.
5. The CPP Programme for Work and Happiness. Accra: 1964, sections 10-
12.
6. Nyerere, Julius K., Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University
Press, 1968, and
 Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism: A Selection from Writings and
Speeches, 1965 -1967. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
7. David E. Apter, "Some Reflections on the Role of Political Opposition in
New Nations," reprinted in Irving L. Markovitz, ed., African Politics and 
Society. New York: The Free Press, 1970, pp. 226 - 241.
8. The late General A. A. Afrifa had said that once the government abolished
the civilian opposition, it automatically made the military its sole 
political opponent. See his work on, The Ghana Coup, 1966. London: 
Frank Cass, 1966.
9. For details of the NLM era in Ghana, see Denis Austin, Politics in Ghana:
1946-60 .London: Oxford University Press, 1964, and David E. Apter, 
Ghana in Transition .Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
10. Attributed to Krobo Edusei who, as Minister of the Interior, was respon­
sible for the operation of the PDA.
11. The parties merging into the United Party were: the Ghana Congress Party;
the Northern Peoples' Party; the Muslim Association Party; theTogoland 
Congress and the Anlo Youth Association.
12. Among these were: (a) The Investigations of Crimes Act (1958) which
broadened the Attomey-General's authority to compel any person to 
supply information where crimes against the state were involved; (b) 
The Offences Against the State Act (1959) which gave judges the 
authority to sentence up to 15 years persons convicted of making false 
reports about Ghana; and (c) The Criminal Procedures Act (1960) 
provided for special courts to enact the death penalty for political crimes 
without trial by the jury.
13. This long title was used on most State occasions.
14. This should in no way suggest a justification for the overthrow of the 1969
Constitution. The personal ambitions and grievances of the key players 
in the coup were clearly dominant over any presumed concerns for 
democracy.
15. The PNP government upheld opposition objections to several cabinet
appointments including tlie appointment of a Regional Minister for the 
Volta Region. The PNP parliamentarians joined forces with those from 
the ranks of the PFP to reject the budget proposals for the 1980/81 year.
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16. The British House of Lords has come under severe criticism in recent times.
Several Britons would now like to have a mixture of elected represen­
tatives and men of experience in the House of Lords.
17. A recent High Court decision on an action by 29 prominent politicians
against the Interim National Electoral Commission shocked public 
opinion. See People's Daily Graphic and The Ghanaian Times issues of May 
18,1992.
18. In this regard the advice tendered to the Gold Coast Governor by the late
J.B. Danquah on the appointment of judges to the superior courts need 
to be canvassed by the Bar Association. The late doyen of Gold Coast 
politics had advised that appointments to the Bench should be made 
from among prominent private legal practioners rather than as a 
promotion for judges of interior courts.
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Chapter 14
PO LITICAL PARTIES AND TH E PROSPECTS  
FOR N ATIONAL STABILITY
Kwame Boafo-Arthur
Introduction
Civilian regime changes in Ghana have always been violent. There 
has been no single instance where a democratically elected govern­
ment handed over power to an opposition group. The military shot 
themselves to power in 1966, 1972, and 1981 on the crest wave of 
perceived mass discontent with civilian administrators. However, the 
military regimes that emerged after the various coups also had to 
contend with various forms of instability. For instance, the National 
Liberation Council (NLC) that ruled from 1966-1969 had to contend 
among others, with an abortive coup d'etat that led to the death of 
CoL E.K.Kotoka, one of the architects of the 1966 coup. The National 
Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) that 
came to power in 1972 was also violently overthrown by the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1979.
The ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has 
been contending with various forms of destabilization, especially 
abortive coups, since 1982. Some form of political instability had 
always preceded military interventions in the country. It could be 
argued therefore that political instability engendered by coups, counter 
coups, ethnic warfare, civilian and military maladministration has 
been a permanent feature of Ghanaian politics since independence.
What then are the main features and components of stable and 
unstable polities? Webster's New World Dictionary defines political 
stability as "having a definite governmental organization that is not 
likely to break down, fall apart or give way." For political sociolo­
gists, a society could be either integrated or disunited, culturally 
homogeneous or fragmented — surviving commonly on accepted 
societal norms or values or not.1 Nations are composed of many 
societies and given the differing ethnic and cultural backgrounds of
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such societies, instability seems to be endemic in most political sys­
tems.
Unstable political systems have certain distinguishing features. 
These include frequent shifts from one type of regime to another, eg, 
monarchy to republic, from civilian dictatorship to military rule or 
from one democratic framework to a different one; frequent changes 
in the personnel of the state; and recurring violence in the form of 
riots, demonstrations, revolts, ethnic warfare, coups and counter coups.
On the other hand, political stability has certain distinctive com­
ponents. David Roth and Frank Wilson, identify them as legitimacy, 
management of conflict, and durability.2 A political system is stable 
where the public perceives its institutions and leaders as legitimate. 
That is, the means for attaining political power and the established 
institutions through which power is exercised must enjoy general or 
mass support. A legitimate government has the capacity to com­
mand obedience without using coercive tactics.
Coercion and other extra legal measures are instruments nor­
mally utilized by unstable and feeble regimes to command obedience 
and acceptance. At times, and even in stable polities, a legitimate 
government may lose its support through ineffective policies. Such 
a situation might lead to a call for fresh elections (as it happened in 
Britain last April 1992), aimed at winning back the mandate of the 
electorate. In most developing countries, however, perception by the 
government of lack of support and disenchantment with the system 
by the citizenry might be the harbinger of more repression or military 
intervention.
Max Weber3 identified three kinds of legitimacy: traditional, 
charismatic, and rational-legal. Traditional authority subsists on 
accepted beliefs in the sanctity of tradition, historical institutions and 
individual occupants of traditional positions of authority. Charis­
matic authority is characterized by the public acceptance of a ruler/ 
individual with exceptional powers or authority. Such exceptional 
leaders always emerge in crisis situations. Rational-legal authority 
is based on the acceptance of the legality of established rules and of 
the right to govern of those who come to power in observance of these 
rules.
A regime's claim to authority may be based on any or a com- 
nation of these Weberian sources of authority. It must, however, 
>e stressed that military intervention and rule is now a common 
urce of political authority in developing countries. Where a regime
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attains power outside the Weberian sources of authority, it normally 
adopts several measures, including intimidation and coercion etc, to 
either legitimize itself or put opposition in line. Even if power is 
attained through the identified Weberian sources, such a legitimate 
government risks its support if it subverts the civil liberties of the 
people and fail to fulfill their expectations. For instance, during 
the first republic, the regime's legitimacy was compromised on 
account of the flagrant disregard for the basic norms of democratic 
governance. Instability was created as a result and this con­
tributed to the military intervention of 1966.
The second component of stability is management of conflict. Political 
systems face various conflicting situations emanating from several 
competing sectors within nations. The system's capability in mediat­
ing demands made by ethnic, religious, socio-economic and other 
cleavages helps in ensuring stability. Whether this intra-state 
competition will culminate in violence or engender stability, will 
depend on the following; the level of development of the political 
system; the capabilities of policy makers; and the political maturity of 
the leaders of the various competing groups. However, where intran­
sigence, arrogance, and lack of respect for democratic rules of gover­
nance reign supreme, resolutions of various conflicts become difficult.
Furthermore, where institutional weakness persists, resolution of 
competitive demands becomes unnecessarily tasking. Conflict is a 
recurrent phenomenon in any political system and the cost of unre­
solved conflict is political instability and loss of legitimacy by the 
government.
The durability of the political system over time is the third 
component of political stability. Successful crisis resolution enhances 
a regime's ability to overcome future crises. Sheer luck may, how­
ever, enable a system to persist by muddling through crises with little 
effort at managing them. A regime's durability will be attained 
where consensual politics is the norm and mechanisms for crisis 
resolution or management are efficient.
On the basis of the foregoing, the paper gives a brief overview 
of the negative politics of the government and the opposition during 
the first three republics. By negative politics, we imply the use of such 
methods of governance that invariably undermine the constitutional 
legitimacy of regimes, create instability and thereby make military 
intervention an easy task as a result of the ready support it gets 
from the people. Next, the sources of stability and instability in
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the general African context are examined to serve as the bases for 
analyzing the future prospects for political stability in Ghana.
Political Parties and Stability in the Earlier Republics
Political parties are formed for various reasons. However, by nature, 
parties are organizations that seek to control the government by 
nominating candidates for office and winning power through the 
election process. Parties aim to acquire power and to retain such 
power once it has been won. This objective could be attained only 
when the ruling party meets the aspirations of the majority of the 
people.
The existence of parties further implies acceptance of the idea 
that the people must be taken into consideration in the orga­
nization and administration of the polity .4 In our Ghanaian 
context, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and its radical 
offshoot, the Convention Peoples'Party (CPP), emerged to lay claim 
to self-government and ipso facto the right to participate in the 
governance of the country.
Even though parties formulate policies to win election, some 
emerged in the past for clearly defined regional or ethnic reasons. For 
instance, whereas the UGCC and the CPP emerged in reaction to 
colonialism that deprived citizens of the right to participation in the 
political process, and for broader national objectives, others like 
the Ga Shifimo Kpee, The Togoland Congress, The Northern Peoples' 
Party and the Muslim Association Party, emerged for ethnic or 
regional and religious reasons.
The erroneous conception that multi-partyism is the harbinger 
of conflict and instability owes its origins to the sharp differences and 
conflicts between the perspectives, goals, and aspirations of political 
parties as well as the methods adopted by such religious, regional 
and ethnic based parties to attain their political objectives in the past.
Such parties perceived the party system as a means to defend 
regional or ethnic political and economic interests. Their irreconcil- 
ble positions and the uncertainty over the political future of such 
hnic groups in the immediate pre-independence period partly 
explain the spate of violence that became a feature of pre- 
id ependence politics.
The CPP faced an onerous task in the face of a polity divided
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along ethnic and religious lines. The stability of the nation depended 
on how the ruling party approached the problems of nation building 
and especially the issue of political opposition.
The First Republic
The stability of the first republic was gravely undermined by the method 
of governance adopted by the ruling CPP. Dr. Nkrumah had earlier 
identified ethnicity as a potentially destabilizing factor in the country. 
In 1954, he warned the Legislative Assembly that any toleration of the 
formation of political parties on regional, sectional or religious bases 
was bound to lead to political chaos and worse still, sow the seeds of 
the destruction of our national existence.5 So far as Nkrumah was 
concerned, the opposition was not to be tolerated because of its regional, 
ethnic or religious biases. The fact that the opposition groups merged 
to form the United Party after independence, and thus could no longer 
be said to be ethnically or regionally based, did not matter to the CPP. 
Ironically, both Dr. Nkrumah, the Prime Minister and Dr. Busia who 
was the leader of the Opposition group in parliament called for mutual 
co - operation from the Government and the Opposition to guarantee 
the greater happiness, progress, success and greatness of the country.6 
This was not to be. The notion of an Opposition ready to subject its 
policies to criticisms most probably rankled the CPP leadership. The 
method of governance adopted therefore had the long term objective 
of dealing once and for all with all shades of organized and unorganized 
political opposition.
The promulgation of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) in 
1958 which led to the detention without trial of many opposition 
members; the "profound dislike by Nkrumah of any open criticism of his 
rule"7; the imposition of one party state in 1964 etc, contributed immea­
surably to the systematic erosion of the civil liberties of Ghanaians. 
Theoretically therefore, the CPP lost its constitutional legitimacy 
on account of the obnoxious methods of governance it adopted.
More significantly, the adoption of one party rule demonstrated 
the government7s unwillingness to share power with other groups. It 
was assumed that one party ism would bring about national unity and 
rapid development. This proved to be illusory. In fact, the elimination 
of the opposition was the culmination of various acts that fly in the face 
of good governance. The legislature pandered to the whims of the
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executive under the one party system. Even before the adoption 
of one party government, the CPP sought to curtail the judiciary's 
independence. This was done when Nkrumah brazenly dismissed Sir 
Arku Korsah as Chief Justice on December 11,1963. His offence was 
the acquittal of Tawia Adamafio, Ako Adjei and Coffie Crabbe in the 
Kulungugu bomb incident trial. On December 23, 1963, the Law of 
Criminal Procedure (Amendment no.2) Act which empowered 
Nkrumah to quash any decision of the Special Court was passed. 
Consequently, on December 25, the president declared Sir Arku 
Korsah's professional judgement null and void.
Most of the measures adopted by the CPP to ensure its continued 
stay in office had the effect of creating political instability. The 
measures were reacted to by the Opposition through assassination 
attempts on the life of Dr. Nkrumah. Since Nkrumah broadened the 
scope of his autocratic control to cover the judiciary, one can argue that 
the invocation of national unity and development as pretexts for the 
establishment of one party government was just one of the means to 
ensure his personalized rule. It was not surprising, therefore, that by 
the end of 1964 the country was manifestly unstable. According to 
Denis Austin, the CPP government was in total disarray, the state 
itself mortally damaged by governmental attacks on the judiciary, 
police, the civil service and the universities.8
In a nutshell, while the ruling party did everything in its power 
to perpetuate its rule through the PDA, the establishment of one 
party state and elimination of the opposition party, electoral fraud, 
suppression of the judiciary etc, the Opposition, anxious to partici­
pate in the political process and unwilling (naturally) to accept the 
unlawful prohibition of its operations, adopted several measures, 
including subversive activities, to topple the government. An envi­
ronment of chronic instability was therefore created for the military 
to intervene. It is arguable that the situation and perhaps the history 
of the nation would have been different if the avenues for a peaceful 
and democratic change of government had not been completely 
blocked by the ruling party.
In any political system, opposition members who are treated as 
ical pariahs and hunted like animals "can be easily pushed to 
ss infelicity"9 and be compelled to resort to desperate mea- 
We need to accept the truism that any government (no matter 
ectoral advantage) which fails to realize the essence of the 
ition, either by omission or commission endangers national
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stability, unity and security. Competitive party systems can only 
emerge where parties are pragmatic and realistic enough to accept 
the legitimacy of political dissent and opposition. It becomes easy 
for national leaders to resolve societal conflicts and thereby ensure 
stability when this fundamental truth is accepted. Unfortunately, 
the CPP failed to accept this fundamental political principle and 
resorted to measures that eventually led to its overthrow.
The Second Republic
The second republic took off in 1969 after three years of military rule. 
However, the seeds of instability were apparently sown even before 
the take off of the second republic. First, in 1969, just as in 1956, 
political campaigns quickly degenerated into what one analyst termed 
"virulent effusions of bad taste" characterized by "insulting jour­
nalistic activities that thrived on personality digging,"10 rather than 
the presentation of alternative goals and means of attaining these 
goals. Secondly, in spite of the lopsided electoral victory of the 
Progress Party (winning 105 out of the 140 parliamentary seats) some 
people were not happy with the measures taken by the NLC to 
deprive some people of their rights as citizens. For instance, apart 
from the banning of the Peoples' Popular Party (PPP) which was 
alleged to have had links with the CPP, Mr. K.A. Gbedemah was 
disqualified from being a member of the National Assembly by 
the controversial article 71 clause 2, paragraph(b) (ii) of the 1969 
constitution.
The Progress Party (PP) government could be faulted on three 
grounds; inability to cope with the economic situation; poor relations 
with principal social groupings; and suspected level of commitment 
to the precepts of liberal democracy.
The major economic problems faced by the PP were; rising prices, 
escalating unemployment, rising taxation which was opposed by a 
broad spectrum of social groupings, stagnating agricultural output, 
falling commodity prices, etc. The attempt to resuscitate the economy 
compelled the PP government to implement certain economic mea­
sures. These included a national development levy to finance rural 
development; the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969, and the Business 
Promotion Act designed to alleviate unemployment and to transfer 
certain foreign-owned enterprises to Ghanaians; import controls; and
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44% devaluation of the national currency. These measures backfired 
because they were unpopular. David Goldworthy opines that:
almost all the regime's economic orthodoxies were unpopular, 
none more so than the final stroke of devaluation and no amount 
of rational explanation in terms of the international financial crisis 
andthe worla-wide demand-slump for agricultural produce could 
save Dr. Busia himself from the major share of the opprobrium.11
The government's persistent attempts to gain relief from external 
creditors and obtain enough funding from external sources were not 
successful. Ronald Libby points out that the policies adopted by 
external donors such as the World Bank and the IMF "were cata­
strophic" for Ghana, "and destroyed what remained of the democratic 
government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate 
made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'etat."12 
Furthermore, the government's relations with major social groupings, 
and commitment to democratic governance became questionable in 
some respects.
For instance, in September 1971, the government froze the assets 
of the TUC and a new Industrial Relations Bill aimed at abolishing the 
TUC and distributing its assets among member unions to make them 
autonomous was rushed through parliament. But this was miscon­
strued and was not well received by the rank and file of the TUC. The 
issue of declaration of assets raised by Lt. General Ocran, a member of 
the Presidential Commission led to his public vilification. The students 
in higher institutions were equally disenchanted by the introduction of 
a loan scheme. Dr. Busia himself showed little regard for the judiciary 
in the famous Sallah case. Nonetheless, he never reversed the decision 
taken by the court as it happened during the First Republic.
It must be stressed that no government can rule without a solid 
support base, but this was precisely what was undermined by the 
policies adopted by the government. On this, Dennis Austin aptly notes 
that, "with remarkable fortitude...the Progress government engaged in 
battle with each section of its supporters."13 Thus by the time of the coup, 
vario11 s segments of the Ghanaian society ranging from students, trades 
uni organization, the judiciary, and the army had been disenchanted 
to some extent by Busia's methods of governance.
rious problem which was not the making of the PP government 
itcome of ethnic cleavages was the polarization of parliament 
alo ethnic lines. The Opposition in Parliament was predominantly
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Ewe, while the PP was predominantly Akan. The merger of the 
opposition parties to form the Justice Party did not in any way affect 
the polarization of parliament along ethnic lines due to the overwhelm­
ing majority of the PP in parliament. The irony of the situation was 
that before the elections, both Dr. Busia and Mr. K. A. Gbedemah, like 
Dr. Nkrumah before them, decried the ethnic sentiments being ex­
pressed during the transition period. Dr. Busia warned the country in 
1969 that the magnitude of tribal associations in the country posed a 
serious threat to the smooth organization of party activities. Mr. K A. 
Gbedemah also referred to the ethnic sentiments being expressed during 
the campaign as a "dreadful tragedy" and implored Ghanaians "to 
remove the stain of tribal nepotism ,"14
The clear division in parliament in 1969 underlined the dangers 
of Ghanaian proclivity towards ethnic exclusiveness. The Opposition 
apparently saw nothing good in any policy decision put forward by 
the ruling party. Its method of walk-outs from parliamentary debates 
made parliamentary work difficult. Maybe, it wrongly perceived its 
duty in parliament as merely to oppose whatever the government 
stood for irrespective of its merits. The Opposition therefore contrib­
uted in undermining the durability of the fledgling democracy.
Nevertheless, the country in comparative terms, enjoyed free­
dom of speech, press and other individual liberties during the Second 
Republic. For sure, the party system was a great improvement on that 
of the First Republic. In spite of the ethnic-based Opposition in Par­
liament, the stability of the nation was not under any serious threat 
as a result of the operation of the party system. The major problem 
was the poor economy. The economic predicament of the nation, in 
the words of Goldworthy, "tightly constrained decision-making and 
ensured many unpopular policies"15 which undermined the 
government's constitutional legitimacy and public support.
It could be hypothesized that with time the ruling party could 
have resolved the socio-political and economic contradictions. The 
PNDC's first two and half years in office attest to the fact that two and 
half years is too short a time for any meaningful assessment of the 
economic performance of a regime that was not ruling by fiat. What 
must be underlined is the ingrained Ghanaian impatience with liberal- 
democratic regimes. The national expectations of what Max Assimeng 
terms "all kinds of political and economic cornucopia"16 within a very 
short time makes the appearance of self-proclaimed redeemers, libera­
tors, and revolutionaries appear timely and desirable. So long as
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Ghanaians look for short cuts to economic cornucopia, we shall 
continue to wander in the political wilderness; and be ruled by 
self-serving and self-appointed people who parade under revolution­
ary and other populist banners.
The Third Republic
Dr.Limann's PNP came to power in 1979 with impressive victories in 
both the parliamentary and presidential elections. In the parliamentary 
elections, the party won 71 out of the 140 seats while the main rival —  
the Popular Front Party (PFP) — won 42 seats. The opposition parties 
together had 69 seats in parliament. Dr. Limann won the presidential 
election in a second ballot defeating the PFP candidate, Mr. Victor 
Owusu. The stage was therefore well set for a competitive party system 
in the country. Unfortunately, the PNP assumed power at a time almost 
everything had gone wrong politically and economically in Ghana. It 
was also a time that public expectations were at a fever pitch due 
partly to the '"house cleaning" exercise embarked upon by the AFRC and 
the electoral promises made by the winning party. Politically, the 
country was unstable after the brief intervention of the AFRC. It is trite 
to note that the AFRC rule clearly brutalized the military command 
structure, unleashed an unprecedented indiscipline in the army and 
seemed to have created enmity between the NCOs and the officers. This 
created an aura of psychological insecurity that most probably 
affected government performance.
Economically, the situation was chaotic after the seven years of 
economic mismanagement by the SMC. The situation was worsened by 
the ill-advised AFRC-sponsored sale at ridiculous prices of almost 
everything in the stores and warehouses. By the time the PNP assumed 
power, there was scarcity of consumer items of every imaginable kind. 
The nation was virtually bankrupt.
The party system, however, appeared to be the best for the 
country. The run off for the presidency was an indication that an 
alternative group could easily dislodge the ruling party in any fair 
elections if the incumbent failed to perform. Given the in-fighting 
within the ruling government, the proposed merger of the opposition 
to form the All Peoples' Party (APP), and the slim parliamentary 
majority of the PNP, the government could have en defeated by
the opposition in the next elections. The political c sate engendered
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by the party system during the Third Republic was, therefore, more 
propitious for competitive politics than the earlier republics. For 
instance, the opposition group cut across the ethnic spectrum unlike 
under the Second Republic, and most members were seasoned poli­
ticians who were presumably well aware of the demands of respon­
sible opposition. It was a credit to the party system of the Third 
Republic that for the first time in the political history of the country 
the budget of the ruling government was rejected by parliament and 
had to be modified to be accepted. To all intents and purposes, the 
stage was set for responsible governance, responsible opposition, 
com petitive party system, development of dem ocratic 
loyalties and the strengthening of democratic institutions.
Ironically, the life of the democratically elected government was 
again truncated by the military. For sure, the public had substantial 
expectations which were contributed to by the various promises "of 
short and long-term economic prosperity7'17 during the electioneering 
campaign. Public disappointment led to indirect pressure on the 
government and created problems for the PNP. The pressures for good 
performance were heightened by the warning given by Rawlings that 
the "politicians were on probation."18 The PNP contributed to its 
problems further by their internal wrangling and jockeying for posi­
tions. The government appeared impotent also in the face of serious 
economic and social crises brought about by low productivity in various 
sectors of the economy. To be brunt, the PNP needed to do more at the 
economic front to check inflation, unemployment, low productivity etc, 
than the "muddling through" approach it apparently adopted. The 
economic crisis obviously affected the support base of the regime. As 
pointed out by Hanson:
The poor performance of the government tended to undermine its 
constitutional legitimacy. In Ghana, as in many developing coun­
tries, the legitimacy of the political order is not a settlea issue. 
Important as constitutional legitimacy is, it is not enough to sustain 
a government. It needs a material base to breathe life and meaning 
into it and it was in this that many people saw that the regime had 
failed.19
The fact that there was no immediate spontaneous supportive reac­
tion to the coup of December 1981 was indicative of the apprehension 
people were in. Was another military intervention the panacea to our 
economic woes? Were Rawlings and his followers motivated by
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blind personal ambitions or genuine concern for the plight of the 
nation? Answers to these questions are obviously beyond the scope 
of this paper. It suffices to say that we are all witnesses to what has 
transpired in the almost eleven years of PNDC rule.20 Even though 
the Second and Third Republics were faced with daunting socio­
economic problems, the situations were not so desperate to warrant 
military interventions. To be sure, the life spans of the republics were 
too short; the legitimacy of the regimes were not in serious doubt, 
and their capabilities at conflict management were not allowed by the 
military to be fully tested.
It seems, therefore, that the military interventions were propelled 
by considerations other than manifest instability. It is, therefore, neces­
sary for us to highlight some sources of stability and instability in 
general terms in order to project the prospects for stable democratic 
governance during the 4th Republic.
Sources of Stability and Instability
The sources of political stability and instability are varied and are 
influenced by different circumstances. We can identify at least four 
major sources, namely, ethnic or cultural differences, socio-economic 
conditions, type of political institutions, and international influences.
An important source of political instability, especially in Africa, is 
ethnic cleavages and, or cultural differences. Attempts at nation build­
ing in thedeveloping world have been constrained because in most cases 
countries are divided internally as a result of distinctive differences of 
language, religion, race, and region of resident.21 Sudan offers a classic 
example where Arabs and black Africans are divided by geography, 
religion and language. This has resulted in bitter conflicts and struggles 
for the control of the state. Jackson and Rosberg note that, political 
tensions and conflicts emanating from ethnic divisions can seriously 
undermine political stability and the ability of any government to 
control its territory.22 In Ghana, the Nanumba-Konkomba, and the 
Gonja-Nawuri ethnic conflicts have been lingering for a long time. Even 
though the conflicts are regionalized, they have very serious implica­
tions for national stability. As noted, parliamentary work during the 
< ond Republic was burdened by the fact that the Opposition was 
dominantly ethnic based. This had the potential of undermining 
itional cohesion and instability.
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Extreme ethnic cleavages has led to a series of conflicts in many 
parts of Africa. For instance, ethnic conflicts contributed to the at­
tempted secession of Biafra and a devastating civil war in Nigeria from 
1967-1970. The on-going civil war in Somalia after the fall of Siad 
Barre is traceable, among other causes, to divisive ethnic rivalries. 
Togo, Rwanda, Kenya, Liberia etc., have at one time or another 
witnessed the vicious nature of ethnic intolerance. It must be empha­
sized that in all cases, serious civil conflict develops where ethnic 
differences have been unduly politicized.
Cultural and ethnic conflicts are not the characteristics of polities 
in only the developing countries. In Canada, cultural or linguistic 
differences between Quebec and the rest of the country have persisted 
over the years. As at now, some parts of Europe are in the throes of 
ethnic wars. Ethnic differences have contributed to a virtual disintegra­
tion of Yugoslavia and has led to a brutal civil war between Serbians 
and Croatians. Ethnic intolerance and a devastating civil war have 
afflicted Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Commonwealth of Indepen­
dent States (CIS). These are pointers to the fact that ethnicity and the 
instability it creates is world wide. It is a socio-political canker that 
negatively affects economic development not only in Africa but in 
other parts of the world. In short, ethnicity has the potential of 
destabilizing any political system unless it is handled with circumspec­
tion by those in authority.
Secondly, the political stability of any nation is affected by the 
prevailing socio-economic conditions. The continuous decline in the 
standards of living in most African countries account for various levels 
of instability on the continent For instance, the late Samuel Doe of 
Liberia capitalized on the "rice riots" of 1980 to overthrow the Tolbert 
regime. Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi note that, "Ghanaian hopes for 
economic prosperity at independence were replaced by a mood of 
disillusionment in the mid-1960s as the Nkrumah policies brought 
consumer scarcities and mounting inflation."23 The cumulative impact 
of deteriorating economic conditions contributed to the fall of the earlier 
republics and the military regime of General Acheampong. According 
to the World Bank, between 1970 and 1982, Ghana's income per capita 
fell by 30% and real wages by 80%; import volume fell by two-thirds; net 
export earning fell by one-half, and the ratio of Ghana's exports to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) dropped from 21 to 4 per cent. In addition, the 
domestic savings rate fell from 12 to 3 per cent of GDP.24
In all cases, socio-economic problems lead to frustrations and
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generate political instability. Philip Cutright opines that economic 
development and the wealth it generates, industrialization, efficient 
communications and education contribute to stable democracy. In his 
view, well-to-do nations have greater chances of sustaining democ­
racy25 and ipso facto, stability. By implication, wealthy nations are 
more stable than poor nations. Even though not all relatively well-to- 
do nations are stable, (e.g. Israel and Iraq), there is little doubt that a 
close correlation exist between political stability and the economic 
well-being of a state. In actual fact, stable political systems are often 
the more highly developed.26 Maxwell Owusu also notes that "na­
tional political cohesion will continue to depend largely on ... rapid 
economic progress."27
Whereas improved socio-economic conditions augurs well for 
political stability, there are cases such as Tanzania, Zambia and 
Malawi in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s where in absence of wealth, 
stability became the hall mark of their political systems. The most 
plausible reason for this might be the type of political system operated 
during the periods. In situations where totalitarian, personalized one 
party rule is the norm, stability is attained through the manipulations of 
the political systems, intimidations of real and imaginary political 
opponents and general deprivations of individual rights. Under such 
conditions a semblance of stability is attained but it happens to be 
stability with very shaky foundations and which confers very little 
lasting developmental benefits on the nations concerned.
Thirdly, the type of political institutions also influence political 
stability. In the view of Samuel Huntington, a nation can avoid instabil­
ity if it develops adaptable, complex and coherent political institutions 
capable of responding to citizen demands.28 The tragedy of most Sub- 
Saharan African countries is that frequent military interventions in the 
democratic process have stunted the growth or development of capable 
political institutions. Not until the military realizes the long term harm 
its frequent forays into civilian administrations do to institutional build­
ing and capabilities, most African countries will continue to bear the 
cross of weak institutions and political instability.
A related argument for stability is about political culture which 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba term the civic culture. They define 
political culture in terms of political orientations and attitudes held by 
nd i vidua Is in relation to their political systems. This includes orien- 
ations that favour both active political participation and passive 
c t. eptance; rationality and traditionality; and consensus and cleavage.
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These could characterize both the nation and individuals.29
For Maxwell Owusu, political culture encompasses "the total 
environment of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, values, judgments, 
sentiments and expectations that shape, define and sustain the relation­
ship between leaders and the led, politicians and the constituents."30 In 
Ghana, due to the complete absence of civic responsibility borne out of 
overwhelming political commitment to societal norms capable of stabi­
lizing the polity,31 the political system easily crumbles any time serious 
economic, social and political difficulties arise. We need to stress that 
democratic political culture which is conducive to national stability 
could be acquired through consistent adherence to democratic system of 
governance. The longevity of democratic governance will promote 
loyalties which will help citizens to counteract any threat to the estab­
lished order. On this, Martin Grondzins avers that national loyalties in 
democratic systems are largely by - products of participation in volun­
tary groups. Such loyalties are not borne out of manipulation from 
above. As such, they are not submissive, are more studied, and less 
emotional.32 To sustain such loyalties, democratic governments must 
ensure economic satisfaction, civil liberties, judicial independence, etc.
Finally, political instability may be created by external circum­
stances. For instance, the regime of Salvadore Allende of Chile was 
destabilized by the American CIA. The conditions were created for 
general chaos brought about by economic hardships and this paved the 
way for the military to overthrow the socialist regime in 1973. In 
Southern Africa, the apartheid government of South Africa carried out 
a series of incursions into Botswana, Lesotho and Angola in alleged 
pursuits of ANC guerrillas, thus destabilizing such countries. Until quite 
recently, South Africa was funding REN AMO to wage guerrilla attacks 
on the legitimate government of Mozambique. The impact of these 
destabilization measures cannot be gainsaid. The PNP government of 
Dr. Limann had cause to warn Libya, and later broke off Ghana's 
diplomatic relations with Libya for allegedly subverting his govern­
ment. In the mid-1980s, the PNDC accused USA of covert subversion 
aimed at destabilizing the government.
Indisputably, international influences both direct and indirect, 
manifested through economic, cultural, political and military mediation 
can either help to stabilize or destabilize a country. It must be added that 
the attitude of the ruling party or group toward the opposition either 
enhances stability or generates instability. Where the ruling party fails 
to appreciate the worth of the opposition in a democratic setting, serious
238
problems capable of undermining national stability crop up.
Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga see political opposition as 
the most advanced and institutionalized form of political conflict.33The 
essence of political opposition lies in its provision of a democratic basis 
for a competitive struggle for power. Effective political competition 
through legitimate channels such as the political system decreases the 
likelihood of violence and ensures stability. On the other hand, 
violence and confrontation become ready tools for the opposition in a 
situation where the ruling party or political system deprives those in 
opposition of the channels for effective political participation in the 
affairs of the state. This was precisely what occurred during the First 
Republic. The CPP operated the party system in such a manner which 
made it impossible for the Opposition to contribute to national discus­
sions; in fact, all democratic means to effect a regime change or ensure 
meaningful participation by those with contrary views were blocked.
A related factor which is very relevant to our current situation is 
the mode of transition from one system of governance to another. In 
post-colonial Africa, regime changes have in most cases been either 
from one party civilian dictatorship to authoritarian military rule 
through coup d'etat or from military authoritarianism to civilian 
constitutional rule. If transitions are not handled circumspectly, those 
leaving might feel aggrieved and might find means to undermine the 
process. It must be stated unequivocally, however, that instability has 
been the lot of countries where the military dictatorships have sought 
to perpetuate their rule by constitutional means. The on-going political 
melodrama with its disastrous effects on Zaire and Togo are classic 
examples. The civil war in Liberia was caused by the late Samuel Doe's 
electoral gerrymandering that transformed him from a military dicta­
tor to a civilian head of state. Any time dictators (whether civilian or 
military) overstay their welcome, their countries are plunged into 
chaos.
It is a truism that the military has dominated the political life of 
Ghanaians for a long time. It is also a fact that the party systems, as 
operated by the earlier republics, gave cause for concern, and to a large 
extent engendered instability in various forms. At the same time it will 
be foolhardy for us to ignore the underlying factors of military 
adventurism and personal ambitions of some of the coup makers. The 
important issue is that the country is at the threshold of yet another 
constitutional order. In the light of our past experiences and the various 
sources of stability and instability discussed above, one is tempted to
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ask what the prospects for political stability are in the 4th Republic. 
Prospects for the Future
The political system has been under military siege since 1966. The 
country is, therefore, yet to get the best out of political parties. Conse­
quently, predicting the political future of the next constitutional govern­
ment is an exceptionally difficult task. We can only take consolation 
from the fact that there has been a qualitative improvement in civilian 
regime performance since the ouster of the First Republic especially 
with regard to the rule of law and respect for civil liberties. One cannot 
say the same for military regimes the country has had. The more 
matured civilian administrations prove to be over the years, the more 
repressive and dictatorial military regimes become.
Frequent military interventions have negatively affected the de­
velopment of strong party traditions in the country. It seems therefore 
that the long term stability of the nation and the ability of the party 
system to play any meaningful role in the country in future will depend 
among other variables, on the level of military support for the political 
system. Will the military (which is now highly politicized) readily 
consign itself to its traditional role after many years of ruling this 
country? It suffices to state categorically that the fundamental duty of 
the military is to defend the country and its governmental institutions 
but not to subvert them through interventions. It is not likely that the 
spate of instability, with particular reference to military interventions, 
would change very much if the military is not prepared to play its 
traditional role. However, since the military capitalize on general 
discontent to intervene in national politics, it behoves the next consti­
tutional government to provide able and transparent leadership and 
thus avoid creating the conditions for interventions.
Another salient issue is that many civilian and "military politi­
cians" have made their careers since 1966 under military regimes. These 
people must realize by now that both military and civilian regimes have 
their failings. They must, therefore, stop instigating the military to ride 
on their shoulders to attain what they will normally fail to attain under 
democratic civilian governments. Simply put, the military must stop 
vetoing the will of the people only to satisfy another batch of civiliai i and 
ntilitaiy-politicians who benefit from every military intervention.
Deteriorating socio-economic conditions have been major sources
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of instability in Ghana. The prospects for stability are therefore, bleak 
if Ghanaians in general fail to realize the enormous socio-economic 
problems facing the nation at the moment. The PNDC's success in 
pursuing draconian economic measures was due to the absence of 
constitutional limitations. If the measures had been pursued under a 
democratic party system, the government in power would have most 
probably been ousted. If the party system is to succeed in ensuring 
stability Ghanaians must accept the restrictions imposed by constitu­
tionalism on the range of policy options that could be pursued. Our 
ability to appreciate what it takes to reach a consensus under demo­
cratic governments will minimize the pressures we unduly put on 
civilian regimes. Such pressures from various social groups even 
before the government gets stabilized tend to undermine the constitu­
tional legitimacy of governments and induce the military to intervene. 
That is, our preparedness to respect the cultural milieu of democratic 
governance will greatly enhance the party system and thereby ensure 
national stability and development.
Finally, a lot will depend on how the party system is operated by 
the ruling and opposition parties. These two groups should not fail to 
note the tremendous responsibilities that will be imposed on them after 
7 January 1993. Apart from sheer military adventurism and personal 
ambitions of most coup leaders, it could be argued that the ruling party 
and the opposition often facilitate military coups through their modes of 
operating and playing the political game. The opposition, for instance, 
has over the years proved to be the most effective factor in mobilizing 
popular discontent against any regime. The alacrity with which 
opposition members accept political appointments dangled by military 
regimes strengthens one's suspicions that parliamentary opposition 
members and their supporters outside parliament indirectly entice 
the military to intervene. It shows further that the Opposition has, over 
the years, contributed immensely to political instability. The Opposition's 
presence and worth must be made through meaningful, constructive 
and intelligent contributions to debate on national issues in parliament 
rather than the utilization of negative and anachronistic weapons 
such as boycotts or walkouts and name calling. A responsible opposi­
tion normally co-operates with the ruling party to find lasting solutions 
o serious national problems through healthy parliamentary debates. 
By so doing, the legitimacy of the democratic system is assured, its 
apabilities at conflict management enhanced and its durability 
uaranteed. Simply, we need to develop a culture of healthy
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democratic debates in order to promote political stability.
It must be underscored that no ruling party can meaningfully 
satisfy all constituents. At the same time a ruling government must 
prove its commitment to democratic ethos of governance to enhance 
political stability. Where a government goes out of its way to incarcer­
ate or detain imaginary or real political opponents on trumped-up 
charges as it happened during the First Republic; antagonizes sensitive 
social groups and ipso facto its support base, as in the Second Republic; 
or proves to be impotent in the face of avoidable and disruptive political 
in-fighting, as in the Third Republic etc., instability is created 
and democracy is greatly imperiled.
As noted, competitive demands are endemic in any political 
system. In a system such as ours with a disabling unemployment rate, 
poor standards of living, chronic debt burden, fluctuating external 
earnings, high levels of illiteracy etc., it is natural to expect demands 
from various national or social groups to be sharper and be more 
violently expressed in future. Unlike dictatorial, single party or mili­
tary regimes, democratic governments cannot readily and easily resort 
to unorthodox means to contain citizen demands. Nevertheless, na­
tional stability will be greatly influenced by the measures that will be 
adopted to tackle not only demands from various social and articulate 
groups but more significantly, the fundamental problem of the eco­
nomic well-being of the generality of the people. As David Levine 
aptly notes, "a political order that recognizes these needs and perspec­
tives as legitimate and provides a place for their free expression is likely 
to be more durable, stable, and secure..."34 This is the challenge that 
faces the ruling and opposition parties in the 4th Republic.
In our present Ghanaian situation, however, a lot will depend on 
how the ruling PNDC ushers the country into the 4th Republic. Unless 
the government amply demonstrates its good faith by ensuring fairness 
in the run up to elections, it will be difficult to guarantee the future 
stability of the nation. The emerging parties are genuinely worried about 
many things. These include the PNDC's lack of neutrality in the transi­
tion process; the arbitrary imposition of the transition process without 
dueconsultation with the opposing democratic forces; insensitiveness to 
demands for changes to the electoral register; the plan to conduct the 
presidential and parliamentary elections on different days in the face of 
grave financial problems, as well as misgivings expressed about the 
possible bandwagon effects of the presidential on the parliamentary 
elections; failure or unwillingness to dissolve the paramilitary organs
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such as the CDOs, militia and commandos in order to ensure an 
atmosphere devoid of intimidation of political opponents; failure to 
grant general and unconditional amnesty to political exiles etc.
The best way the PNDC can help to stabilize the 4th republic is to 
heed popular demands and thereby eliminate the dangerously grow­
ing mass disenchantment with the transition process. Continued 
disregard for the wishes of the people and especially the clearly 
disadvantaged political parties is a recipe for national instability and 
disaster.
Conclusion
It is clear from the above discussions that instability as a result of frequent 
military interventions, civilian government's inability, at times, to 
conform to democratic ethos of governance, political in-fighting 
among leading party members at the expense of national issues of 
importance, both military and civilian government's failure to find 
lasting solutions to pressing economic problems etc, have been recur­
ring themes in the political history of Ghana. Thus, the major bane of 
political stability has been the negative politics of both the government 
and the opposition as well as the unfettered ambitions of some military 
personnel.
Given our past experiences, it is apt to conclude that national 
stability will depend, among others, on the following; the responsive­
ness of the govemment-to-be, to the needs of the majority of the people; 
creation of general national awareness on the seriousness of the socio­
economic and political challenges in the coming years through sus­
tained political education; governmental adherence to constitutional­
ism; the level of maturity that will be exhibited by both the government 
and the opposition when dilating on issues of national concern; avoid­
ing sentiments and policies that tend to incite ethnic exclusiveness and 
enmity; facilitating effective collaboration between the government 
and the opposition through regular seminars or workshops; and the 
extent to which the military will succeed in exorcizing itself of its 
arbiter mentality.
While the nature of the economy will be crucial to stability, it 
is expected that the pursuit of viable economic policies, capable of 
positively affecting the well-being of the ordinary man, will make it 
possible for Ghanaians to accept the realities of the moment.
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The role of finance in party politics cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, 
it can be postulated that finance is the"oil that greases the engine" 
of party politics.1 An enormous amount of money must be spent to 
reach the electorate —  to break down public inertia and secure political 
activity. Radio and television time, newspaper space, printing of 
campaign literature, campaign vehicles and payment of staff emolu­
ments are phenomenally costly. Despite the crucial role that finance 
plays in politics, little or no attention has been given to the subject 
by scholars on Ghanaian politics.2 This dearth of literature on party 
financing may be attributed largely to the fact that the extent of 
contributions and the identity of the donors have remained a closely- 
guarded secret. This paper sets out to do three things. First, it traces 
the history of party financing during the post-colonial period in 
Ghana. Second, it identifies and discusses the main features of laws 
regulating the funding of parties. Third, it recommends measures 
aimed at improving the financial position of political parties. Because 
of the paucity of information on financing parties in Ghana, the 
paper is exploratory.
The History of Financing Parties in Ghana
Party financing in Ghana is often associated with corrupt practices. The 
genesis of this link between party financing and corruption may be 
traced to the period of Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party 
(CPP). The 1956 Jibowu Commission Report found that the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company (CPC), a subsidiary of the Cocoa Marketing Board 
(CMB) and established in 1952, instead of being one of the agencies
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through which loans should be issued to farmers, rather became the 
outlet for loans which were channelled to finance the activities of the 
CPP and its supporters.3 The Commission emphasized that it was 
unable to
dismiss as mere rumour the allegation that the funds of the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company had been used either directly or indirectly 
for the purposes of the C PP.4
The liquidation of the CPC was followed by the establishment of the 
National Development Company (NADECO) as a limited liability 
company in January 1958 to finance the CPP, because Nkrumah "thought 
that it was unfair to finance the party from public funds."5 NADECCKs 
role as an avenue to finance the CPP is further buttressed by a resolution 
of the NADECO Board of Directors on 26 September 1962:
Resolved that in view of the support of the CPP on the question of 
African Unity and for its policy of total independence of the 
African continent economically, socially and politically, the Com­
pany, being a non-profit making Organization, should support 
financially the said CPP by allocating funds which would 
otherwise be declared as bonuses to its shareholders or such sums 
as it can conveniently allocate without impairing its status, 
financial standing or in any way hinder its progress. 6
The A.G. Leventis deal of 1962 which earned Nkrumah and the CPP 
$ 2.4 million as a result of the inflated price of the properties of 
Leventis and the Sargall transaction were all conducted through 
NADECO. It must be pointed out that although NADECO did a 
certain amount of legitimate insurance business it became the "av­
enue through which commissions, bribes and other moneys were 
collected to finance the CPP. Huge sums of money amounting to 
£G588,404 13s 2d were transferred at various dates into the coffers 
of the CPP from the funds of NADECO. " 7 In the words of the 
Azu Crabbe Commission which probed the affairs of NADECO Ltd 
'NADECO was not only the principal prop of the CPP but also the 
clearing house for bribes paid either to the CPP or to Nkrumah. " 8 
One other method which was used during the Nkrumah period, 
o finance the CPP, was the payment of bribes as a condition for the 
ward of government contracts. Contractors who refused to pay bribes 
vere blacklisted. Extortions of moneys from building contractors no
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doubt resulted in inflation of contract prices which were paid by the 
Ghanaian taxpayer.9
Similar practices prevailed under subsequent civilian regimes. 
For example, during the period of the People's National Party (PNP) 
there was the Chiavelli affair. It was in connection with this that 5 
prominent members of the Party were sentenced in 1982 to various 
terms of imprisonment for obtaining a loan, (which they shared among 
themselves) to finance the PNP from the Italian businessman, Chiavelli. 
This contravened the 1979 Political Parties Decree which stipulated 
that no political party should be financed from foreign sources.
Although there was no big scandal with respect to party 
financing under the Progress Party (PP) regime, it is tempting to say 
that office holders seem to have become important source of financial 
support for the party. It would appear that it was because of this that 
ministers of the PP were allowed to hold profit-making positions in 
private companies and public corporations, contrary to constitutional 
stipulations, so long as their motives were deemed "pure, laudable 
and public spirited."10
The brief history of party financing reveals that campaign and 
organization funds of most of the parties were not raised by contribu­
tions from the rank and file of their supporters but rather from substan­
tial contributions from business interests, legitimate or otherwise, and 
from men of means who often but by no means always, expect some­
thing in return. The experience of party funding during 1952-1966 and 
1979-1981 shows that the ruling parties were funded from illegal sources, 
which promoted corruption. The promulgation of the 1992 Political 
Parties Law (PNDCL 208) is, therefore, an attempt to neutralize the 
"excesses" of party financing during the First and Third Republics.
Regulation of Party Finance
The 1979 Political Parties Decree (SMCD 229) and the Political Parties 
Law of 1992 (PNDCL 208) purport to limit the size of individual 
contributions, to prohibit certain types of contributions and to require 
political parties to declare their assets, liabilities, expenditure and au­
dited accounts.11 The 1979 Decree and the 1992Law mandatorily require 
the publication of the size of contributions, the names of contributors, 
assets, liabilities and the nature of expenditures before and after elec­
tions. The 1992 Political Parties Law, for instance, stipulates that:
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every political party shall within 60 days after the issue to it of a 
final certificate or registration submit to the Interim National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) — a written declaration giving 
details of all its assets and expenditure, — including all contribu­
tions or declarations whether in cash or in kind made or to be 
made to the initial assets of the party by its founding members in 
respect of the first year of its existence.12
The Law further enjoins a political party to submit to the INEC within 
40 days after a public election in which it participated a "detailed 
statement — of all expenditure incurred in respect of each candidate 
put up or supported by that political party specifying the manner in 
which any money involved was spent. " 13 Any political party which 
refuses or neglects to comply with the provision or makes a false 
declaration will have its registration cancelled.
The assumption behind the requirement to declare assets, 
liabilities and expenditures in relation to elections is that the secrecy 
surrounding party financing facilitated corruption. In other words, 
the requirement is to ensure transparency and accountability in the 
operations of political parties.
Limitation on Sources of Funds
The 1979 and 1992 Political Parties Law prohibit or limit contributions 
from certain types of sources. Aliens, companies, partnerships, firms or 
business enterprises are all barred from contributing to the funds of 
political parties. The basic explanation for this limitation is that large 
contributions by aliens and business interests are made in expectation 
of something in return, for example, the granting of licenses and 
award of contracts. Corrupt practices which the granting of licences 
and award of contracts promote have serious implications for the 
building of a democratic society. Corruption, as Price has pointed out, 
undermines the dependability of government organizations and re­
duces the government's capacity to respond to and control its environ­
ment.14 In this way corruption "impedes political development and 
negatively affects the attainment of modernization goals."15 Corrup­
tion also undermines the stability of regimes. Indeed, one of the main 
reasons offered by coup makers to explain the overthrow of regimes is 
corruption.16
Perhaps the most debilitating effect of corruption on a demo­
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cratic society is its link to the "softness of the State."17 In the words 
of Myrdal
the general setting of the soft state makes corruption possible, and 
in turn the prevalence of corruption is a mighty influence keeping 
these countries as soft States.18
The state is often an artificial entity. The disregard of its rules bears little 
social stigma and rules are largely disregarded where the political 
overseers exhibit weak leadership.19
On the other hand, the issue of limiting the size of individual 
contributions to parties is a vexed one. While some argue that one 
cannot run a political party without money, others assert that large 
contributions carry the risk that individual donors would unjustly 
influence, dominate and manipulate political parties and their lead­
ers.20
In 1979 citizens of Ghana could not contribute more than c l,000 
per annum to party funds. This was found to be meagre. A Bill was 
to be initiated in Parliament by the PNP to raise the contribution to 
*100,000 when the PNP was overthrown by the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC). The 1992 Political Parties Law, on the other 
hand, originally pegged the amount of contribution to party funds 
at *200,000. This generated a lot of heated debate and controversy 
among political groupings, who claimed the initial level of contribu­
tion failed to take into account the cost of living and the inflation and 
exchange rate in the country. The Law was subsequently amended 
by the PNDC to empower the INEC to set the limit of individual 
contributions. After consultations with potential party leaders the 
INEC fixed *1 million in cash or in kind as the limit that any indi­
vidual can contribute to a political party fund within a year. Again, 
this level of contribution did not satisfy most political groups, who 
pointed out that at a meeting with INEC on 12 June 1992 they 
suggested levels of contributions ranging from *10 million to *20 
million.
The controversy over the limit on contributions by individuals 
cannot be discussed adequately without identifying the sources of 
funding of political parties vis-a-vis the requirements which a party 
has to meet before being issued a certificate of registration. The 
main sources of party financing in Ghana are supposed to be the 
sale of party cards or what is called membership dues; sale of party "T" 
shirts; fund raising rallies; and individual donations. Of these ind
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vidual contributions from well-to-do persons by and large remain 
the mainstay of party finance. This has been the case because the 
other sources of funding are grossly inadequate in view of the 
requirements which a party has to satisfy before registration. Some of 
the requirements include the following:
(i) that there is in each district of Ghana a founding member of the 
party who is ordinarily resident in the district or is a registered 
voter in the district;
(ii) that the party has branches in all the regions of Ghana and is, in 
addition organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in 
each region;
(iii) that the party has on its national executive committee or secre­
tariat a member ordinarily resident or registered as a voter in
each region;
(iv) a list of full names and addresses of at least one founding 
member of the political party from each district;
(v) a full description of the identifying symbols, slogans and 
colours, if any, of the political party; and
(vi) payment of a registration fee to the Interim National Electoral 
Commission.21
One of these requirements, which has financial implications, is 
that a party must have branches in all the regions of Ghana and not less 
than two-thirds of the districts in each region.22 The logistics involved 
in this requirement, operating at the ward, branch, constituency, 
district, regional and national levels, runs into billions of cedis, which 
membership dues, sale of "T" shirts and fund raising rallies per se 
cannot adequately take care of. Political parties do not, therefore, have 
any choice but rely extensively on individual contributions. This 
situation buttresses the view that the high cost of campaigning is one 
of the major unsolved problems in politics.
Three major deficiencies are, however, associated with indi­
vidual contributions. First, contributions may affect policy-making 
by making parties alter their policies and administrative decisions to 
fit the interest or demands of the big donors. In other words, indi­
vidual donations may lead to corruption, whereby the huge finan­
ciers may demand their "pound of flesh" in the form of award of 
contracts and appointment of persons of their choice to top govern­
ment positions, and granting of import licenses. Second, control over
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party funds by a few people may affect the internal power structure 
of power within a political party. The party leadership is controlled 
by those who have funded the party. Policies, which are not in line 
with the interests of party members, emanate from the "sponsors" 
of the party rather than the leadership. Sometimes the few rich 
people in the party manoeuvre to either get themselves or their 
incompetent favourites appointed to top positions in the party, 
where they could influence decisions directly. The consequences of 
"hijacking" the adm inistration of the party by big donors 
may result in the party leadership becoming stooges and thereby 
losing interest in members as well as ceasing to canvass for new 
members.23
Third, the high cost of campaigning may give undue influence 
over political recruitment to the big donors. For example, if two men 
in a party organization are seeking nomination for either an elective 
or appointive political position, and if one has the resources to pay 
his own campaign bills whereas the other has not, the chances are 
that the wealthier aspirant will win out. In short, if it is expensive 
to stand for Parliament, for example, men and women without finan­
cial resources may be prevented from putting themselves forward.24
Truman had the above dangers in mind when he argued that the 
central objective of contributions is "access to the power of the elected 
officials" rather than a donation which "is purely a matter of personal 
friendship."25 The result is that those who help out a politician in his 
time of need can receive favoured treatment when they have problems 
of their own. What is ironic is how inexpensive such an investment can 
be. For a gift of say c5 million an individual may gain, in return, the 
"intercession" of a minister or parliamentarian that will get him 
government contract or an import licence that will ultimately net him 
or his business about c500 million.
One reason for this favoured treatment is that so few citizens 
contribute at all. The dominant access to politicians by a few wealthy 
contributors to political party campaigns in Ghana is largely the apathy 
of millions of voters who could contribute to the campaign funds of 
political parties but abstain from it ostensibly because Ghanaians 
allegedly do not have the habit of "political giving."26 They make 
annual donations to their churches; but very few send money to their 
local party organizations or to the candidates.
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How does one resolve the paucity of funds available to political parties 
in Ghana and their heavy reliance, therefore, on individual contribu­
tions? First, the political parties themselves must make some effort to 
broaden the base of contributors. Scholars of party finance27 recognize 
that the development of a flow of regular contribution from large 
numbers of relatively small contributors would free parties from the 
//importunities,, of those who give large sums when the party coffer is 
empty and also permit more orderly planning and conduct of party 
activities. In this connection, the decentralization of the structure and 
machinery of political parties should be vigorously pursued to ensure 
transparency and accountability. Like the national government, the 
structure of parties in Ghana over the years had been centralized to the 
point that the parties did not find "grassroots" fund raising drives 
profitable as a means of whipping up political enthusiasm. Decentrali­
zation of the structure of the parties will also promote political education 
of the "grassroots" to pay their membership subscriptions, which will 
broaden the base of party funding.
Second, the possibility of state financial subsidies to the parties 
in the form of block grants should be explored. State subvention to 
parties and the cost of electoral campaigns have been successfully 
introduced in about two dozen countries, including, Germany and 
Puerto Rico.28 State subsidies may not only minimize corruption but 
may also enable the parties to concentrate upon the recruitment of 
new members and on political education rather than the time-wast­
ing task of fun-raising. State subsidies however are not only expen­
sive but also make the parties bureaucratic and unresponsive to the 
demands and interests of members. It is also likely that state sub­
sidies will deter the collection of membership subscriptions by party 
organizations. Short of direct state subsidies for general campaign 
purposes, the provision of "free" (or more accurately paid-for-out- 
of government funds) time for political parties on radio and 
television may be considered. This will enable all parties to have 
equal access to the media.
A national foundation may be established by the state to raise 
funds both internally and externally for distribution to the parties, 
his foundation should be a corporate entity and independent of the 
government of the day. The justification for such a foundation is to 
;reatly reduce the financial gap between the parties. State income tax
Measures to Improve Financial Standing of Political Parties
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laws may also be amended to grant tax incentives for political parties. 
For instance, a tax credit of up to £14 million may be granted on a 
political party's contributions returns with no "itemization of deduc­
tions," while an income deduction of up to £6 million be permitted on 
returns with "itemized deductions." Tax incentives are, however 
worthless unless the parties have an effective machine for solicitation.29 
The merit behind this proposal is not only to aid the efforts of parties 
to lift themselves from financial difficulties but also to allow for 
deductions of "charitable" contributions and operating costs of the 
parties.30
Conclusion
What conclusions can we draw about the financing of political parties in 
Ghana? First, the cynical view that contribution to the funds of a 
political party is equivalent to a bribe at times matches the facts. Yet the 
significance of money in politics can be appreciated only by a view that 
places party finance in the total context of the political process. It is 
probably fair enough to say that men of wealth on the whole use money 
in politics to protect what they regard as their interests. Their votes are 
few in a regime of popular government and they build their "political 
defences" by the use of money. (Key, 1964; Heard 1960 Alexander 1961).
Such statements about the concern of moneyed interests 
in politics may be generally correct. That the unbridled dominance of 
money would run counter to the tenets of a democratic order may also 
be indisputable. But the pragmatic question about the power of money 
in politics may come down to one of how much power and how that 
power is used. The abuse of such power may go unchecked if account­
ability is not part of the political process. In other words, money has its 
power in politics but this power has its limits.
Furthermore, the role of contributors in influencing policies and 
actions of government must be regarded in a larger context than that of 
a contributor always buying a specific action or wanting something in 
return. Businessmen, for instance, may contribute to a party on the 
assumption that its general policy orientation will turn out to be sympa­
thetic to them. In effect, persons with political concerns give to their 
friends. When the chips are down on specific questions they hope to be 
treated favourably. Thus the pattern of contributions may be just one 
dimension of the variety of interest cluster around political parties.
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All these, however, are not to deny the fact that contributions to 
political parties in Ghana are mostly meant to purchase specific actions. 
A party or a candidate that encounters great difficulty in raising the 
money absolutely necessary to meet campaign expenses may be under 
an exceptionally strong pressure to make concrete commitments in 
exchange for financial support. The Ghanaian experience of financing 
political parties has shown that parties or candidates put themselves 
under obligation to do specific favours for contributors somewhat 
beyond the fringe of respectability. Finally, the way in which parties 
raise and spend money may also have a potentially adverse affect on 
political life in a number of ways. Unfortunately, political scientists 
have not found any agreed way to assess its actual impacts and there is 
much disagreement and confusion about the topic. The problem arises 
mainly because it is difficult to separate the influence of money from 
politics.
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of successfully building a democratic society in Ghana as 
well! as the role of political parties, the law and constitution, 
socio-political forces, culture, practices and processes in 
implementing this challenging national agenda.
The analyses are incisive, frank and compelling. This 
book should be read by all and sundry.
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